27 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
27 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security policy
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Please report security problems privately by email to **holden@ssalomon.com**, not in a public
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issue. Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and which version you tested. You will get an
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acknowledgement within a few days.
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## What counts
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This tool reads private transcripts and writes to one directory, so the issues that matter most are:
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- anything that makes it write outside the ledger directory and its own state file;
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- anything that lets transcript content or a judge's answer reach the filesystem, a command line or
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a shell other than as ledger text;
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- any way it could modify a transcript or an opencode database;
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- secrets surviving the redaction step in a common, recognisable format;
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- the judge receiving tools, files or network access it should not have.
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## What does not
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- Content you configure the tool to send to a hosted model. That is the documented design; use a
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local model if you do not want transcripts to leave the machine (see the README's privacy section).
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- Hooks: they are commands you choose to run.
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- A secret in a format the redactor does not recognise. Redaction is best-effort; review a ledger
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before you publish it. Reports of common formats it misses are welcome as ordinary issues.
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