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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
flan	ca906f5ee4	docs: TrueNAS 26 is supported; record what has actually been run ... The README and how-it-works still said "TrueNAS 26: nested snapshots are not supported yet" and "the third is not fixed, and is why 26 reports BROKEN". Both shipped in v0.7.0 and are now false — exactly the kind of stale claim that misleads somebody deciding whether to trust this with their backups. Adds docs/verification.md: what has ACTUALLY been run, as opposed to what the support matrix proves. The matrix is static analysis — it shows the patch's assumptions still hold, which is a strictly weaker claim than "a backup ran and a restore came back". The new file records the three live tasks exercised on 25.10.4 (nested, nested+zvols, non-nested), the md5 of the file that came back out of B2, the real orphan the collector reclaimed from the pool, and what is NOT covered (24.10/25.04 unrun; master broken; no reboot on v0.7.0). The README now points at it, next to the matrix it qualifies. The how-it-works TrueNAS 26 section now explains the part that mattered: the public pool.* queries are not like-for-like replacements for the deleted private zfs.* ones — they apply a visibility policy hiding 84 of 270 datasets on a real pool, including live app data — and the rule the module now follows (read the truth from ZFS, make changes through middleware). Plus the divergence nothing warned about: 26 decides `recursive` by a different rule than this patch decides `nested`, which orphaned one snapshot per zvol on every run until ownership of the sweep was made unconditional.	2026-07-14 02:22:36 +00:00
flan	30b9f18166	release v0.7.0 v0.7.0 v0.7.0-rc1	2026-07-14 01:45:23 +00:00
flan	908b6e9f22	merge: TrueNAS 26 support ... Enumerate datasets and snapshots from ZFS, not middleware's filtered queries; own the snapshot sweep unconditionally (TrueNAS 26 decides "recursive" by a different rule than we decide "nested"); resolve the snapshot namespace at runtime by the same predicate tools/compat.py checks. Four adversarial audits, every finding fixed and mutation-pinned. Verified on a real TrueNAS 26.0.0-BETA.1 install: 292-dataset backup, 0 orphans, 0 leaked mounts, byte-identical restore of a four-level-deep child dataset that middleware's own API hides.	2026-07-14 01:44:44 +00:00
flan	df412eeff7	test: make three vacuous tests actually test something; drop one duplicate ... The test suite is not bloated -- 3,701 lines of test code against 3,760 lines of product code, one duplicate pair in 356 tests, 8% single-assertion tests. The waste was not volume, it was four tests that looked like coverage and provided none: - test_parents_are_mounted_before_children: the fixture was already in depth order, so the sort it exists for was never exercised. Deleting `mounts.sort(key=_depth)` passed the whole suite. It now uses datasets whose NAME order differs from their MOUNTPOINT depth, which is the only case the sort is for. - test_it_NEVER_touches_the_current_run: the "current" snapshot was a minute old, so the age floor excluded it regardless and the same-snapname guard never ran. That guard only matters for a run that OUTLIVES the floor -- which a first full upload easily does, and where collecting it would yank the snapshot out from under a backup that is still reading from it. Now tested with a 12-hour-old current run. - the fingerprint/unknown test put the unreadable file in `providers`, which is not broken -- so fingerprint() skipped the whole module via is_broken() and the filter under test never executed. The blip has to land in the module that IS broken. - test_the_real_truenas_versions was a byte-identical copy of test_async_middleware_is_detected under a name promising more. Replaced with the fact actually worth pinning: the flavour probe must read STOCK source, because apply.sh re-runs on an already-patched overlay and our own SNAPSHOT_SYNC block is a plain `def create_snapshot` -- reading it would report a 25.10 box as synchronous and inject the wrong wrapper. All four now fail when the code they name is broken.	2026-07-14 01:41:25 +00:00
flan	086b20ed23	fix: fourth audit — two regressions from the last fix, and the boot preflight had no test ... Two of these were mine, from the previous round. - mounted_snapshots still swallowed OSError. I said I had fixed it and had not: the edit never matched, and I did not read it back. With the mount table unreadable the GC loses its in-use protection entirely and can destroy the snapshots of a backup that is still uploading (a first upload easily outlives the 1h age floor). It raises now, and both behaviours are tested. - The foreign-dataset check added last round had two bugs of its own. It ignored `mounted`, so a locked/encrypted dataset from a sibling tree turned a working nightly backup into a permanent failure — it belongs in `skipped`, exactly as an in-tree one does. And it tested `mp.startswith(path + "/")`, so a foreign dataset mounted EXACTLY at the backup path slipped through — the very hole the check was added to close, one character wide, and the worse case of the two because it SHADOWS the base dataset's own directory. - _read_sidecar's new raise broke cleanup_all, which is what recover.sh and uninstall.sh call — i.e. the code that must work when the box is ALREADY stuck. One unreadable sidecar aborted it before it unmounted anything, leaving the staging tree mounted, which pins the snapshots, which is the state recover.sh exists to escape. It now reports and carries on — and does not delete a record it could not read. - compat could report a FALSE OK: `defined` was collected by walking the whole file, so any function named `delete` anywhere in it — on an unrelated class, or nested inside another method — satisfied "this namespace defines delete". The runtime is stricter (a plugin class on the service's MRO), so the two could disagree in the ok direction. compat now looks in the class that declares the namespace. Same question on both sides, which is what pick_snapshot_service's docstring has been claiming all along. - apply.sh's compat preflight — the guard that refuses to patch a middleware whose assumptions no longer hold, on every boot, on a live NAS — had no test at all. It could be turned into a no-op eight different ways with the suite still green. The SHIPPED heredoc is now extracted and driven directly against fake verdicts. Also pinned: the Tap/Tap2 prefix collisions (a sweep that treats "Tap2/data@snap" as part of Tap's tree DESTROYS another pool's snapshot), and the GC's in_use wiring. 355 tests. Verified on TrueNAS 26.0.0-BETA.1: 292-dataset backup, 0 orphans, 0 leaked mounts, byte-identical restore of a 4-deep child dataset.	2026-07-14 01:34:13 +00:00
flan	677c90481c	docs: record the third-audit findings in the changelog	2026-07-14 00:39:40 +00:00
flan	8a41d7d7ef	fix: third audit — a cross-tree dataset was omitted silently, and the block tests passed on comments ... D1, the only cardinal-rule violation left. plan_staging scopes by dataset NAME, which is right (a dataset with no mountpoint cannot be scoped by path). But ZFS lets any dataset mount anywhere, so one from a DIFFERENT tree can sit inside the backup path: Tank/photos mountpoint=/mnt/Tap/apps/photos It holds data inside the path, and `zfs snapshot -r Tap@...` does NOT cover it — recursion follows the dataset tree, not the directory tree. It fell out of the name filter and vanished: not staged, not in `skipped`, no error. The backup reported SUCCESS with that data missing. Stock has the same blind spot but refuses the nested config outright; we are the ones relaxing that guard, so the hole is ours. It now raises. The test suite was the real weakness. apply.sh's injected blocks carry the highest-consequence logic in the project — the run_in_thread hop, the flavour selection, the finally-teardown, the re-raise — and were guarded only by substring greps. Two of them passed on COMMENTS: `assert "raise" in block` was satisfied by a comment reading "a cleanup that raises...", and `assert "cleanup_task" in block` by "cleanup_task gets logger=None". Deleting the actual re-raise (restic then backs up the UN-STAGED path — the silently-empty backup this module exists to prevent) and deleting the actual cleanup call from the finally (~250 orphans per run) both left the suite green. They are asserted structurally now, against the parsed block. Eleven regressions the audit found surviving now fail the suite, including: a swallowed staging failure, a missing teardown, an inverted flavour mapping, blocking work back on the asyncio event loop, the host's deleted get_dataset_recursive, query_filesystems quietly preferring the filtered middleware query, and a re-frozen `runner`/`sleep`/ `mounts_file` default (which would silently re-arm 19 tests reading the real mount table on the NAS). Also: _read_sidecar conflated "no sidecar" with "cannot read the sidecar", so cleanup_task took the empty branch and UNLINKED the only record of a tree it could not read. mounted_snapshots returned an empty set on error, silently switching off the GC's protection for snapshots a concurrent run is using. Both raise now. Verified on TrueNAS 26.0.0-BETA.1: zvol-orphan case 0 orphans, 292-dataset backup 0 orphans / 0 leaked mounts, byte-identical restore of a 4-deep child dataset.	2026-07-14 00:38:45 +00:00
flan	0fea5c40bd	docs: record the second-audit findings in the changelog	2026-07-14 00:21:06 +00:00
flan	ce6998a935	fix: second audit — the delete check did nothing on a real box, and five guards were untestable ... The most important finding is that the FIRST audit's fix was wrong. _can_delete() asked `callable(getattr(service, "delete"))`. But CRUDService defines `delete` on the BASE class and dispatches to self.do_delete at call time, so a bound `delete` exists on every CRUDService subclass whether or not it still implements one. The check was therefore answering "is this a CRUDService?" — precisely the weaker "is the namespace registered?" question its own docstring said must never be asked. It would still have picked a gutted pool.snapshot and failed every delete. It now walks the MRO and ignores middlewared.service.* plumbing, so only a PLUGIN class defining delete/do_delete counts. The test double was equally wrong: it modelled a gutted service as object(), a shape middlewared cannot produce, so the test passed against a fake it could never have caught in the field. It is now CRUDService-shaped. Also: - The recursive delete's fast path returned [] without confirming anything was destroyed. A delete that returns cleanly is not proof — iX has already gutted pool.snapshot.do_update on master into a no-op that returns None. cleanup_task read "no survivors" as a clean sweep, dropped the sidecar (the only record), and would have orphaned ~250 snapshots per run, silently. It confirms against ZFS now, and the by-name sweep trusts ZFS rather than the API's return value. - When ZFS cannot be read, the sweep no longer claims success. The two mistakes are not symmetric: a false survivor self-heals (sidecar kept, next run reclaims, record clears), a lost record does not. - _write_sidecar swallowed OSError. The sidecar is the only record the snapshots exist; failing to write it must never be invisible. - stage_nested now refuses UP FRONT when middleware has no usable snapshot delete, rather than discovering it after restic has already run. Tests. The autouse fixture added in the last commit did not work: `runner=_run`, `mounts_file="/proc/self/mounts"` and `sleep=time.sleep` are frozen into __defaults__ at def time, so monkeypatching the module attribute never reached them. 19 tests were still reading the real mount table — one matching name from running a real `umount` on the NAS — and the retry loop really slept. All three are late-bound now; the suite reads nothing outside tmp_path and runs in 1.1s. Every mutation the audit reported as SURVIVING now fails the suite: the naive delete check, the unconfirmed fast path, the malformed-row guard, a disconnected GC, eager service resolution, compat's method check, compat's unknown handling, a single-quoted filtered query in apply.sh, and the get-service assumption. Also: fingerprint() folded `unknown` problems into a broken module, so one transient 429 rewrote the bug report and the next clean run rewrote it back. Problems are state-tagged; only definite breakage is digested. Verified on TrueNAS 26.0.0-BETA.1: zvol-orphan case 0 orphans, 292-dataset backup 0 orphans / 0 leaked mounts / 0 stale sidecars, byte-identical restore of a 4-deep child dataset.	2026-07-14 00:10:10 +00:00
flan	928d0d1973	refactor: one seam for snapshots — read from ZFS, mutate through middleware ... `middleware` and the ZFS reader were being threaded through five functions as a pair, and the snapshot namespace was re-resolved in each of them. That is one collaborator, not two. _Snapshots owns both, resolves the namespace lazily (so the read-only paths do not raise over a mutation they never make), and makes the rule the module rests on structural instead of a comment people have to remember. Deliberately internal: apply.sh injects calls to the public functions into middlewared itself, so their signatures are a boot-time contract with a live NAS and are not worth churning for tidiness. Verified on TrueNAS 26.0.0-BETA.1 after the change: 292-dataset backup, 0 orphans, 0 leaked mounts, byte-identical restore of a 4-deep child dataset.	2026-07-13 23:33:30 +00:00
flan	413cd60ed4	fix: own the snapshot sweep unconditionally; align the runtime and the manifest ... Four audits of the TrueNAS 26 branch. The findings, in severity order. 1. TrueNAS 26 orphaned a snapshot on every run, with no backstop. Stock decides `recursive` by its own rule, and on 26 that rule is no longer ours. <= 25.10 its create_snapshot called get_dataset_recursive() — the same function this module vendors — so "stock went recursive" and "we have something to stage" were the same question. 26 uses filesystem.statfs: recursive = (path == the dataset's mountpoint). A dataset whose only descendants are ZVOLs or legacy/none-mountpoint datasets now gets a RECURSIVE snapshot while the patch sees nothing to stage. The patch then handed the snapshot back to stock, which destroys the parent only. No staging tree meant no sidecar, and the GC only ever ran from stage_nested — so nothing on the box would ever have found the children. Reproduced on the VM: one orphan per zvol, every run, forever, backup green. Ownership of the sweep is no longer conditional on staging (own_snapshot()). 2. The runtime resolved a NAMESPACE; compat.py verified a METHOD. get_service() only proves a namespace is registered. compat checks the namespace AND that it defines delete/do_delete. So if iX guts the method but keeps the service — which they have already done to pool.snapshot.do_update on master — compat falls through to zfs.snapshot and reports the box healthy, while the runtime picks pool.snapshot and fails every delete. Both sides now ask "can this namespace delete?", and a test binds the two lists together. 3. query_filesystems() silently dropped malformed rows — the one remaining silent-omission path, and a direct contradiction of the cardinal rule. It raises now. A missing `zfs` binary raised FileNotFoundError rather than ZfsError; also fixed. 4. The retry loop discarded the delete error and reported every survivor as "(still busy?)" — naming the one cause that is benign and hiding the ones that are permanent. It keeps and reports the real error. Also: the staging-failure handler could lose the original exception if its own sweep raised; get_service is now a checked assumption; normalise_dataset and two dead MiddlewareCall properties removed; stale comments corrected. Tests: five of them were shelling out to the REAL pool (`zfs list -r Tap`, 2148 snapshots) and passed here only because this box has no zfs binary — they would have gone red on the NAS, which is the one machine the release process requires them green on. An autouse fixture now makes that impossible. Mutation-tested: reverting any of the five fixes above now fails the suite; before, all 293 passed. Verified on TrueNAS 26.0.0-BETA.1 (zvol leak reproduced, then closed; 292-dataset backup, 0 orphans, byte-identical restore of a 4-deep hidden dataset) and on 25.10.4 (pool.snapshot.delete honours recursive=True).	2026-07-13 23:30:48 +00:00
flan	605231b39f	feat: TrueNAS 26 support; enumerate datasets and snapshots from ZFS, not middleware ... TrueNAS 26 deletes plugins/zfs_/ outright, taking the private zfs.dataset.query, zfs.snapshot.query and zfs.snapshot.delete with it. All three were on the nested module's critical path, so nested snapshots were BROKEN on 26. Snapshot deletion now resolves its namespace at runtime: pool.snapshot on 25.10 and 26, zfs.snapshot on 24.10 and 25.04. No single namespace spans every supported release. tools/compat.py checks the same list the runtime uses, so what CI verifies and what runs cannot drift apart. Enumeration does NOT move to pool.dataset.query / pool.snapshot.query, and that is the point of this commit. Those methods exist, are documented, and are covered by iX's deprecation policy — and they are not like-for-like replacements. They apply a visibility policy that hides ix-apps/*, .system/* and .ix-virt/*: 84 of 270 datasets on a real pool, including live application data. Staging from that view omits them silently, and plan_staging never sees them, so they do not even reach the skipped list. The snapshot query hides the same datasets' snapshots, so the sweep orphans one per hidden dataset on every run. So: read the truth from ZFS, make changes through middleware. zfs list cannot be filtered by policy and behaves identically on every release. A failing zfs list raises rather than returning an empty list — "no datasets" and "the command broke" must never look the same. No shipped release is affected: v0.6.1 and earlier use the private zfs.dataset.query, which returns all 270 datasets. The bug existed only in this port. Verified on a real TrueNAS 26.0.0-BETA.1 install: 274-snapshot recursive backup of a 292-dataset pool, zero orphaned snapshots, zero leaked mounts, and a byte-identical restore of a four-level-deep child dataset that pool.dataset.query hides.	2026-07-13 22:43:20 +00:00
flan	7cc0826c2c	The matrix bot would never have worked: wrong permissions, wrong forge ... Two bugs, both of which would have failed silently on the first scheduled run: - permissions were while the step pushes a branch and opens a PR. It would have died with a 403 and I would have had a bot that never worked. - it opened the PR on GITHUB, which is a one-way MIRROR. A PR merged there would be clobbered by the next fleet-repos mirror push from Gitea. A bot opening PRs against a mirror is a bot doing nothing, slowly. Now: contents+pull-requests write, and the PR is opened on Gitea (canonical) via its API. One long-lived PR, force-pushed in place -- a daily PR is the same mistake as a daily comment, wearing a hat. v0.6.1-rc2 v0.6.1	2026-07-13 20:28:30 +00:00
flan	82084b6806	The bug-report bot was spamming; make it say something only when there is something to say ... It commented on every run that found a break. In one day it left ELEVEN identical 3,000-character comments on the same issue. That is not a warning system, it is a mute button with extra steps -- and the next real finding would have been scrolled past, which defeats the entire reason for building it. Now: the issue BODY is the current truth, edited in place. COMMENTS are a changelog of changes. A fingerprint of the findings (broken ref/module/problem triples only) is embedded in the body; a run whose findings match it says nothing at all. It closes the issue when everything is fixed. The fingerprint deliberately ignores anything that moves on its own -- healthy rows, the hardware-verified column, TrueNAS point releases -- so TS-25.10.4 becoming TS-25.10.5 is not news and does not wake anybody up. Also: - The two near-identical per-forge shell steps are gone, replaced by one tested implementation (tools/compat_publish.py). Two copies of 'find the issue, decide whether to comment' is two chances to drift, and the Gitea one duplicated an issue for real. - The README matrix refresh now opens a PULL REQUEST instead of pushing straight to main from CI. An unattended push to main is exactly what the release barrier exists to prevent: a bot that can move main can move it somewhere nobody looked.	2026-07-13 20:20:35 +00:00
flan	c6b252ac6b	release v0.6.1 v0.6.1-rc1	2026-07-13 19:59:38 +00:00
flan	841e0364fd	CHANGELOG: repair a section spliced into the middle of a bullet, and guard it ... An edit matched the literal '## Unreleased' inside a backticked phrase in a prose bullet and spliced a whole new section into the middle of it, splitting the sentence in half. The release body IS this file, so that would have shipped to every user. Tests now assert: no empty version section, versions descend, no heading is indented inside a list item, and every bullet's bold phrases are balanced (ignoring code spans -- '*args, **kwargs' is a literal, not markup).	2026-07-13 19:59:35 +00:00
flan	0d04c2cd1c	Collect orphaned snapshots by name: the sidecar lives in tmpfs ... A reboot mid-backup orphaned the entire tree, permanently. The sidecar is the record of which snapshots a run pinned -- and /run is tmpfs. A reboot or crash between the recursive snapshot and its cleanup destroyed that record, leaving one snapshot per descendant dataset (250+ on a real pool) with nothing pointing at them. Nothing would ever have found them. gc_stale_snapshots() identifies leftovers by NAME, so it works when the record is gone. It runs after the sidecar reclaim -- the recorded path stays authoritative and the collector only mops up what the record lost. It deletes data on a name match, which is a weaker claim than a recorded fact, so the selection is a pure function with the harshest tests here. A snapshot is collected only if the name is exactly <dataset>@<task>-<YYYYMMDDHHMMSS>, it is not the current run's, NOTHING IS MOUNTED FROM IT (this, not the age guard, is what protects a concurrent backup), and it is over an hour old. Checked against the real pool: of 4728 snapshots including 2341 periodic ones, it selects exactly the orphans of the task being run and nothing else.	2026-07-13 19:56:32 +00:00
flan	2b8ef107f7	The sidecar must carry EVERY pending tree, not just the newest ... Found live, in the code written to prevent exactly this. The sidecar held ONE snapshot. So a run that reclaimed an older tree, failed to finish reclaiming it, and then recorded its own snapshot OVERWROTE the only record of the survivor -- orphaning it permanently. Observed: job 24 left one snapshot busy and kept the sidecar (correct). Job 46 reclaimed it, hit ZFS's 300s automount window (the runs were minutes apart), left it behind again, and then wrote its own snapshot over the record. Permanent orphan, created by the safety net. The sidecar is now a list. stage_nested carries forward whatever a reclaim could not delete; cleanup_task sweeps every pending tree and writes back only the survivors. cleanup_all reports them one per line instead of formatting a list into an f-string at the user during uninstall. Job 46 also confirms the automount fix itself: it swept all 256 of its own snapshots with no straggler. v0.6.0-rc6 v0.6.0	2026-07-13 19:35:44 +00:00
flan	b50567e9a7	A few snapshots leaked on every nested run, forever ... Found on real hardware: a 256-snapshot backup of /mnt/Tap swept 253 and left 3 with 'dataset is busy'. ZFS AUTOMOUNTS <dataset>/.zfs/snapshot/<snap> when it is read, and keeps it mounted for zfs_expire_snapshot seconds (300 default) after the last access. teardown() unmounts OUR bind mounts but not the automount underneath, so zfs destroy refuses for exactly the datasets restic read most recently. cleanup_task() then removed the sidecar anyway -- destroying the only record those snapshots existed. Nothing would ever have reclaimed them. - release_snapdirs() unmounts ZFS's own automounts (deepest first) before deleting. - delete_snapshot_tree() retries the transient busy and RETURNS what it could not delete, instead of swallowing it. - The sidecar is removed only on a confirmed-clean sweep -- including on the staging-failure path, which used to remove it before the caller swept. A sidecar left behind when the tree is gone costs one no-op delete; a sidecar removed while the tree exists is unrecoverable. v0.6.0-rc5	2026-07-13 19:18:22 +00:00
flan	1b2407f6e2	compat: dedup the bug report deterministically (lowest issue number wins) ... Two issues with the same title already existed -- the old title embedded the list of broken refs, so the issue's identity changed whenever that set changed. With an order-dependent pick the bot would alternate between them, reopening one and commenting on the other. Lowest number is stable regardless of how the API sorts.	2026-07-13 19:08:27 +00:00
flan	ab0b66c47d	compat: the bug-report title must be stable across ref-set changes ... The title embedded the list of broken refs, so the issue's identity changed whenever that set changed -- and it did: when the async/sync port briefly made 26 look green, the next run filed a SECOND issue for 'master' alone. A bot that spawns duplicates gets muted, and then it is not a warning system any more. The title is now fixed; the refs live in the body, which gets updated in place.	2026-07-13 19:02:57 +00:00
flan	469a2e4651	Installing the patch permanently blocked updating it ... install.sh chmod +x's update.sh, and git recorded update.sh as 100644 -- so the chmod was a TRACKED modification, and update.sh refuses to run over a dirty tree. Install once and you could never update again. The error even told you to 'git checkout -- .', which just undoes the exec bit so the next install can re-dirty it. Found on the real box, which had been sitting on v0.4.1 for exactly this reason. Fixed on both sides: the scripts install.sh chmods are executable in git (so the chmod is a no-op), and update.sh's dirty check now looks at CONTENT, not mode -- git diff --numstat reports 0 0 for a mode-only change. A test asserts every script in install.sh's chmod loop is already 100755 in git. v0.6.0-rc4	2026-07-13 18:58:46 +00:00
flan	518a22d87e	docs: user-facing URLs point at GitHub, the user-facing repo ... Gitea is canonical for development; GitHub is where users clone from and where the box's read-only checkout points. The install instructions, the re-clone hint and the 'file an issue' link are all read by users, so they name GitHub. docs/releasing.md still names Gitea, because that is a contributor doc about where the code is pushed. v0.6.0-rc3	2026-07-13 18:42:44 +00:00
flan	8c1b4c45f5	release: rc notes resolve to the base version; publish without jq ... release_notes.py 'notes v0.6.0-rc1' looked for a CHANGELOG section literally named v0.6.0-rc1. check() already used base_version(); extract_notes() did not. So the release workflow cut the tag, passed every gate, and then died extracting the body -- the candidate existed but was never published. Caught in an rc, which is the entire point of having them. Also: the Gitea publish and issue steps used jq, which is not guaranteed on a self-hosted runner. A publish step that dies on a missing tool leaves a tag with no release behind it, and a bug report that dies on one is a warning system that does not warn. Both now use python3, which setup-python guarantees. v0.6.0-rc2	2026-07-13 18:38:02 +00:00
flan	c250bc8f5d	release v0.6.0 v0.6.0-rc1	2026-07-13 18:35:14 +00:00
flan	1c46ef66b0	CHANGELOG: merge the duplicate Added/Fixed sections in Unreleased ... Incremental edits had produced two of each. The release body IS this section, so a duplicated heading is what users would have read.	2026-07-13 18:35:11 +00:00
flan	252696f1de	docs: split the 969-line README; put Install at the top ... Install was at line 517 of 969, under the boot sequence, the snapshot lifecycle and the release process. Someone deciding whether to trust this with their backups should not have to scroll past any of that. README is now 211 lines: what it does, the minimum version, install, the support matrix, updating, uninstall. Everything else moved to docs/ (nested snapshots, how it works, recovery, CLI, releasing). A test enforces it: every internal link resolves, Install stays near the top, and the README does not grow back. Moving Markdown breaks cross-references -- it broke eight of them here, including one in a recovery doc, where the person following the link is by definition already having a bad day.	2026-07-13 18:34:44 +00:00
flan	a1e31e9c0a	CHANGELOG: the barrier does not check the candidate's CI run ... That gate was removed as redundant -- the release job re-runs the full suite against the tagged commit, and release_gate proves a candidate points at it. The notes described a check that does not exist.	2026-07-13 18:30:59 +00:00
flan	a54b4dd7f6	Never touch CloudSync tasks; restore the logger the async cleanup path dropped ... create_snapshot is module-global in plugins/cloud/snapshot.py, and cloud_sync.py imports it as well as cloud_backup/sync.py. So the wrapper sat in the path of every rclone/Storj CloudSync task with snapshot=true, and ran a zfs.dataset.query before concluding it had nothing to do -- a new failure mode for jobs that worked before this patch existed. Worse: a CloudSync task that ever got staged would never be torn down. The teardown is wired into cloud_backup's restic_backup finally, and CRUD_BLOCK deliberately leaves CloudSync's guard intact, so the bind mounts would pin the snapshot forever. The staging path now bails out unless the snapshot is named cloud_backup-*, before any middleware call. Separately: the async wrapper's finally dropped logger=, which the sync one passes. run_in_thread forwards **kwargs, so a cleanup that failed to unmount a bind mount or delete a snapshot tree logged nothing at all -- on the only platform anyone runs.	2026-07-13 18:30:35 +00:00
flan	ecb64878ff	compat: check the middlewared METHODS we call, not just the symbols we wrap ... This gap was hiding a catastrophe. TrueNAS 26 deletes plugins/zfs_/dataset.py and plugins/zfs_/snapshot.py outright, taking zfs.dataset.query, zfs.snapshot.query and zfs.snapshot.delete with them (26 uses filesystem.statfs and zfs.resource.*). Nothing about the five cloud_backup files reveals that, so every other check went green -- including the one I had just added. The patch would have applied cleanly and then failed on the first backup, or worse: snapshotted fine and failed to DELETE, orphaning one snapshot per descendant dataset (250 on a real pool) on every run, forever. So 26 is BROKEN and the nested module will not apply there. The async/sync wrapper work and the vendored get_dataset_recursive stay -- they are correct and necessary -- but 26 is not supported until the ZFS calls are ported, and that needs a real 26 box to verify. Shipping a port nobody has run is the failure this project exists to avoid. Also: do_delete is recognised as delete (24.10/25.04 use the CRUDService convention), which was reporting both as BROKEN -- a false verdict that would have disabled nested snapshots on boxes where they work.	2026-07-13 18:25:14 +00:00
flan	498b2690e1	TrueNAS 26 support: one sync implementation, two wrappers ... 26 rewrites cloud_backup from async to synchronous AND deletes get_dataset_recursive(), which SNAPSHOT_BLOCK called out of the host module's namespace. Either is a broken backup found at restore time. The nested module is now one synchronous implementation talking to middlewared via call_sync, behind two thin wrappers. apply.sh reads which flavour the installed middleware declares and injects the matching one: <= 25.10 reaches it through 'await middleware.run_in_thread(...)', 26 is already in a worker thread and calls it directly. The snapshot/bind-mount/failure logic exists once -- an async twin would mean every future fix had to land twice. A middleware whose three wrapped functions disagree about asyncness is refused, not guessed at. get_dataset_recursive is vendored, removing the dependency on both versions rather than asserting it. master stays BROKEN on purpose: iX are still renaming middleware->context, cloud_backup->entry and adding a required credentials param there. Chasing a branch that moves daily is how you ship a patch nobody tested.	2026-07-13 18:18:28 +00:00
flan	cf2c6a8a02	README: state and enforce the 24.10 minimum; document the compat preflight ... TrueCloud Backup does not exist before 24.10, so on anything older the patch would attach to nothing and do nothing -- silently, while the user believed their backups were set up. install.sh now reads system.version and refuses, naming the reason. Also: the boot sequence now documents the preflight (and that an incompatible module is skipped for one boot, NOT kill-switched); the troubleshooting table covers the incompatibility warning; forge URLs point at Gitea.	2026-07-13 18:09:23 +00:00
flan	aa725fb198	Pin the two native probes against drift ... The split-literal squash is implemented twice: inline in apply.sh's runtime probe and as compat._squash in the static checker. That subtlety already caused one silent bug (the probe concluded iX had removed the nesting guard, which means 'retire the module'). Both are now exercised against the same inputs, including the split-across-literals form stock actually uses.	2026-07-13 17:59:27 +00:00
flan	ea090c7f72	Audit fixes: a compat verdict must never be able to brick a working box ... The audit found the new machinery could do more harm than the bugs it prevents. - apply.sh reused the 'nothing left to do' exit -- which touches the PERMANENT kill switch, cleared only by install.sh, never by update.sh -- for the incompatible case. On TrueNAS 26 (providers ok, nested opt-out) both modules go quiet, so the switch would fire and the release that fixed 26 could never re-enable itself. Retirement and incompatibility now take different exits. - A network blip, a re-export, or a conditional def all read as BROKEN. Each is now 'unknown', which changes nothing, rather than evidence strong enough to disable a module. - 'native' outranked BROKEN everywhere but apply.sh, so a TrueNAS that reworded the guard AND reshaped the functions rendered as good news. - compat.py --tree read B2_BLOCK's own 'restic = True' as native support, so the documented way to check a live box lied on every patched machine. - The signature check was a name-subset test. It passed reorders, kw-only conversions, and added required params -- and it had already passed a real bug: restic_backup takes 4 args on 24.10/25.04, and the wrapper forwarded 5. Nested backups have been raising TypeError on those releases the whole time. The wrapper now forwards *args/**kwargs. - release.sh --promote was unreachable: it died if the tag existed, the gate died if it did not. The tests hid it by always tagging first.	2026-07-13 17:58:15 +00:00
flan	f927773f81	docs: TrueNAS compatibility matrix and the two-stage release process ... The matrix is regenerated daily by CI rather than typed once and forgotten — a support table that quietly goes stale is a false promise to someone deciding whether to trust this with their backups.	2026-07-13 17:35:03 +00:00
flan	cd39489c7f	compat/release: stop interpolating ${{ }} into run: bodies ... The report body is full of backticks, so 'echo "${{ steps.report.outputs.body }}"' pasted it into the shell text and bash executed create-snapshot, def and async as commands. The report is built from iX's middleware source, so that was an injection vector as well as a bug. inputs.tag on workflow_dispatch had the same shape. Data goes through files, scalars through env:. Tests enforce it across every workflow.	2026-07-13 17:30:50 +00:00
flan	9236aa0034	apply.sh: fix the compat preflight heredoc closing its own command substitution ... The trailing ) ended $( on the same line, so the Python body parsed as shell and the real closer was unmatched. Caught by shellcheck in CI (SC1089).	2026-07-13 17:27:41 +00:00
flan	5cbb7def6f	Compatibility watch: check the patch's assumptions against every TrueNAS release line ... TrueNAS 26 rewrites cloud_backup from async to sync. Every block the nested module injects is an async wrapper around an awaited original, so on 26 it hands sync.py a coroutine where it unpacks a tuple. tools/compat.py records what each module assumes and checks it two ways: CI runs it against iX's source at every release line (including master and the current BETA) and files a bug report when an unreleased line breaks; apply.sh runs it against the middlewared actually installed and refuses to apply a module whose assumptions no longer hold. Stock TrueNAS without a feature beats TrueNAS with a broken one. Workflows run on both forges; only the release/issue API calls differ.	2026-07-13 17:25:37 +00:00
flan	4ced730d65	Make Gitea canonical; derive the changelog URL from the remote instead of hard-coding GitHub	2026-07-13 17:21:30 +00:00
flan	8a82bde531	noqa placement: ruff anchors S607 to the args list, not the call	2026-07-13 16:53:59 +00:00
flan	0e9e22da18	Annotate the two remaining static-analysis findings in alert_source.py ... subprocess is called in list form with only literal arguments -- nothing user-supplied reaches the command line -- and the partial `git` path is moot in a module that only ever runs as root inside middlewared. Deliberately NOT tagged: this changes no behaviour, and cutting a release for two noqa comments would raise an update alert on every user's box. main sits one commit ahead of v0.5.1 until the next real change -- which is exactly the restraint the alert's docs-only rule exists to encode.	2026-07-13 16:53:08 +00:00
flan	bf6d37e621	v0.5.1: the update alert could have broken middlewared at startup ... middlewared's alert.load() imports every file in alert/source/ with NO try/except: def load(self): for module in load_modules(.../alert/source): for cls in load_classes(module, AlertSource, (ThreadedAlertSource,)): ... and it runs during setup. A module that raises on import therefore takes middlewared's startup down with it -- exactly the class of failure this project exists to avoid. apply.sh now COMPILES the substituted alert source and refuses to write it if it does not parse. An uninstalled alert is a missing convenience; a broken one is a broken box. @PATCH_DIR@ is also substituted with repr() rather than raw, so a repository path containing a quote or backslash yields a valid Python literal instead of a syntax error in the installed module. The alert source no longer mutates sys.path. It loaded tools/release_notes.py via sys.path.insert(0, ...), which shadows the stdlib for that interpreter -- and ThreadedAlertSource runs in middlewared's thread pool, so mutating sys.path is a race. It now loads by file path with importlib. New tests guard every import-time failure mode: the module compiles, apply.sh compiles before writing, awkward paths (quotes, backslashes) still produce valid modules, nothing but imports/constants/classes runs at module scope, every AlertClass name ends in "AlertClass" (AlertClassMeta raises NameError otherwise), the alert text placeholders match the args passed, and no git command that writes to .git is ever used. 152 tests, ruff and shellcheck -S style clean. v0.5.1	2026-07-13 16:52:23 +00:00
flan	4e0814028c	v0.5.0: TrueNAS alert when an update is available ... Raises a real alert in the TrueNAS UI bell -- not a log line nobody reads. On by default, checked once a day. install.sh --no-update-alerts turns it off. It does not nag --------------- A release whose CHANGELOG contains only a "### Docs" section changed no code and raises nothing. Anything else raises INFO; a "### Security" section raises WARNING. The CHANGELOG's own section headings are the signal, and a security fix anywhere in the range escalates the whole span -- a docs-only release sitting on top of a security fix still reports as security rather than hiding it. Why an AlertSource and not midclt ---------------------------------- TrueNAS cannot raise an alert from the CLI. midclt exposes only alert.dismiss, alert.list, alert.list_categories, alert.list_policies and alert.restore -- alert CREATION is internal to middlewared, and none of its ~60 one-shot classes is generic enough to reuse. Registering an AlertSource is the only way. It is also the least invasive thing this patch does. The providers and nested modules both APPEND CODE TO STOCK middleware files; the alert source ADDS ONE FILE and modifies none. It is the native mechanism -- the same one every built-in TrueNAS alert uses -- and TrueNAS polls it itself, so there is no cron job and no systemd timer. - Fail-safe: every error path returns None; it cannot take middlewared down. - Read-only: `git ls-remote` plus an HTTPS fetch of the CHANGELOG. It never writes to .git, so it cannot leave root-owned objects behind the way a `git fetch` from middlewared (running as root) would. - Removed by uninstall.sh (mw_patch.revert_all). - It only tells you; it never updates anything. Verified against the real repo and remote, with middlewared stubbed: on v0.4.1, only a README-only v0.4.2 available -> NO ALERT on v0.4.0, v0.4.1 fixed real bugs -> INFO on v0.3.2, v0.3.3 was the password fix -> SECURITY / WARNING 139 tests, ruff and shellcheck -S style clean. v0.5.0	2026-07-13 16:45:26 +00:00
flan	345741e1f1	v0.4.2: README — document updating properly ... The Updating section told you to run update.sh, but never said how to GET it. It ships inside the patch, so any clone older than v0.4.0 does not have it -- the docs described a script the reader did not possess. There is now an explicit bootstrap step, including the fix for the "insufficient permission for adding an object to repository database" failure that past `sudo git pull`s leave behind. Rewrote "After a TrueNAS update". It never explained that apply.sh re-applies the patch at every boot (so you never reinstall), and it soft-pedalled what a failure costs: "fail-safe" means the BOX stays up, not that your backups keep running. A [FAIL] providers is a broken backup, and the docs now say that plainly instead of implying everything degrades gracefully. Added a repo map -- patch/mw_patch.py and tools/release_notes.py were documented nowhere -- and fixed `ruff check patch tests`, which skips tools/. Every command and file path in the README was then verified to exist and run: all five update.sh flags, the ruff/pytest commands, every file in the repo map, and the truecloud_nested.py cleanup CLI. 132 tests, ruff and shellcheck -S style clean. v0.4.2	2026-07-13 16:36:28 +00:00
flan	092bdeae29	v0.4.1: fix three real bugs in update.sh found by auditing it ... Release-candidate tags would have been installed as stable ----------------------------------------------------------- git's version sort ranks v0.5.0-rc1 ABOVE v0.5.0 (verified empirically), and the release workflow deliberately supports rc/beta/alpha tags. update.sh would have offered an RC as "the newest release". Tag selection is now filtered to plain vX.Y.Z. update.sh would have died mid-update on an untracked file ---------------------------------------------------------- The dirty-tree guard uses --untracked-files=no, so an untracked file that the TARGET tracks slips past it -- and `git checkout` then aborts. Under set -e the script died with a raw git error, after already recording the rollback point. Not hypothetical: a hand-copied patch/wait_restart.sh blocked a pull on a real box in exactly this way. It is now detected up front, by name. Gitignored files are correctly not treated as blockers, since git overwrites those silently. Special case: if update.sh ITSELF is the blocker, it was hand-copied in to bootstrap -- and "delete update.sh, then re-run update.sh" is impossible. It now says so and prints the git commands that bootstrap it properly. --rollback skipped that check entirely and would have hit the identical failure. The check is now a shared function used by both paths, and rollback also validates that the recorded revision still exists. Also: install.sh's chmod aborted under set -e if a listed file was missing (the file set changes between versions, so --rollback must not be killed by a name this version happens to know about), and --to with no value was silently ignored. Verified end to end in a throwaway clone: forward v0.4.1 -> v0.4.2 and rollback back, with files appearing and disappearing correctly; both guards fire. 132 tests, ruff and shellcheck -S style clean. v0.4.1	2026-07-13 16:30:50 +00:00
flan	347c415aa7	v0.4.0: add update.sh ... Fetch a newer release and apply it, preserving the nested-snapshot opt-in setting. bash update.sh # to the newest release, with a confirmation bash update.sh --check # show what would happen; change nothing bash update.sh --rollback # undo the last update Deliberately NOT automated. This patch injects Python into middlewared and re-applies itself at every boot, so an unattended pull would let any bad upstream commit reach a box with no human in the loop and take effect on the next reboot. v0.0.4 shipped exactly such a bug and took every app on the box down. The manual step is the safety gate. Design decisions worth keeping: - Defaults to the newest RELEASE TAG, not main. main can be mid-refactor; a tag is the tested artifact. --main exists but says so loudly. - Tags ordered by version, not date. Date order silently downgrades the box the first time a hotfix is tagged out of band: a v0.3.6 cut after v0.4.0 would sort as "newest". - Refuses to run over a dirty working tree rather than merging across hand-edited or scp'd files. (Verified: the guard fires.) - Shows the commits and release notes you do not have, read from the TARGET's CHANGELOG via tools/release_notes.py -- not a second copy of the extractor. - Records the previous revision BEFORE moving, so --rollback works even if install.sh dies halfway. - Repairs .git ownership, which past `sudo git pull`s leave root-owned and which then breaks every later non-root git command. update.sh is covered by the version-drift check, so it cannot go stale the way create_task.py's __version__ did. Tested end to end in a throwaway clone: detects v0.3.2 -> v0.3.5, lists missing commits, handles already-up-to-date, and the dirty-tree guard fires. 132 tests, ruff and shellcheck clean. v0.4.0	2026-07-13 16:20:37 +00:00
flan	45f957af23	v0.3.5: log the recursive-delete failure instead of swallowing it ... delete_snapshot_tree tries one recursive delete first, then falls back to sweeping the tree by name. The exception from the fast path was discarded. That failure is usually benign -- stock's finally already removed the parent once our mounts were released, which is exactly what the sweep exists to handle. But if the cause were anything else, this was the only place it was ever visible, and it went straight to /dev/null. The sweep would then report some different, downstream symptom. It is now logged before falling through. Also annotated the two remaining static-analysis findings as considered rather than leaving them to be re-litigated every audit: subprocess is always invoked in list form (no shell, so ZFS dataset names cannot inject), and a partial `systemctl` path is moot in a script that only ever runs as root. Extended ruleset (E,F,W,B,S,SIM,UP,C4,RET,ARG,A,ISC) and shellcheck -S style both report zero. 132 tests. v0.3.5	2026-07-13 16:06:12 +00:00
flan	126756498c	v0.3.4: one implementation of apply/revert (patch/mw_patch.py) ... The "strip the TRUECLOUD_PATCH block" logic existed twice -- in apply.sh's heredoc and in an inline heredoc in uninstall.sh -- and the uninstall copy was the untested one. That is precisely how the two could have drifted apart, with apply.sh reverting one set of files and uninstall.sh another. Both now call patch/mw_patch.py. 17 new tests cover it, including that revert_nested never touches restic.py: that file carries a TRUECLOUD_PATCH block too, but it belongs to the providers module, and removing it would silently break B2 backups. apply.sh imports it fail-safe -- on ImportError the backend patch is skipped and middlewared starts stock, which is this script's whole design principle. The import uses sys.path.append, never insert(0): prepending would give patch/ precedence over the stdlib for that interpreter, so a future patch/json.py would shadow the real json module and break the boot. Also: the README's create_task.py example still taught `--password <secret>`, which is how a security fix quietly fails to land. It now shows --password-stdin. 132 tests, ruff and shellcheck clean. v0.3.4	2026-07-13 16:02:53 +00:00
flan	60b3ac4557	v0.3.3: keep the restic repo password out of argv and shell history ... Security -------- create_task.py shelled out to `midclt call cloud_backup.create '<json>'`, and that JSON carries the restic repository password -- so it sat in the subprocess's argv, which is world-readable via ps, for the duration of the call. That password is the encryption key for the entire cloud backup repository. It now talks to the middleware through truenas_api_client, the library that backs midclt itself, so the password never leaves this process's memory. Verified on a live box: list-tasks and list-credentials work through the new transport. --password is also no longer required, because passing a secret as a CLI argument writes it to shell history permanently. --password-stdin reads it from stdin, and with neither flag the tool prompts via getpass. --password still works but warns. Fixed ----- uninstall.sh could leave every patch installed. It reverted by unmounting the overlay -- but apply.sh only mounts one when the target directory is read-only. On a writable /usr it patches the real files in place, and uninstall would remove the boot hook, report success, and leave the patch applied. It now strips the appended blocks from the middleware files explicitly. This also covers the case where the overlay unmount fails. create_task.py's __version__ had been stuck at 0.2.0 through three releases. The version-drift check added in v0.3.1 only looked at VERSION= in shell scripts, so it missed the one file that actually shows a version to users (--version). The check now covers __version__ too -- and caught this immediately. 118 tests, ruff and shellcheck clean. v0.3.3	2026-07-13 15:43:24 +00:00
flan	8aa9038226	Fix: --disable-nested-snapshots did not disable anything until reboot ... apply.sh only ever ADDED patches; there was no revert path anywhere. Disabling removed the opt-in marker and then merely skipped re-applying -- but the overlay persists for the whole boot, so the previously patched cloud/{snapshot,crud}.py, cloud_backup/sync.py and _truecloud_nested.py were all still on disk, and middlewared re-imported them on the restart install.sh performs. It printed "DISABLED (stock guard restored)" while the feature kept running until the next reboot. Someone disabling it because they were worried about it would have believed it was off. apply.sh now reverts on every not-needed path (opt-out, or superseded by native support): remove the module FIRST -- every injected block is guarded by `if _tc_nested is not None`, so the stock guard comes back even if a later step fails -- then strip the appended blocks from the three patched files. restic.py also carries a TRUECLOUD_PATCH block but belongs to the providers module; reverting it would silently break B2 backups, so it is explicitly excluded. Verified: the three nested files restore byte-for-byte to stock, the module is removed, and restic.py's block survives. install.sh --disable also tears the staging tree down first, since those bind mounts pin ZFS snapshots that could otherwise never be destroyed. Updating WITHOUT the flag was always correct and is unchanged: the nested module is never installed into middleware unless explicitly enabled. 109 tests, ruff and shellcheck clean. v0.3.2	2026-07-13 15:23:27 +00:00