ai-incidents 1.0.0
This commit is contained in:
Holden Salomon
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name: test
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on:
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push:
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pull_request:
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permissions:
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contents: read
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jobs:
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test:
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runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
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strategy:
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fail-fast: false
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matrix:
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os: [ubuntu-latest]
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python: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"]
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include:
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- os: macos-latest
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python: "3.13"
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
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with:
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python-version: ${{ matrix.python }}
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- name: Install
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run: python -m pip install -e '.[test]'
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- name: Test
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run: python -m pytest -q
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- name: CLI smoke test
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run: ai-incidents --version && ai-incidents -c examples/config.toml config
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__pycache__/
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*.py[cod]
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*.egg-info/
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build/
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dist/
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.venv/
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.pytest_cache/
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.ruff_cache/
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# Changelog
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All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format follows
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[Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and the project uses
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[Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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## [Unreleased]
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## [1.0.0] - 2026-09-21
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First public release. `ai-incidents` began as a nightly job in a private set of scheduled agent
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scripts, where it had been running since July 2026 and had filed 44 incidents. This release
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extracts it into a standalone tool with no dependency on that environment.
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### Added
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- `ai-incidents run`: scan transcripts, gate, judge, write the ledger, commit, record. A run with
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no candidates makes no model call.
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- `ai-incidents scan`, `init`, `reindex` and `config` commands.
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- `--dry-run` (no model call, no writes), `--dry-run --with-judge` (model call, still no writes),
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and `--backfill` to judge existing history instead of taking a baseline on a first run.
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- One TOML configuration file for transcript locations, judge, ledger, git, state, privacy and
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hooks. Unknown keys are rejected.
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- opencode 1.x support: sessions are read from its SQLite store, opened read-only.
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- Judge backends: the Claude Code CLI (all tools and MCP servers disabled, no session
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persistence), any OpenAI-compatible endpoint for local models, or an arbitrary command.
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- Structured verdicts: the judge answers in JSON, which is validated before anything is written;
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the ledger, report and index are rendered by the tool, not edited by the model.
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- Secret redaction of candidates before they reach the judge and of verdicts before they reach the
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ledger.
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- `WriteGuard`: every file write is checked against the ledger directory and the state file.
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- Optional hooks (`notify_cmd`, `on_success_cmd`, `on_failure_cmd`, and `--notify-cmd`) in place
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of built-in notification and heartbeat services.
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- Optional plain-text seen-list export, for transcript-cleanup jobs that must not delete
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sessions before they are judged.
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- A run lock, so overlapping runs cannot race on the state file.
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- Examples for a systemd user timer and cron, a full configuration reference, and a curated sample
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ledger and run report.
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- Test suite (pre-filter, both transcript formats, state semantics, judge backends, ledger
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writer, redaction, permission envelope, git) and GitHub Actions CI on Python 3.11 to 3.13.
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### Changed (from the private sweep)
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- **Renamed and folded.** The collector (`ai-incidents-collect` plus `_scan_incidents.py`), the
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gate (`ai-incidents-gate`), the agent job definition, and the publisher
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(`ai-incidents-publish`) are now one program, `ai-incidents run`. The pre-filter lives in
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`prefilter.py`, transcript reading in `sources.py`, the judge rubric in `prompts/judge.md`, and
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ledger writing in `ledger.py`.
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- **The judge no longer edits files.** It used to be an agent with Read, Write and Edit tools and
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a scoped shell; it now receives text and returns JSON, with no tools at all. The tool writes the
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ledger itself.
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- **Severity-ranked ledger.** `incidents.md` is ordered most severe first, newest first within a
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severity (it was newest first). `order = "newest"` restores the old order.
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- **`state.json` in the ledger is now `index.json`.** It is still derived from `incidents.md` on
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every write and uses the same fingerprints, so existing `first_seen` dates carry over. The name
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`state.json` now belongs to the tool's own run state, kept outside the ledger by default.
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- **Two-phase seen-state is kept, in one process.** Sessions with candidates are recorded as judged
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only after the verdict is written and committed; clean sessions immediately. The separate
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`--promote` step is gone.
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- **Talkative sessions are cut once instead of split across runs.** A session with more candidates
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than the per-run budget used to be re-emitted on every run and never finished; it is now capped
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at `max_per_session` candidates, with its behaviour block always kept.
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- **Tracebacks from the agent's own inline scripts** (`python -c`, stdin heredocs) no longer count
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as notable failures on their own.
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- **Only shell commands are checked for destructive patterns**, not file paths passed to read or
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edit tools.
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- **Git writes are narrower.** Commits name their paths explicitly (`git commit -- <paths>`), so
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other staged or untracked files in the ledger repository are never swept in. The hard-coded
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remote check became the optional `expected_remote_url`.
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### Removed
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- Multi-host collection over SSH. Run one instance per machine instead.
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- Built-in ntfy notification, the dead-man's-switch heartbeat, quota-retry scheduling and the
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unattended-agent runner: use hooks, your scheduler's own retry, and `on_success_cmd`.
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- Hard-coded paths, host names and repository names.
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[Unreleased]: https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents/compare/v1.0.0...HEAD
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[1.0.0]: https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents/releases/tag/v1.0.0
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# Contributing
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Bug reports and pull requests are welcome at https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents.
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## Development
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```sh
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python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate
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pip install -e '.[test]'
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pytest
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```
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The package has no runtime dependencies beyond the Python standard library (3.11+), and it should
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stay that way.
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## Ground rules
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- **The permission envelope is the product.** Every file write goes through `WriteGuard`;
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transcripts are only ever opened read-only; the judge gets text on stdin and no tools. A change
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that weakens any of these needs a very good reason and a test.
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- **A new pre-filter pattern needs a test** showing a transcript line it catches, and ideally one it
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must not catch. The pre-filter favours recall, but every false positive costs judge tokens.
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- **Never commit a real transcript.** Build fixtures with the helpers in `tests/helpers.py`. Test
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secrets are assembled at runtime so the source does not trip secret scanners.
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- **Keep the ledger format stable.** People hand-edit `incidents.md`; a format change must parse
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the old format and must not rewrite hand-written entries.
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- Update `CHANGELOG.md` under `Unreleased`.
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 Holden Salomon
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
|
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
|
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
|
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
|
||||
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
|
||||
|
||||
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
|
||||
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
|
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
|
||||
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
|
||||
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
|
||||
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
|
||||
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
|
||||
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
|
||||
SOFTWARE.
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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include README.md LICENSE NOTICE CHANGELOG.md SECURITY.md CONTRIBUTING.md
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recursive-include tests *.py
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recursive-include examples *
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recursive-include src/ai_incidents/prompts *.md
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ai-incidents
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Copyright (c) 2026 Holden Salomon
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AI disclosure
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This tool runs an AI model as part of its normal operation: each run sends
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pre-filtered excerpts of your agent transcripts to the model you configure
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(the Claude Code CLI by default, or a local model), and that model judges which
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moments were real incidents and drafts the ledger entries.
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Portions of this repository, including code, tests and documentation, were
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written with the assistance of AI (Anthropic Claude / Claude Code) under the
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maintainer's direction. The sample ledger and report in examples/ were derived
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from entries the tool itself drafted during real use, then curated and
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generalized for publication.
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# ai-incidents
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Coding agents occasionally do real damage: they delete data, take a service down, leak a
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credential into a transcript, or burn a week of quota, and the lesson is usually forgotten by the
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next session. `ai-incidents` runs unattended over your own Claude Code and opencode transcripts,
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uses deterministic rules to pick out the moments that look like trouble, has a model judge which
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of them were real incidents, and keeps a severity-ranked markdown ledger of what broke, what it
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cost and the lesson, with a record of everything it excluded and why.
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[`examples/sample-ledger.md`](examples/sample-ledger.md) is a curated excerpt from real use, and
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[`examples/sample-report.md`](examples/sample-report.md) shows the matching run report.
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## Install
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```sh
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pipx install git+https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents # or: uv tool install git+https://...
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ai-incidents init --ledger ~/ai-incidents-ledger --git # writes ~/.config/ai-incidents/config.toml
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ai-incidents run --dry-run # see what would be judged; changes nothing
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```
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From a checkout, `pipx install .` or `uv tool install .` works the same way. Python 3.11 or later,
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no other dependencies. The default judge is the Claude Code CLI (`claude`), which must be logged in;
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see [Choosing a judge](#choosing-a-judge) for local models.
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## Quick start
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```sh
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ai-incidents run --dry-run # scan, and show what would be sent to the judge; no model call
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ai-incidents run # first run: record existing sessions as a baseline, judge nothing
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ai-incidents run # later runs: judge only sessions that are new or have grown
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```
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The first run takes a **baseline**: it records every existing session as already judged, so you
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do not pay to judge your whole history on day one. To judge history instead, run
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`ai-incidents run --backfill` (or set `first_run = "backfill"`); it works through the backlog
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`max_candidates` at a time, one batch per run.
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Then schedule it. A systemd user timer and a crontab line are in
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[`examples/systemd/`](examples/systemd) and [`examples/cron.txt`](examples/cron.txt). Nightly is
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plenty: runs are incremental, and a night with nothing to judge makes no model call at all.
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A run prints one line per source and a headline:
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```
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claude-code: 12 new session(s), 10 clean, 2 with candidates
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opencode: 3 new session(s), 3 clean, 0 with candidates
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Candidates: 5
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committed 240f3cb
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ai-incidents 2026-09-21: 1 filed (1 high), 2 candidate(s) excluded
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HIGH Deleted 48,211 live production orders with the wrong connection string
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report: /home/you/ai-incidents-ledger/reports/2026-09-21.md
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```
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## What it writes
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Everything goes into the ledger directory (a git repository, if you want history):
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| File | What |
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|---|---|
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| `incidents.md` | The ledger. One entry per incident: title, date, severity, then **What**, **Cost** and **Lesson**. Most severe first. Hand edits and hand-written entries are kept. |
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| `reports/YYYY-MM-DD.md` | One per judged run: what the pre-filter found, each confirmed incident with the reason it cleared the bar, each excluded candidate with the reason it did not, and the judge's token use. |
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| `latest.md` | A copy of the newest report. |
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| `index.json` | A machine index (fingerprint, title, date, severity, first seen). Regenerated from `incidents.md` on every write; do not edit it. |
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An entry looks like this:
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```markdown
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## Committed 14 embedded git repositories to `main` with `git add -A` · 2026-07-14 · MEDIUM
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- **What:** ran `git add -A && git commit && git push` in a worktree where a scheduled review job had left 14 throwaway clones ...
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- **Cost:** `main` carried 14 broken submodule references that broke cloning until a follow-up commit removed them ...
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- **Lesson:** `git add -A` is not a review step: stage explicit paths anywhere a tool may have written, and read the warnings from commands that succeed.
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```
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The tool's own run state (which sessions have been judged) lives outside the ledger, in
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`~/.local/state/ai-incidents/state.json` by default.
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## Configuration
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One TOML file, `~/.config/ai-incidents/config.toml` by default (or `$AI_INCIDENTS_CONFIG`, or
|
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`-c PATH`). [`examples/config.toml`](examples/config.toml) documents every key. Unknown keys are an
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error, so a typo cannot quietly switch something off. `ai-incidents config` prints the effective
|
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settings, including exactly which paths the tool will write.
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| Table | Key | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `[[source]]` | `type` | `claude-code`, `opencode` | Transcript format. Omit every `[[source]]` to read both defaults. |
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| | `path` | `~/.claude/projects`, `~/.local/share/opencode/opencode*.db` | Where the transcripts are. The opencode path is a glob. |
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| | `name` | the type | Needed only to tell two sources of one type apart. |
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| `[scan]` | `max_candidates` | `50` | Most candidates shown to the judge per run; the rest wait for the next run. |
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| | `max_per_session` | `12` | Most candidates from one session. |
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| | `first_run` | `baseline` | `baseline` or `backfill` (see Quick start). |
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| | `exclude` | `[]` | Globs on transcript paths to skip. |
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| | `extra_destructive`, `extra_benign`, `extra_alarm` | `[]` | Extra pre-filter regexes (for example your own alert names). |
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| `[judge]` | `backend` | `claude` | `claude`, `openai` or `command`. |
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| | `model` | `sonnet` | Model name or alias for the backend. |
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| | `timeout` | `900` | Seconds before the judge call is abandoned. |
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| | `prompt_file` | built in | Replace the judging rubric. |
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| | `base_url`, `api_key_env`, `json_mode` | | `openai` backend. `api_key_env` names an environment variable; keys never go in the file. |
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| | `command` | | `command` backend: argv of a program that reads the prompt on stdin. |
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| `[ledger]` | `dir` | (required) | The ledger directory. |
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||||
| | `order` | `severity` | `severity` or `newest`. |
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||||
| `[git]` | `enabled` | `true` | Commit if `ledger.dir` is a git repository. |
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||||
| | `push` | `false` | Push after committing. |
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||||
| | `expected_remote_url` | | Refuse to push if the remote has been repointed. |
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||||
| `[state]` | `file` | `~/.local/state/ai-incidents/state.json` | Run state. |
|
||||
| | `seen_list` | | Optional plain-text list of judged Claude Code transcripts, for cleanup jobs. |
|
||||
| `[privacy]` | `redact` | `true` | Mask secret-shaped strings before the judge and before the ledger. |
|
||||
| `[hooks]` | `notify_cmd` | | Runs after a run that filed something. |
|
||||
| | `on_success_cmd` | | Runs after every successful run, quiet ones included: a heartbeat. |
|
||||
| | `on_failure_cmd` | | Runs after a failed run. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Commands and exit codes
|
||||
|
||||
| Command | Does |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `ai-incidents run` | Scan, judge if there is anything to judge, write, commit, record. `--dry-run`, `--dry-run --with-judge`, `--backfill`, `--notify-cmd CMD`, `--no-git`, `--push` / `--no-push`. |
|
||||
| `ai-incidents scan [--show]` | Show what the pre-filter finds. Reads only; records nothing. |
|
||||
| `ai-incidents init --ledger DIR [--git]` | Write a starter config and create the ledger directory. |
|
||||
| `ai-incidents reindex` | Re-rank `incidents.md` and rebuild `index.json` after hand edits. |
|
||||
| `ai-incidents config` | Print the effective configuration. |
|
||||
|
||||
Exit codes: `0` success (a quiet run is a success), `1` the run failed (judge, git, or state
|
||||
error), `2` bad usage or configuration, `3` another run holds the lock.
|
||||
|
||||
### Hooks
|
||||
|
||||
Hooks replace any built-in notifier. Each is a command line, split the way a shell would split it
|
||||
but not run through one; wrap it in `sh -c '...'` if you want pipes. The run summary arrives on
|
||||
stdin, and these variables are set: `AI_INCIDENTS_STATUS` (`ok` or `failed`),
|
||||
`AI_INCIDENTS_HEADLINE`, `AI_INCIDENTS_FILED`, `AI_INCIDENTS_HIGH`, `AI_INCIDENTS_MEDIUM`,
|
||||
`AI_INCIDENTS_LOW`, `AI_INCIDENTS_EXCLUDED`, `AI_INCIDENTS_REPORT`. A hook that fails is logged and
|
||||
ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
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||||
[hooks]
|
||||
notify_cmd = "curl -s -H 'Title: ai-incidents' --data-binary @- https://ntfy.sh/your-topic"
|
||||
on_success_cmd = "curl -fsS -m 10 https://hc-ping.com/your-uuid"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Choosing a judge
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[judge] # default: the Claude Code CLI you already use
|
||||
backend = "claude"
|
||||
model = "sonnet"
|
||||
|
||||
[judge] # a local model through any OpenAI-compatible server
|
||||
backend = "openai"
|
||||
base_url = "http://localhost:11434/v1" # Ollama; llama.cpp's server is http://localhost:8080/v1
|
||||
model = "qwen3:32b"
|
||||
|
||||
[judge] # anything that reads a prompt on stdin
|
||||
backend = "command"
|
||||
command = ["llm", "-m", "some-model"]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The judge must answer with a JSON object in the format the rubric describes. Larger models follow
|
||||
it more reliably; a malformed answer fails the run safely (see [Failure modes](#failure-modes)).
|
||||
|
||||
## Permission envelope
|
||||
|
||||
The tool reads private transcripts, so what it may do is deliberately narrow, and enforced in
|
||||
code rather than by convention:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Transcripts are read-only.** Claude Code JSONL files are opened for reading. opencode's SQLite
|
||||
database is opened with `mode=ro` and `query_only`. (SQLite's WAL mode has every reader
|
||||
coordinate through a `-shm` index file next to the database, which a reader may create or update;
|
||||
that is lock bookkeeping, not data. For a database owned by another user, the tool opens it
|
||||
`immutable=1` instead, so it never leaves a sidecar file that user cannot write.)
|
||||
- **The judge only reads.** It never sees a transcript directly: it receives the pre-filtered,
|
||||
redacted excerpts as text on stdin (never on the command line, where other local users could
|
||||
read them) and answers with JSON. With the default backend, `claude -p` runs with
|
||||
`--tools ""` (no built-in tools), `--strict-mcp-config` (no MCP servers), and
|
||||
`--no-session-persistence` (its own session is not written back into your transcripts), in an
|
||||
empty temporary directory. With the `openai` backend it is one HTTP request. The `command`
|
||||
backend runs whatever you configure, so the envelope there is yours to keep.
|
||||
- **The only writes are the ledger.** Every file write goes through one guard that allows exactly
|
||||
the ledger directory and the state file (plus its lock, and the optional seen-list). Anything
|
||||
else raises before a byte is written. The ledger text is rendered by the tool from validated,
|
||||
single-line JSON fields; the model never chooses a path or writes markdown structure.
|
||||
- **Git is narrow.** Commits name their files explicitly, so nothing else in the ledger repository
|
||||
(staged or not) is swept in. Pushing is off by default; when on, it pushes the current branch
|
||||
to its own name on the configured remote: no force, no tags, no detached HEAD, and optionally
|
||||
only to an `expected_remote_url`. Git is never allowed to prompt.
|
||||
- **Hooks are yours.** They run the commands you configure and are outside the envelope by
|
||||
definition. Nothing from a transcript is ever put on a hook's command line.
|
||||
|
||||
The test suite checks these: a full run over both transcript formats must leave every file outside
|
||||
the ledger and state unchanged, writes outside the guard must fail, the judge's argv must not
|
||||
contain the candidates, and a commit must not include files the tool did not write.
|
||||
|
||||
## Privacy
|
||||
|
||||
Transcripts contain everything you and your agents did: code, file contents, command output, and
|
||||
now and then a secret that should never have been printed. Know where they go:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Excerpts leave the machine for the judge.** Only the pre-filtered moments are sent (a few
|
||||
hundred characters per turn, the flagged commands and failures, and the title and first line of
|
||||
each existing ledger entry), not whole transcripts. They go to whichever model you configure. With the default
|
||||
`claude` backend that is Anthropic, the same provider your Claude Code sessions already use;
|
||||
opencode sessions may have run against a different provider, so sending them to Claude is a new
|
||||
disclosure.
|
||||
- **A local model keeps everything local.** Point the `openai` backend at llama.cpp, Ollama, vLLM
|
||||
or LM Studio on your own hardware and no excerpt leaves the machine.
|
||||
- **Redaction is best-effort.** Common token formats, private keys, `Authorization` headers, URL
|
||||
credentials and `password=`-style assignments are masked before the judge sees them and again
|
||||
before anything reaches the ledger. A bare password with nothing around it cannot be recognised.
|
||||
The rubric also tells the judge never to copy a secret or a third party's name into its answer.
|
||||
- **The ledger is private by default.** It describes your mistakes, your infrastructure and your
|
||||
projects. Review it before you publish it; `examples/sample-ledger.md` shows what a scrubbed
|
||||
excerpt looks like.
|
||||
- `ai-incidents run --dry-run -v` prints the candidates exactly as they would be sent, without
|
||||
sending them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Design
|
||||
|
||||
### Why it runs unattended
|
||||
|
||||
Nobody writes a postmortem for their own agent session. The session that caused the damage is
|
||||
usually the one that cleaned it up, and by the next day the lesson survives only in a transcript
|
||||
nobody will reread, until the transcript itself is deleted (Claude Code removes old transcripts
|
||||
after `cleanupPeriodDays`, 30 by default). A recorder that depends on someone remembering to run it
|
||||
has the same problem as the postmortem. So it runs on a timer, reads what was actually said and
|
||||
done, and costs nothing on the nights when nothing happened.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why a model judges instead of rules
|
||||
|
||||
Rules are good at finding *candidate* moments and bad at deciding whether they mattered. The same
|
||||
`git reset --hard` is routine cleanup in one session and the loss of a day's unpushed work in
|
||||
another; `rm -rf` of a scratch directory and of a data directory look alike to a regex. Deciding
|
||||
needs the surrounding conversation and the consequences, which is a judgement.
|
||||
|
||||
So there are two stages, each doing what it is good at. The **pre-filter** is deterministic, free,
|
||||
and tuned for recall. It reads what sessions *said* (the agent admitting a mistake, the user
|
||||
objecting, an alarm, the agent blaming someone else's code) and, just as important, what they
|
||||
*did*: destructive commands, notable failures, and warnings printed by commands that exited 0.
|
||||
Reading behaviour is not optional. The sweep this tool came from originally matched only
|
||||
confessions, and on its first real test it missed all three incidents of that day, because none of
|
||||
the sessions happened to say one of the magic phrases; one of them committed 14 repositories to
|
||||
`main` from a command that exited 0 and announced the damage in a warning nobody read. The
|
||||
**judge** is a model, tuned for precision: strict about what counts, told that a digest of
|
||||
destructive commands is not an accusation, and told that confidently blaming an upstream project
|
||||
for your own bug is an incident in its own right.
|
||||
|
||||
The pre-filter also acts as a gate. When there are no candidates, no model is loaded. An agent
|
||||
that starts up only to discover there is no work still pays for the whole start-up, and a nightly
|
||||
job that does that every night is the kind of unmetered cost this ledger exists to catch.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why exclusions are recorded
|
||||
|
||||
Every run report lists each candidate the judge excluded, with a one-line reason. Without that, the
|
||||
bar for "incident" is invisible and cannot be argued with: you cannot tell a quiet week from a
|
||||
judge that has become lax, or a noisy ledger from one that has become credulous. The exclusions are
|
||||
where you notice the judge drifting, where you find a real incident it waved through, and where you
|
||||
learn which pre-filter patterns only produce noise. They also make a quiet run a real result: "five
|
||||
candidates, all routine, here is why" is a finding; silence is not.
|
||||
|
||||
### Severity is the cost
|
||||
|
||||
Severity is defined by what an incident *cost*, not by how alarming the mistake looked. **HIGH**
|
||||
is data loss, an outage, or a real credential exposure. **MEDIUM** is wasted rework, a bad
|
||||
decision pushed to a shared branch, or a debug spiral. **LOW** is a self-inflicted mess that was
|
||||
cleaned up cheaply. The agent catching its own mistake before it cost anything is not an incident
|
||||
at all. The ledger is ordered by severity, then date, because its reader wants the most expensive
|
||||
lessons first; the chronology is in `reports/`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Failure modes
|
||||
|
||||
| What goes wrong | What happens |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| The judge fails: it times out, exits non-zero, hits a quota, or answers with prose instead of a verdict (`claude -p` exits 0 while printing a spend-limit message). | The answer is validated, not the exit code, so the run fails with exit 1 and records nothing for the candidate sessions. The next run shows them again. Clean sessions are still recorded. |
|
||||
| The judge returns a malformed incident (no lesson, an unknown severity). | That incident is rejected and listed in the report under "Loose ends"; the rest of the verdict is used. Candidates it never mentions are listed too. |
|
||||
| The pre-filter misses something. | Recall is bounded by what a session said or did in a way the patterns recognise. A wrong decision that involved no destructive command, no failure and no complaint is invisible. `extra_*` patterns let you widen it; the exclusions show you what it currently catches. |
|
||||
| The judge invents or overstates detail. | It is told to judge only from the excerpts, and each entry links back to its sessions in the report. The ledger is plain markdown: correct it by hand and run `reindex`. |
|
||||
| The same incident surfaces twice (a resumed session, two sessions about one mistake). | The judge sees the existing ledger and marks duplicates, and an entry whose title matches an existing one is never filed twice. A duplicate under a different title can still slip through; delete it by hand. |
|
||||
| More candidates than the budget. | Whole sessions are deferred to the next run, never split; clean sessions later in the scan are still recorded. A backfill takes several runs. |
|
||||
| Two runs overlap. | The second exits with code 3 without touching anything. |
|
||||
| The push fails. | The ledger is already committed locally and the sessions recorded; the run exits 1, and the next run pushes. |
|
||||
| A transcript is deleted before it is judged. | It is simply gone. Schedule runs more often than your transcript retention. If a cleanup job of your own deletes transcripts, point it at `seen_list` so it only removes what has been judged. |
|
||||
| A secret in an unrecognised format. | It can reach the judge and, if the judge repeats it, the ledger. Keep the ledger private and review before publishing. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
- **Claude Code** 2.x: transcripts under `~/.claude/projects/` (or `$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`), and the
|
||||
`claude` CLI for the default judge, which needs a build with `--tools` and
|
||||
`--no-session-persistence`. Tested with 2.1.
|
||||
- **opencode** 1.x: the SQLite store (`opencode.db`, or `opencode-<channel>.db`) under
|
||||
`~/.local/share/opencode/`. Tested on 1.18.22 or later. The older JSON-file storage is not read.
|
||||
A port for opencode 2.x is planned.
|
||||
- **Python** 3.11 to 3.13, on Linux and macOS.
|
||||
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
[MIT](LICENSE). See [NOTICE](NOTICE) for attribution.
|
||||
+26
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||
# Security policy
|
||||
|
||||
## Reporting a vulnerability
|
||||
|
||||
Please report security problems privately by email to **holden@ssalomon.com**, not in a public
|
||||
issue. Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and which version you tested. You will get an
|
||||
acknowledgement within a few days.
|
||||
|
||||
## What counts
|
||||
|
||||
This tool reads private transcripts and writes to one directory, so the issues that matter most are:
|
||||
|
||||
- anything that makes it write outside the ledger directory and its own state file;
|
||||
- anything that lets transcript content or a judge's answer reach the filesystem, a command line or
|
||||
a shell other than as ledger text;
|
||||
- any way it could modify a transcript or an opencode database;
|
||||
- secrets surviving the redaction step in a common, recognisable format;
|
||||
- the judge receiving tools, files or network access it should not have.
|
||||
|
||||
## What does not
|
||||
|
||||
- Content you configure the tool to send to a hosted model. That is the documented design; use a
|
||||
local model if you do not want transcripts to leave the machine (see the README's privacy section).
|
||||
- Hooks: they are commands you choose to run.
|
||||
- A secret in a format the redactor does not recognise. Redaction is best-effort; review a ledger
|
||||
before you publish it. Reports of common formats it misses are welcome as ordinary issues.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
||||
# ai-incidents: full configuration reference.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Default location: ~/.config/ai-incidents/config.toml (or $AI_INCIDENTS_CONFIG, or -c PATH).
|
||||
# Every key is optional except [ledger] dir. Unknown keys are an error, so a typo cannot silently
|
||||
# switch a setting off. Paths accept ~ and $VARIABLES.
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Where the transcripts are ---------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Read-only, always. Omit every [[source]] to read both defaults below.
|
||||
# Give two sources of the same type distinct names, e.g. a second Claude Code config directory.
|
||||
|
||||
[[source]]
|
||||
type = "claude-code"
|
||||
path = "~/.claude/projects" # default; honours $CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR
|
||||
# name = "claude-code" # default: the type
|
||||
|
||||
[[source]]
|
||||
type = "opencode"
|
||||
path = "~/.local/share/opencode/opencode*.db" # default; a glob, to catch channel builds
|
||||
|
||||
# --- The pre-filter --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
[scan]
|
||||
max_candidates = 50 # most candidates shown to the judge in one run; the rest wait
|
||||
max_per_session = 12 # most candidates from any one session
|
||||
first_run = "baseline" # "baseline": record existing sessions as judged, without judging
|
||||
# "backfill": judge them, max_candidates at a time
|
||||
exclude = [] # fnmatch globs on the transcript path, e.g. ["*/-home-me-scratch*"]
|
||||
extra_destructive = [] # extra regexes for commands that count as destructive
|
||||
extra_benign = [] # extra regexes for destructive-looking commands that are routine
|
||||
extra_alarm = [] # extra regexes for your own alarms, e.g. ["MyJobOverdue"]
|
||||
|
||||
# --- The judge -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# One model call per run, and only when there are candidates. It gets the candidates on stdin and
|
||||
# has no tools. The candidates leave this machine for whichever model you choose here.
|
||||
|
||||
[judge]
|
||||
backend = "claude" # "claude" | "openai" | "command"
|
||||
model = "sonnet"
|
||||
timeout = 900 # seconds
|
||||
prompt_file = "" # replace the built-in rubric (see src/ai_incidents/prompts/judge.md)
|
||||
|
||||
# backend = "claude": the Claude Code CLI, run with every tool and MCP server disabled.
|
||||
binary = "claude"
|
||||
extra_args = [] # appended to the claude command line
|
||||
|
||||
# backend = "openai": any OpenAI-compatible endpoint. This is the local-model option.
|
||||
# base_url = "http://localhost:8080/v1" # llama.cpp server
|
||||
# base_url = "http://localhost:11434/v1" # Ollama
|
||||
# model = "qwen3:32b"
|
||||
# api_key_env = "LOCAL_LLM_KEY" # name of an env var; never the key itself
|
||||
# json_mode = true # send response_format = json_object
|
||||
# max_tokens = 16000
|
||||
|
||||
# backend = "command": any program that reads the prompt on stdin and prints the answer.
|
||||
# command = ["ollama", "run", "qwen3:32b"]
|
||||
|
||||
# --- The output ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
[ledger]
|
||||
dir = "~/ai-incidents-ledger" # required
|
||||
order = "severity" # "severity": most severe first | "newest"
|
||||
title = "AI incidents" # heading for a new incidents.md
|
||||
|
||||
[git]
|
||||
enabled = true # commit if ledger.dir is a git repository; ignored otherwise
|
||||
push = false
|
||||
remote = "origin"
|
||||
branch = "" # refuse to run on any other branch; empty = whatever is checked out
|
||||
expected_remote_url = "" # refuse to push if the remote has been repointed
|
||||
author_name = "" # commit identity; empty = git's own configuration
|
||||
author_email = ""
|
||||
|
||||
[state]
|
||||
file = "~/.local/state/ai-incidents/state.json" # default ($XDG_STATE_HOME)
|
||||
seen_list = "" # optional plain-text export of judged Claude Code transcripts, one
|
||||
# `<file name>:<mtime>:<size>` per line, for a cleanup job that must
|
||||
# not delete what has not been judged. Read back on start.
|
||||
|
||||
[privacy]
|
||||
redact = true # mask secret-shaped strings before the judge and before the ledger
|
||||
extra_redact_patterns = [] # extra regexes to mask
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Hooks -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Commands, split like a shell would but not run by one. They get the run summary on stdin and in
|
||||
# AI_INCIDENTS_* environment variables. A failing hook is logged and ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
[hooks]
|
||||
notify_cmd = "" # after a run that filed something; quiet runs are silent
|
||||
on_success_cmd = "" # after every successful run (a heartbeat for a dead-man's switch)
|
||||
on_failure_cmd = "" # after a failed run
|
||||
timeout = 60
|
||||
# notify_cmd = "curl -s -H 'Title: ai-incidents' --data-binary @- https://ntfy.sh/your-topic"
|
||||
# on_success_cmd = "curl -fsS -m 10 https://hc-ping.com/your-uuid"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
# crontab -e
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Nightly at 02:30. cron's PATH is minimal: give the full path to ai-incidents, and make sure the
|
||||
# judge's CLI (claude, by default) is reachable too. Output goes to a log you can read later; the
|
||||
# exit code is 0 for a successful run (quiet or not), 1 for a failed one, 3 if a run was already
|
||||
# in progress.
|
||||
|
||||
PATH=/home/you/.local/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin
|
||||
30 2 * * * ai-incidents run >> "$HOME/.local/state/ai-incidents/cron.log" 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
# With a notification when something is filed, and a heartbeat on every successful run:
|
||||
# 30 2 * * * ai-incidents run --notify-cmd "curl -s --data-binary @- https://ntfy.sh/your-topic" >> "$HOME/.local/state/ai-incidents/cron.log" 2>&1
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# AI incidents
|
||||
|
||||
A curated excerpt from a real ledger kept by `ai-incidents`: five of its entries, with host names,
|
||||
project names, people and infrastructure details generalized. The format is exactly what the tool
|
||||
writes. Most severe first; newest first within a severity.
|
||||
|
||||
## Cleanup deleted the user's own agent sessions, unrecoverably, twice in one day · 2026-09-01 · HIGH
|
||||
- **What:** cleaning up its own smoke-test sessions, the agent filtered a global session list by name and by time window and piped the result into a delete; the filter also matched the user's real sessions, including the one open in their terminal, and after reporting the damage it ran the same filter again later that day.
|
||||
- **Cost:** at least five sessions destroyed with nothing recoverable; the user's active session was cut off mid-use and unrelated work was lost.
|
||||
- **Lesson:** never choose what to delete by name or time window over a shared list; delete only what you can prove you created (a recorded ID list, a tagged prefix), and after a filter has deleted someone else's data once, redesign it before running it again.
|
||||
|
||||
## An hourly agent's cost, once measured: ~47.6 billion tokens a year · 2026-07-14 · HIGH
|
||||
- **What:** an ingestion pipeline ran an unattended agent every hour; measured over a week, each run used about 5 million tokens, some ran past 200 turns, and 11 of 27 runs found no work at all.
|
||||
- **Cost:** roughly 47.6 billion tokens a year, drawn from the same subscription quota as interactive work, so the bill was paid invisibly in rate-limit headroom.
|
||||
- **Lesson:** gate an unattended agent behind a deterministic check so a model is loaded only when there is work, price the model to the work, and treat cadence as a cost multiplier.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deleted source data after mistaking its own bug for corruption · 2026-07-11 · HIGH
|
||||
- **What:** decided a price-history file was corrupt ("905 missing trading days") and deleted it; the corruption was the agent's own validation bug, because a parquet round-trip had renamed the date column and broken its comparison.
|
||||
- **Cost:** the file could not be fetched again (the free source returned nothing and the paid one was rate-limited), so the data loss stood.
|
||||
- **Lesson:** never delete source data to exclude it; quarantine it or filter at read time, and check a corruption diagnosis against a known-good sample before acting on it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Committed 14 embedded git repositories to `main` with `git add -A` · 2026-07-14 · MEDIUM
|
||||
- **What:** ran `git add -A && git commit && git push` in a worktree where a scheduled review job had left 14 throwaway clones; git staged each one as an embedded repository and the commit went to `main`, while printing `warning: adding embedded git repository` 14 times from a command that exited 0.
|
||||
- **Cost:** `main` carried 14 broken submodule references that broke cloning until a follow-up commit removed them; it also exposed that the review job had been cloning into its own checkout on every run.
|
||||
- **Lesson:** `git add -A` is not a review step: stage explicit paths anywhere a tool may have written, and read the warnings from commands that succeed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Monitoring went blind: an inline comment corrupted a metric value · 2026-07-14 · MEDIUM
|
||||
- **What:** wrote `MaxAge=9d # comment` into a config file; a homegrown metrics generator read the comment as part of the value, and the metrics exporter rejected the whole file. The ready explanation, that the exporter was being strict about comments, was wrong.
|
||||
- **Cost:** every job-health metric vanished from monitoring until it was caught in the same session, so any job failure in that window would have gone unnoticed.
|
||||
- **Lesson:** keep comments off value lines in key=value files, test the parser against trailing content, and when a tool rejects your output, read what your own code wrote before blaming the tool.
|
||||
|
||||
## Recurring patterns
|
||||
- **Matching by name or time window instead of an ID you own, before deleting or killing.** A loose match over a shared namespace (sessions, processes, files) eventually catches something that is not yours.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
# AI-incidents run · 2026-07-19
|
||||
|
||||
## What the pre-filter found
|
||||
|
||||
- **claude-code:** 390 new session(s), 376 clean, 14 with candidates
|
||||
- **Candidates:** 50
|
||||
- **Judge:** claude CLI, model sonnet
|
||||
|
||||
## Confirmed incidents (1)
|
||||
|
||||
### Committed 14 embedded git repositories to `main` with `git add -A` · 2026-07-14 · MEDIUM
|
||||
**Category:** destructive-action · **Sessions:** `a41c07e2` (claude-code, 2026-07-14)
|
||||
|
||||
Clears the bar: `main` carried 14 broken submodule references until a follow-up commit removed them, and the warning that proves it came from a command that exited 0.
|
||||
|
||||
## Excluded candidates (5)
|
||||
|
||||
- **C03** `5d2b9f10` (claude-code, 2026-07-15): `rm -f` of a previous attempt's own scratch files before writing a clean replacement. Own-scratch cleanup, not an incident.
|
||||
- **C11, C12** `e8f41a77` (claude-code, 2026-07-17): two self-described mistakes during a test-suite reduction, both caught by the compiler and fixed before anything was committed. No cost survived.
|
||||
- **C19** `0c9d3e55` (claude-code, 2026-07-16): a memory-leak diagnosis that ended up blaming an upstream project. Checked against the misattribution bar, but the session cited a specific, real upstream report and took no action on its earlier wrong theory. Not filed.
|
||||
- **C27** `9b61aa04` (claude-code, 2026-07-17): a long library migration with several self-caught missteps, each verified back to a correct final state. Routine iteration.
|
||||
|
||||
*This is a curated excerpt of a real run report, generalized the same way as `sample-ledger.md`;
|
||||
the candidate list at the end of a full report is omitted.*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
# A systemd *user* service. Install with:
|
||||
# cp ai-incidents.service ai-incidents.timer ~/.config/systemd/user/
|
||||
# systemctl --user daemon-reload
|
||||
# systemctl --user enable --now ai-incidents.timer
|
||||
# loginctl enable-linger "$USER" # so it runs while you are logged out
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Check on it with:
|
||||
# systemctl --user list-timers ai-incidents.timer
|
||||
# journalctl --user -u ai-incidents.service
|
||||
|
||||
[Unit]
|
||||
Description=ai-incidents: judge new agent sessions and update the ledger
|
||||
After=network-online.target
|
||||
Wants=network-online.target
|
||||
|
||||
[Service]
|
||||
Type=oneshot
|
||||
# pipx / uv tool installs land in ~/.local/bin, which is not on a user unit's PATH.
|
||||
Environment=PATH=%h/.local/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin
|
||||
ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/ai-incidents run
|
||||
# A quiet run makes no model call and finishes in seconds. A busy one waits on the judge
|
||||
# ([judge] timeout, default 900s); leave headroom over it.
|
||||
TimeoutStartSec=1200
|
||||
Nice=10
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
[Unit]
|
||||
Description=Run ai-incidents nightly
|
||||
|
||||
[Timer]
|
||||
# Nightly is plenty: the state file makes runs incremental, and a night with nothing to judge
|
||||
# costs no model call. Run it more often than your transcripts are cleaned up (Claude Code's
|
||||
# cleanupPeriodDays defaults to 30), or sessions can be deleted before they are judged.
|
||||
OnCalendar=*-*-* 02:30:00
|
||||
Persistent=true
|
||||
RandomizedDelaySec=600
|
||||
|
||||
[Install]
|
||||
WantedBy=timers.target
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
[build-system]
|
||||
requires = ["setuptools>=77"]
|
||||
build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
|
||||
|
||||
[project]
|
||||
name = "ai-incidents"
|
||||
version = "1.0.0"
|
||||
description = "An unattended incident recorder for AI coding agents: reads your Claude Code and opencode transcripts, has a model judge what really went wrong, and keeps a severity-ranked ledger of the lessons."
|
||||
readme = "README.md"
|
||||
license = "MIT"
|
||||
license-files = ["LICENSE", "NOTICE"]
|
||||
authors = [{ name = "Holden Salomon", email = "holden@ssalomon.com" }]
|
||||
requires-python = ">=3.11"
|
||||
dependencies = []
|
||||
keywords = ["claude-code", "opencode", "ai-agents", "incidents", "postmortem", "llm-judge", "transcripts"]
|
||||
classifiers = [
|
||||
"Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable",
|
||||
"Environment :: Console",
|
||||
"Intended Audience :: Developers",
|
||||
"Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux",
|
||||
"Operating System :: MacOS",
|
||||
"Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
|
||||
"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11",
|
||||
"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12",
|
||||
"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13",
|
||||
"Topic :: Software Development :: Quality Assurance",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[project.urls]
|
||||
Homepage = "https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents"
|
||||
Repository = "https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents"
|
||||
Issues = "https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents/issues"
|
||||
Changelog = "https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md"
|
||||
|
||||
[project.optional-dependencies]
|
||||
test = ["pytest>=7"]
|
||||
|
||||
[project.scripts]
|
||||
ai-incidents = "ai_incidents.cli:main"
|
||||
|
||||
[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
|
||||
where = ["src"]
|
||||
|
||||
[tool.setuptools.package-data]
|
||||
ai_incidents = ["prompts/*.md"]
|
||||
|
||||
[tool.pytest.ini_options]
|
||||
testpaths = ["tests"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
"""ai-incidents: an unattended incident recorder for AI coding-agent sessions."""
|
||||
|
||||
__version__ = "1.0.0"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
from .cli import main
|
||||
|
||||
sys.exit(main())
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
|
||||
"""Command line: ``ai-incidents run | scan | init | reindex | config``."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
from . import __version__, config, gitops, pipeline
|
||||
from .config import ConfigError
|
||||
from .envelope import EnvelopeError, WriteGuard
|
||||
from .state import LockedError, State
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _say(msg: str) -> None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
print(msg, flush=True)
|
||||
except BrokenPipeError:
|
||||
# The reader went away (`ai-incidents scan --show | head`). Stop printing, keep working:
|
||||
# a run must not be abandoned halfway because nobody is reading its progress.
|
||||
os.dup2(os.open(os.devnull, os.O_WRONLY), sys.stdout.fileno())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cmd_run(args, cfg) -> int:
|
||||
o = pipeline.run(
|
||||
cfg,
|
||||
dry_run=args.dry_run,
|
||||
with_judge=args.with_judge,
|
||||
backfill=args.backfill,
|
||||
notify_cmd=args.notify_cmd,
|
||||
use_git=False if args.no_git else None,
|
||||
push=args.push,
|
||||
verbose=args.verbose,
|
||||
say=_say,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return o.code
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cmd_scan(args, cfg) -> int:
|
||||
"""Show what the pre-filter finds. Reads transcripts and state; writes nothing."""
|
||||
state = State(cfg.state.file, cfg.state.seen_list)
|
||||
res = pipeline.scan(cfg, state, backfill=args.backfill)
|
||||
for line in res.summary():
|
||||
_say(line.replace("**", ""))
|
||||
if args.show:
|
||||
for c in res.candidates:
|
||||
_say("\n" + c.render())
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_OK
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cmd_init(args, cfg_path: str) -> int:
|
||||
ledger_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(args.ledger))
|
||||
if os.path.exists(cfg_path) and not args.force:
|
||||
_say(f"{cfg_path} already exists (use --force to overwrite)")
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_USAGE
|
||||
guard = WriteGuard(dirs=[ledger_dir], files=[cfg_path])
|
||||
guard.write_text(cfg_path, config.EXAMPLE.format(ledger=ledger_dir, state=config.default_state_path()))
|
||||
_say(f"wrote {cfg_path}")
|
||||
guard.makedirs(ledger_dir)
|
||||
if args.git and not gitops.is_repo(ledger_dir):
|
||||
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--quiet", ledger_dir], check=True)
|
||||
_say(f"initialised a git repository in {ledger_dir}")
|
||||
_say("next: `ai-incidents run --dry-run` to see what would be judged")
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_OK
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cmd_config(args, cfg) -> int:
|
||||
_say(f"config: {cfg.path}")
|
||||
for s in cfg.sources:
|
||||
_say(f"source: {s.name} ({s.type}) {s.path}")
|
||||
j = cfg.judge
|
||||
_say(f"judge: {pipeline._judge_label(cfg)}, timeout {j.timeout}s")
|
||||
_say(f"ledger: {cfg.ledger.dir or '(not set)'}"
|
||||
+ (" [git]" if cfg.ledger.dir and gitops.is_repo(cfg.ledger.dir) and cfg.git.enabled else ""))
|
||||
_say(f"state: {cfg.state.file}")
|
||||
if cfg.state.seen_list:
|
||||
_say(f"seen: {cfg.state.seen_list}")
|
||||
_say(f"writes: {cfg.ledger.dir}/ and {cfg.state.file}" + (f" and {cfg.state.seen_list}" if cfg.state.seen_list else ""))
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_OK
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
|
||||
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(
|
||||
prog="ai-incidents",
|
||||
description="Find the moments your AI coding agents caused real damage, and keep a ledger of the lessons.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
p.add_argument("--version", action="version", version=f"%(prog)s {__version__}")
|
||||
p.add_argument("-c", "--config", help="config file (default: $AI_INCIDENTS_CONFIG or ~/.config/ai-incidents/config.toml)")
|
||||
sub = p.add_subparsers(dest="cmd", required=True)
|
||||
|
||||
r = sub.add_parser("run", help="scan, judge, and update the ledger")
|
||||
r.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true",
|
||||
help="scan and show what would be judged; call no model and write nothing")
|
||||
r.add_argument("--with-judge", action="store_true",
|
||||
help="with --dry-run: do call the judge and print the report, but still write nothing")
|
||||
r.add_argument("--backfill", action="store_true",
|
||||
help="judge existing sessions on a first run instead of taking a baseline")
|
||||
r.add_argument("--notify-cmd", help="command to run when incidents are filed (overrides hooks.notify_cmd)")
|
||||
r.add_argument("--no-git", action="store_true", help="write the ledger but do not commit")
|
||||
push = r.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
|
||||
push.add_argument("--push", dest="push", action="store_true", default=None, help="push after committing")
|
||||
push.add_argument("--no-push", dest="push", action="store_false", help="do not push")
|
||||
r.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", action="store_true", help="with --dry-run: print the full judge prompt")
|
||||
|
||||
s = sub.add_parser("scan", help="show what the pre-filter finds; read-only")
|
||||
s.add_argument("--show", action="store_true", help="print the candidates")
|
||||
s.add_argument("--backfill", action="store_true", help="include sessions a first run would baseline")
|
||||
|
||||
i = sub.add_parser("init", help="write a starter config and create the ledger directory")
|
||||
i.add_argument("--ledger", required=True, help="ledger directory to create")
|
||||
i.add_argument("--git", action="store_true", help="also `git init` the ledger directory")
|
||||
i.add_argument("--force", action="store_true", help="overwrite an existing config")
|
||||
|
||||
sub.add_parser("reindex", help="re-rank incidents.md and rebuild index.json after hand edits")
|
||||
sub.add_parser("config", help="print the effective configuration")
|
||||
return p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
|
||||
args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
|
||||
cfg_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(args.config)) if args.config else config.default_config_path()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if args.cmd == "init":
|
||||
return cmd_init(args, cfg_path)
|
||||
cfg = config.load(cfg_path, required=args.cmd in ("run", "reindex"))
|
||||
if args.cmd == "run":
|
||||
return cmd_run(args, cfg)
|
||||
if args.cmd == "scan":
|
||||
return cmd_scan(args, cfg)
|
||||
if args.cmd == "reindex":
|
||||
return pipeline.reindex(cfg, say=_say)
|
||||
if args.cmd == "config":
|
||||
return cmd_config(args, cfg)
|
||||
except ConfigError as e:
|
||||
print(f"ai-incidents: config: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_USAGE
|
||||
except LockedError as e:
|
||||
print(f"ai-incidents: {e}; not starting a second run", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_LOCKED
|
||||
except (EnvelopeError, ValueError, OSError) as e:
|
||||
print(f"ai-incidents: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_FAILED
|
||||
return pipeline.EXIT_USAGE
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
|
||||
"""One TOML file configures everything. Unknown keys are an error, so a typo cannot silently turn a
|
||||
setting off."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tomllib
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field, fields
|
||||
|
||||
from .judge import BACKENDS, JudgeConfig
|
||||
from .sources import SOURCE_TYPES
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ConfigError(ValueError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def xdg(var: str, fallback: str) -> str:
|
||||
return os.environ.get(var) or os.path.expanduser(fallback)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_config_path() -> str:
|
||||
return os.environ.get("AI_INCIDENTS_CONFIG") or os.path.join(
|
||||
xdg("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", "~/.config"), "ai-incidents", "config.toml"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_state_path() -> str:
|
||||
return os.path.join(xdg("XDG_STATE_HOME", "~/.local/state"), "ai-incidents", "state.json")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_source_path(kind: str) -> str:
|
||||
if kind == "claude-code":
|
||||
base = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR") or "~/.claude"
|
||||
return os.path.join(base, "projects")
|
||||
if kind == "opencode":
|
||||
return os.path.join(xdg("XDG_DATA_HOME", "~/.local/share"), "opencode", "opencode*.db")
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class SourceConfig:
|
||||
type: str = ""
|
||||
path: str = ""
|
||||
name: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class ScanConfig:
|
||||
max_candidates: int = 50
|
||||
max_per_session: int = 12
|
||||
first_run: str = "baseline" # "baseline" | "backfill"
|
||||
exclude: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
extra_destructive: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
extra_benign: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
extra_alarm: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class LedgerConfig:
|
||||
dir: str = ""
|
||||
order: str = "severity" # "severity" | "newest"
|
||||
title: str = "AI incidents"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class GitConfig:
|
||||
enabled: bool = True
|
||||
push: bool = False
|
||||
remote: str = "origin"
|
||||
branch: str = ""
|
||||
expected_remote_url: str = ""
|
||||
author_name: str = ""
|
||||
author_email: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class StateConfig:
|
||||
file: str = ""
|
||||
seen_list: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class PrivacyConfig:
|
||||
redact: bool = True
|
||||
extra_redact_patterns: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class HooksConfig:
|
||||
notify_cmd: str = ""
|
||||
on_success_cmd: str = ""
|
||||
on_failure_cmd: str = ""
|
||||
timeout: int = 60
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Config:
|
||||
sources: list[SourceConfig] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
scan: ScanConfig = field(default_factory=ScanConfig)
|
||||
judge: JudgeConfig = field(default_factory=JudgeConfig)
|
||||
ledger: LedgerConfig = field(default_factory=LedgerConfig)
|
||||
git: GitConfig = field(default_factory=GitConfig)
|
||||
state: StateConfig = field(default_factory=StateConfig)
|
||||
privacy: PrivacyConfig = field(default_factory=PrivacyConfig)
|
||||
hooks: HooksConfig = field(default_factory=HooksConfig)
|
||||
path: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _section(cls, raw, where: str):
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return cls()
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"[{where}] must be a table")
|
||||
known = {f.name: f for f in fields(cls)}
|
||||
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - set(known))
|
||||
if unknown:
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"[{where}] unknown key(s): {', '.join(unknown)}")
|
||||
defaults = cls()
|
||||
for k, v in raw.items():
|
||||
want = type(getattr(defaults, k))
|
||||
if want is int and isinstance(v, bool) or not isinstance(v, want):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"[{where}] {k} must be {want.__name__}, got {type(v).__name__}")
|
||||
if want is list and not all(isinstance(x, str) for x in v):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"[{where}] {k} must be a list of strings")
|
||||
return cls(**raw)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _expand(p: str) -> str:
|
||||
return os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(os.path.expandvars(p))) if p else p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load(path: str | None = None, required: bool = True) -> Config:
|
||||
path = path or default_config_path()
|
||||
raw: dict = {}
|
||||
if os.path.exists(path):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with open(path, "rb") as f:
|
||||
raw = tomllib.load(f)
|
||||
except tomllib.TOMLDecodeError as e:
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"{path}: {e}") from e
|
||||
elif required:
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"no config at {path} (create one with `ai-incidents init`)")
|
||||
return from_dict(raw, path)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def from_dict(raw: dict, path: str = "") -> Config:
|
||||
top = {"source", "scan", "judge", "ledger", "git", "state", "privacy", "hooks"}
|
||||
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - top)
|
||||
if unknown:
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"unknown top-level key(s): {', '.join(unknown)}")
|
||||
|
||||
cfg = Config(path=path)
|
||||
srcs = raw.get("source")
|
||||
if srcs is None:
|
||||
srcs = [{"type": "claude-code"}, {"type": "opencode"}]
|
||||
if not isinstance(srcs, list):
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[[source]] must be an array of tables")
|
||||
names = set()
|
||||
for i, s in enumerate(srcs):
|
||||
sc = _section(SourceConfig, s, f"source #{i + 1}")
|
||||
if sc.type not in SOURCE_TYPES:
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"[[source]] #{i + 1}: type must be one of {sorted(SOURCE_TYPES)}")
|
||||
sc.name = sc.name or sc.type
|
||||
if sc.name in names:
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"[[source]] name {sc.name!r} is used twice; give one a distinct `name`")
|
||||
names.add(sc.name)
|
||||
sc.path = _expand(sc.path or default_source_path(sc.type))
|
||||
cfg.sources.append(sc)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg.scan = _section(ScanConfig, raw.get("scan"), "scan")
|
||||
cfg.judge = _section(JudgeConfig, raw.get("judge"), "judge")
|
||||
cfg.ledger = _section(LedgerConfig, raw.get("ledger"), "ledger")
|
||||
cfg.git = _section(GitConfig, raw.get("git"), "git")
|
||||
cfg.state = _section(StateConfig, raw.get("state"), "state")
|
||||
cfg.privacy = _section(PrivacyConfig, raw.get("privacy"), "privacy")
|
||||
cfg.hooks = _section(HooksConfig, raw.get("hooks"), "hooks")
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.scan.first_run not in ("baseline", "backfill"):
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[scan] first_run must be 'baseline' or 'backfill'")
|
||||
if cfg.scan.max_candidates < 2:
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[scan] max_candidates must be at least 2")
|
||||
if not 2 <= cfg.scan.max_per_session <= cfg.scan.max_candidates:
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[scan] max_per_session must be between 2 and max_candidates")
|
||||
if cfg.ledger.order not in ("severity", "newest"):
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[ledger] order must be 'severity' or 'newest'")
|
||||
if cfg.judge.backend not in BACKENDS:
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"[judge] backend must be one of {sorted(BACKENDS)}")
|
||||
if cfg.judge.backend == "command" and not cfg.judge.command:
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[judge] backend = 'command' needs `command = [...]`")
|
||||
if cfg.judge.timeout <= 0:
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[judge] timeout must be positive")
|
||||
|
||||
cfg.ledger.dir = _expand(cfg.ledger.dir)
|
||||
cfg.state.file = _expand(cfg.state.file) or default_state_path()
|
||||
cfg.state.seen_list = _expand(cfg.state.seen_list)
|
||||
cfg.judge.prompt_file = _expand(cfg.judge.prompt_file)
|
||||
return cfg
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
EXAMPLE = '''\
|
||||
# ai-incidents configuration. Every key is optional except ledger.dir.
|
||||
# Reference: https://github.com/sudolulo/ai-incidents#configuration
|
||||
|
||||
# Where the transcripts are. Read-only, always. Omit [[source]] entirely to read both defaults.
|
||||
[[source]]
|
||||
type = "claude-code"
|
||||
path = "~/.claude/projects"
|
||||
|
||||
[[source]]
|
||||
type = "opencode"
|
||||
path = "~/.local/share/opencode/opencode*.db"
|
||||
|
||||
[scan]
|
||||
max_candidates = 50 # most candidates shown to the judge in one run
|
||||
max_per_session = 12 # most candidates from any one session
|
||||
first_run = "baseline" # "baseline": mark existing sessions judged; "backfill": judge them
|
||||
|
||||
[judge]
|
||||
backend = "claude" # "claude" | "openai" | "command"
|
||||
model = "sonnet"
|
||||
timeout = 900
|
||||
# For a local model, use an OpenAI-compatible server instead (llama.cpp, Ollama, vLLM):
|
||||
# backend = "openai"
|
||||
# base_url = "http://localhost:11434/v1"
|
||||
# model = "qwen3:32b"
|
||||
|
||||
[ledger]
|
||||
dir = "{ledger}"
|
||||
order = "severity" # "severity" (most severe first) | "newest"
|
||||
|
||||
[git]
|
||||
enabled = true # commit the ledger if ledger.dir is a git repository
|
||||
push = false
|
||||
|
||||
[state]
|
||||
file = "{state}"
|
||||
|
||||
[privacy]
|
||||
redact = true
|
||||
|
||||
[hooks]
|
||||
# notify_cmd = "curl -s -H 'Title: ai-incidents' --data-binary @- https://ntfy.sh/your-topic"
|
||||
'''
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
"""The write side of the permission envelope.
|
||||
|
||||
Every file this tool writes goes through a ``WriteGuard``. The guard is built once per run from the
|
||||
configuration and knows exactly which places may be written: the ledger directory, the state file
|
||||
(and its lock), and the optional seen-list export. Anything else raises ``EnvelopeError`` before a
|
||||
byte is written, so a bug, a hostile path in the config, or a judge that tries to smuggle a file
|
||||
name into its verdict cannot turn this tool into a general-purpose writer.
|
||||
|
||||
The read side is simpler: transcripts are opened with ``open(..., "r")`` and SQLite ``mode=ro``,
|
||||
and the judge is given text on stdin and has no tools at all. See the README's "Permission
|
||||
envelope" section.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class EnvelopeError(PermissionError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _real(path: str) -> str:
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(path)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class WriteGuard:
|
||||
def __init__(self, dirs: list[str] = (), files: list[str] = ()):
|
||||
self.dirs = [_real(d) for d in dirs if d]
|
||||
self.files = {_real(f) for f in files if f}
|
||||
|
||||
def check(self, path: str) -> str:
|
||||
real = _real(path)
|
||||
if real in self.files:
|
||||
return real
|
||||
for d in self.dirs:
|
||||
if real == d or real.startswith(d + os.sep):
|
||||
return real
|
||||
raise EnvelopeError(f"refusing to write outside the envelope: {path}")
|
||||
|
||||
def makedirs(self, path: str) -> None:
|
||||
os.makedirs(self.check(path), exist_ok=True)
|
||||
|
||||
def write_text(self, path: str, content: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Atomic write: a reader never sees a half-written file, and a crash leaves the old one."""
|
||||
real = self.check(path)
|
||||
parent = os.path.dirname(real)
|
||||
os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".tmp-", dir=parent)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
f.write(content)
|
||||
os.replace(tmp, real)
|
||||
except BaseException:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.unlink(tmp)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
raise
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
||||
"""Commit (and optionally push) the ledger. The only git operations this tool performs.
|
||||
|
||||
* Only the files this run wrote are staged and committed, by explicit path, with
|
||||
``git commit -- <paths>``. Anything else in the ledger repository, staged or not, is left alone.
|
||||
``git add -A`` is not a review step.
|
||||
* Push is off by default. When on, it pushes the current branch to the configured remote under its
|
||||
own name: no refspec rewriting, no force, no tags. A detached HEAD is refused.
|
||||
* ``expected_remote_url`` pins the remote: if the checkout has been repointed, the push is refused
|
||||
instead of publishing the ledger somewhere else.
|
||||
* Git never prompts: an unattended run must fail, not hang waiting for a password.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
|
||||
from .config import GitConfig
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GitError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _git(repo: str, *args: str, check: bool = True, cfg: GitConfig | None = None) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
|
||||
pre = []
|
||||
if cfg and cfg.author_name:
|
||||
pre += ["-c", f"user.name={cfg.author_name}"]
|
||||
if cfg and cfg.author_email:
|
||||
pre += ["-c", f"user.email={cfg.author_email}"]
|
||||
env = {**os.environ, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0", "GIT_ASKPASS": "", "SSH_ASKPASS": ""}
|
||||
p = subprocess.run(["git", *pre, "-C", repo, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, env=env)
|
||||
if check and p.returncode != 0:
|
||||
raise GitError(f"git {' '.join(args)}: {(p.stderr or p.stdout).strip()[-400:]}")
|
||||
return p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_repo(path: str) -> bool:
|
||||
if not os.path.isdir(path):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
p = _git(path, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel", check=False)
|
||||
return p.returncode == 0 and os.path.realpath(p.stdout.strip()) == os.path.realpath(path)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def current_branch(repo: str) -> str:
|
||||
return _git(repo, "branch", "--show-current").stdout.strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _check_remote(repo: str, cfg: GitConfig) -> None:
|
||||
if not cfg.expected_remote_url:
|
||||
return
|
||||
url = _git(repo, "remote", "get-url", cfg.remote, check=False).stdout.strip()
|
||||
if url.rstrip("/").removesuffix(".git") != cfg.expected_remote_url.rstrip("/").removesuffix(".git"):
|
||||
raise GitError(f"remote {cfg.remote} is {url!r}, not the expected {cfg.expected_remote_url!r}; refusing")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _branch(repo: str, cfg: GitConfig) -> str:
|
||||
branch = current_branch(repo)
|
||||
if not branch:
|
||||
raise GitError("detached HEAD; refusing")
|
||||
if cfg.branch and branch != cfg.branch:
|
||||
raise GitError(f"ledger repo is on {branch!r}, configured branch is {cfg.branch!r}; refusing")
|
||||
return branch
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pull(repo: str, cfg: GitConfig) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Fast-forward from the remote before writing. Returns a warning, or None."""
|
||||
_check_remote(repo, cfg)
|
||||
branch = _branch(repo, cfg)
|
||||
p = _git(repo, "pull", "--ff-only", "--quiet", cfg.remote, branch, check=False)
|
||||
if p.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return f"git pull --ff-only failed: {(p.stderr or p.stdout).strip()[-200:]}"
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def commit(repo: str, paths: list[str], message: str, cfg: GitConfig) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Commit exactly ``paths``. Returns the short hash, or None when nothing changed."""
|
||||
_branch(repo, cfg)
|
||||
rel = [os.path.relpath(p, repo) for p in paths]
|
||||
for r in rel:
|
||||
if r.startswith(".."):
|
||||
raise GitError(f"refusing to commit a path outside the ledger repo: {r}")
|
||||
_git(repo, "add", "--", *rel)
|
||||
if _git(repo, "diff", "--cached", "--quiet", "--", *rel, check=False).returncode == 0:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
_git(repo, "commit", "--quiet", "-m", message, "--", *rel, cfg=cfg)
|
||||
return _git(repo, "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def push(repo: str, cfg: GitConfig) -> None:
|
||||
_check_remote(repo, cfg)
|
||||
branch = _branch(repo, cfg)
|
||||
_git(repo, "push", "--quiet", "--no-follow-tags", cfg.remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}")
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
"""Optional hooks: tell something else how the run went.
|
||||
|
||||
Hooks are commands you configure, so they run outside the permission envelope by definition. They
|
||||
receive the run summary on stdin and as ``AI_INCIDENTS_*`` environment variables; nothing is ever
|
||||
interpolated into the command line. A hook that fails is logged and ignored: a broken notifier must
|
||||
not turn a successful run into a failed one, or the other way round.
|
||||
|
||||
* ``notify_cmd``: after a run that filed at least one incident. A quiet run is silent.
|
||||
* ``on_success_cmd``: after every successful run, quiet or not. Use it as a dead-man's-switch
|
||||
heartbeat: a skipped judge is a successful run, and a monitor must be told so.
|
||||
* ``on_failure_cmd``: after a run that failed (judge error, git error, bad state).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import shlex
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run_hook(cmd: str, summary: str, env: dict[str, str], timeout: int = 60, log=None) -> bool:
|
||||
if not cmd:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
log = log or (lambda m: print(m, file=sys.stderr))
|
||||
try:
|
||||
argv = shlex.split(cmd)
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
log(f"hook {cmd!r}: cannot parse ({e})")
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
p = subprocess.run(
|
||||
argv, input=summary, text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=timeout,
|
||||
env={**os.environ, **{k: str(v) for k, v in env.items()}},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as e:
|
||||
log(f"hook {argv[0]}: {e}")
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if p.returncode != 0:
|
||||
log(f"hook {argv[0]} exited {p.returncode}: {(p.stderr or p.stdout).strip()[-200:]}")
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
|
||||
"""The judge: one model call, text in, JSON out, no tools.
|
||||
|
||||
The judge never touches the filesystem. It receives the rubric as a system prompt and the
|
||||
candidates on stdin (never in argv, where other local users could read them with ``ps``), and it
|
||||
answers with a JSON verdict. The verdict is validated here before anything is written: an exit code
|
||||
of 0 is not evidence of an answer. ``claude -p`` exits 0 while printing "You've hit your spend
|
||||
limit", and a local model can return prose. Either is a failed run, and a failed run records
|
||||
nothing, so the next run shows the same candidates again.
|
||||
|
||||
Backends:
|
||||
|
||||
* ``claude``: the Claude Code CLI in print mode, with every built-in tool and every MCP server
|
||||
disabled and session persistence off (so the judge's own session is not swept next time).
|
||||
* ``openai``: any OpenAI-compatible ``/chat/completions`` endpoint. This is the local-model path:
|
||||
llama.cpp's server, Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio.
|
||||
* ``command``: any program that reads a prompt on stdin and prints the answer on stdout.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import urllib.error
|
||||
import urllib.request
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
from importlib import resources
|
||||
|
||||
from .ledger import ISO_DATE, SEVERITIES, Entry, one_line
|
||||
from .prefilter import Candidate
|
||||
|
||||
CATEGORIES = (
|
||||
"data-loss",
|
||||
"outage",
|
||||
"credential-leak",
|
||||
"destructive-action",
|
||||
"debug-spiral",
|
||||
"unmetered-cost",
|
||||
"misattribution",
|
||||
"other",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class JudgeError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_rubric() -> str:
|
||||
return resources.files("ai_incidents").joinpath("prompts/judge.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_message(candidates: list[Candidate], existing: list[Entry], today: str) -> str:
|
||||
lines = [f"Today is {today}.", "", f"## Candidates ({len(candidates)})", ""]
|
||||
lines += [c.render() + "\n" for c in candidates]
|
||||
lines += ["", f"## Already in the ledger ({len(existing)})", ""]
|
||||
if not existing:
|
||||
lines.append("(the ledger is empty)")
|
||||
for i, e in enumerate(existing, 1):
|
||||
what = e.what()
|
||||
lines.append(f"- [E{i:02d}] {e.title} · {e.date} · {e.severity}" + (f" -- {what[:200]}" if what else ""))
|
||||
lines += ["", "Answer with the JSON object only."]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- verdict ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Incident:
|
||||
title: str
|
||||
date: str
|
||||
severity: str
|
||||
category: str
|
||||
what: str
|
||||
cost: str
|
||||
lesson: str
|
||||
candidates: list[str]
|
||||
why: str
|
||||
|
||||
def entry(self) -> Entry:
|
||||
return Entry.new(self.title, self.date, self.severity, self.what, self.cost, self.lesson)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Exclusion:
|
||||
candidates: list[str]
|
||||
reason: str
|
||||
duplicate_of: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Verdict:
|
||||
incidents: list[Incident] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
excluded: list[Exclusion] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
patterns: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
rejected: list[str] = field(default_factory=list) # malformed incidents, with the reason
|
||||
unaddressed: list[str] = field(default_factory=list) # candidate ids the judge never mentioned
|
||||
usage: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def extract_json(text: str) -> dict:
|
||||
"""The first JSON object in ``text``. Tolerates a code fence or a sentence around it, because
|
||||
models add them however firmly they are told not to."""
|
||||
text = text.strip()
|
||||
fence = re.search(r"```(?:json)?\s*(\{.*?\})\s*```", text, re.S)
|
||||
if fence:
|
||||
text = fence.group(1)
|
||||
start = text.find("{")
|
||||
if start < 0:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge answer contains no JSON object: {text[:200]!r}")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
obj, _ = json.JSONDecoder().raw_decode(text[start:])
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge answer is not valid JSON ({e}): {text[start:start + 200]!r}") from e
|
||||
if not isinstance(obj, dict):
|
||||
raise JudgeError("judge answer is not a JSON object")
|
||||
return obj
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _ids(v) -> list[str]:
|
||||
if isinstance(v, str):
|
||||
v = [v]
|
||||
if not isinstance(v, list):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
return [str(x).strip() for x in v if str(x).strip()]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_verdict(text: str, candidates: list[Candidate], today: str, redact=lambda s: s) -> Verdict:
|
||||
obj = extract_json(text)
|
||||
if not isinstance(obj.get("incidents", []), list) or not isinstance(obj.get("excluded", []), list):
|
||||
raise JudgeError("judge answer: 'incidents' and 'excluded' must be lists")
|
||||
if "incidents" not in obj and "excluded" not in obj:
|
||||
raise JudgeError("judge answer has neither 'incidents' nor 'excluded'")
|
||||
|
||||
by_id = {c.id: c for c in candidates}
|
||||
v = Verdict()
|
||||
for i, raw in enumerate(obj.get("incidents") or []):
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
v.rejected.append(f"incident #{i + 1}: not an object")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
def get(k, raw=raw):
|
||||
return one_line(redact(str(raw.get(k) or "")))
|
||||
|
||||
sev = get("severity").upper()
|
||||
missing = [k for k in ("title", "what", "cost", "lesson") if not get(k)]
|
||||
if missing or sev not in SEVERITIES:
|
||||
why = f"missing {', '.join(missing)}" if missing else f"severity {sev!r}"
|
||||
v.rejected.append(f"incident #{i + 1} ({get('title') or 'untitled'}): {why}")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
ids = [x for x in _ids(raw.get("candidates")) if x in by_id]
|
||||
date = get("date")
|
||||
if not ISO_DATE.match(date):
|
||||
dated = [by_id[x].date for x in ids if by_id[x].date]
|
||||
date = dated[0] if dated else today
|
||||
cat = get("category").lower()
|
||||
v.incidents.append(Incident(
|
||||
title=get("title"), date=date, severity=sev,
|
||||
category=cat if cat in CATEGORIES else "other",
|
||||
what=get("what"), cost=get("cost"), lesson=get("lesson"),
|
||||
candidates=ids, why=get("why"),
|
||||
))
|
||||
for raw in obj.get("excluded") or []:
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
ids = [x for x in _ids(raw.get("candidates") or raw.get("candidate")) if x in by_id]
|
||||
v.excluded.append(Exclusion(ids, one_line(redact(str(raw.get("reason") or ""))) or "(no reason given)",
|
||||
one_line(str(raw.get("duplicate_of") or ""), 40)))
|
||||
pats = obj.get("patterns") or []
|
||||
if isinstance(pats, list):
|
||||
v.patterns = [one_line(redact(str(p)), 500) for p in pats if str(p).strip()]
|
||||
mentioned = {x for i in v.incidents for x in i.candidates} | {x for e in v.excluded for x in e.candidates}
|
||||
v.unaddressed = [c.id for c in candidates if c.id not in mentioned]
|
||||
return v
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- backends --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class JudgeConfig:
|
||||
backend: str = "claude"
|
||||
model: str = "sonnet"
|
||||
timeout: int = 900
|
||||
binary: str = "claude"
|
||||
extra_args: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
base_url: str = "http://localhost:8080/v1"
|
||||
api_key_env: str = ""
|
||||
json_mode: bool = True
|
||||
max_tokens: int = 16000
|
||||
command: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
prompt_file: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def claude_argv(cfg: JudgeConfig, system_prompt: str) -> list[str]:
|
||||
argv = [
|
||||
cfg.binary, "-p",
|
||||
"--output-format", "json",
|
||||
"--tools", "", # no built-in tools: no Read, no Bash, no Write, no web
|
||||
"--strict-mcp-config", # and no MCP servers, since none are passed in
|
||||
"--no-session-persistence", # the judge's own session is not written to ~/.claude/projects
|
||||
"--system-prompt", system_prompt,
|
||||
]
|
||||
if cfg.model:
|
||||
argv += ["--model", cfg.model]
|
||||
return argv + list(cfg.extra_args)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _run(argv: list[str], stdin: str, timeout: int) -> str:
|
||||
# An empty working directory: no project CLAUDE.md, .mcp.json or settings get picked up, and
|
||||
# nothing the judge's CLI might write lands anywhere that matters.
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="ai-incidents-judge-") as cwd:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
p = subprocess.run(
|
||||
argv, input=stdin, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, cwd=cwd,
|
||||
env={**os.environ, "NO_COLOR": "1"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except FileNotFoundError as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge command not found: {argv[0]}") from e
|
||||
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge timed out after {timeout}s") from e
|
||||
if p.returncode != 0:
|
||||
tail = (p.stderr or p.stdout or "").strip()[-500:]
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge exited {p.returncode}: {tail}")
|
||||
return p.stdout
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _claude(cfg: JudgeConfig, system_prompt: str, message: str) -> tuple[str, dict]:
|
||||
out = _run(claude_argv(cfg, system_prompt), message, cfg.timeout)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
env = json.loads(out)
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"claude did not return its JSON envelope: {out.strip()[:300]!r}") from e
|
||||
if not isinstance(env, dict):
|
||||
raise JudgeError("claude returned an unexpected envelope")
|
||||
result = str(env.get("result") or "")
|
||||
if env.get("is_error") or env.get("subtype") not in (None, "success"):
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"claude reported an error: {result[:300] or env.get('subtype')}")
|
||||
usage = {k: env[k] for k in ("total_cost_usd", "duration_ms", "num_turns") if k in env}
|
||||
if isinstance(env.get("usage"), dict):
|
||||
u = env["usage"]
|
||||
usage["input_tokens"] = sum(int(u.get(k) or 0) for k in (
|
||||
"input_tokens", "cache_creation_input_tokens", "cache_read_input_tokens"))
|
||||
usage["output_tokens"] = int(u.get("output_tokens") or 0)
|
||||
return result, usage
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _openai(cfg: JudgeConfig, system_prompt: str, message: str) -> tuple[str, dict]:
|
||||
body = {
|
||||
"model": cfg.model,
|
||||
"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": system_prompt}, {"role": "user", "content": message}],
|
||||
"temperature": 0,
|
||||
"max_tokens": cfg.max_tokens,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cfg.json_mode:
|
||||
body["response_format"] = {"type": "json_object"}
|
||||
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
|
||||
if cfg.api_key_env:
|
||||
key = os.environ.get(cfg.api_key_env, "")
|
||||
if not key:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"environment variable {cfg.api_key_env} is not set")
|
||||
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {key}"
|
||||
req = urllib.request.Request(
|
||||
cfg.base_url.rstrip("/") + "/chat/completions", data=json.dumps(body).encode(), headers=headers
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=cfg.timeout) as r:
|
||||
data = json.loads(r.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
|
||||
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge endpoint returned HTTP {e.code}: {e.read()[:300]!r}") from e
|
||||
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge endpoint unreachable: {e}") from e
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"judge endpoint returned non-JSON: {e}") from e
|
||||
try:
|
||||
text = data["choices"][0]["message"]["content"] or ""
|
||||
except (KeyError, IndexError, TypeError) as e:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"unexpected response shape from judge endpoint: {str(data)[:300]}") from e
|
||||
usage = {}
|
||||
if isinstance(data.get("usage"), dict):
|
||||
usage = {"input_tokens": data["usage"].get("prompt_tokens"), "output_tokens": data["usage"].get("completion_tokens")}
|
||||
return text, usage
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _command(cfg: JudgeConfig, system_prompt: str, message: str) -> tuple[str, dict]:
|
||||
if not cfg.command:
|
||||
raise JudgeError("judge.backend = 'command' needs judge.command")
|
||||
return _run(list(cfg.command), system_prompt + "\n\n---\n\n" + message, cfg.timeout), {}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
BACKENDS = {"claude": _claude, "openai": _openai, "command": _command}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def call(cfg: JudgeConfig, system_prompt: str, message: str) -> tuple[str, dict]:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
fn = BACKENDS[cfg.backend]
|
||||
except KeyError:
|
||||
raise JudgeError(f"unknown judge backend {cfg.backend!r}; expected one of {sorted(BACKENDS)}") from None
|
||||
return fn(cfg, system_prompt, message)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
|
||||
"""The ledger: a markdown file of incidents, ranked by what they cost.
|
||||
|
||||
``incidents.md`` is the source of truth and stays hand-editable. Each entry is
|
||||
|
||||
## <short title> · <YYYY-MM-DD> · <HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW>
|
||||
- **What:** one sentence: what the agent did
|
||||
- **Cost:** one sentence: what it actually cost
|
||||
- **Lesson:** one actionable sentence: how not to repeat it
|
||||
|
||||
Everything above the first entry is the header and everything from the first non-entry ``##``
|
||||
section after the entries (for example ``## Recurring patterns``) is the footer; both are kept
|
||||
verbatim. Entry bodies are kept verbatim too, so a hand-written entry with extra lines survives a
|
||||
run untouched. Only the order changes: most severe first, newest first within a severity.
|
||||
|
||||
``index.json`` is derived from ``incidents.md`` on every write and is never authored, so a confused
|
||||
run can garble prose but cannot corrupt the index.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import datetime as _dt
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
|
||||
SEVERITIES = ("HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW")
|
||||
SEV_RANK = {s: i for i, s in enumerate(SEVERITIES)}
|
||||
SEP = " · "
|
||||
|
||||
HEAD = re.compile(
|
||||
r"^##\s+(?P<title>.+?)\s+·\s+(?P<date>[^·]+?)\s+·\s+(?P<sev>HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW)\s*$"
|
||||
)
|
||||
ISO_DATE = re.compile(r"^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$")
|
||||
_RULE = re.compile(r"^\s*(-{3,}|\*{3,}|_{3,})\s*$")
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_HEADER = """# {title}
|
||||
|
||||
Times AI-generated work caused a real problem: what it did, what it cost, and the lesson.
|
||||
Most severe first; newest first within a severity. Written by `ai-incidents`; hand edits and
|
||||
hand-written entries are kept.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def fingerprint(title: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Stable identity for an incident: its title, normalised. Severity gets re-rated and dates get
|
||||
corrected, but a retitled incident is a different incident."""
|
||||
norm = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "-", title.lower()).strip("-")
|
||||
return hashlib.sha1(norm.encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def one_line(s: str, limit: int = 1000) -> str:
|
||||
"""Collapse whitespace. A newline in model output must never become a new heading."""
|
||||
s = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", str(s or "")).strip()
|
||||
return s[:limit]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def clean_title(s: str) -> str:
|
||||
# The separator is structural; a title containing it would parse as a different entry.
|
||||
return one_line(s, 160).replace("·", "-").lstrip("#").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Entry:
|
||||
title: str
|
||||
date: str
|
||||
severity: str
|
||||
body: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def fp(self) -> str:
|
||||
return fingerprint(self.title)
|
||||
|
||||
def heading(self) -> str:
|
||||
return f"## {self.title}{SEP}{self.date}{SEP}{self.severity}"
|
||||
|
||||
def render(self) -> str:
|
||||
return "\n".join([self.heading(), *self.body])
|
||||
|
||||
def sort_date(self) -> str:
|
||||
m = re.match(r"\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}", self.date)
|
||||
return m.group(0) if m else ""
|
||||
|
||||
def what(self) -> str:
|
||||
for ln in self.body:
|
||||
m = re.match(r"^\s*-\s*\*\*What:\*\*\s*(.*)$", ln)
|
||||
if m:
|
||||
return m.group(1).strip()
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def new(cls, title, date, severity, what, cost, lesson) -> "Entry":
|
||||
return cls(
|
||||
clean_title(title),
|
||||
date,
|
||||
severity,
|
||||
[f"- **What:** {one_line(what)}", f"- **Cost:** {one_line(cost)}", f"- **Lesson:** {one_line(lesson)}"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Ledger:
|
||||
header: str = ""
|
||||
entries: list[Entry] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
footer: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
def fps(self) -> set[str]:
|
||||
return {e.fp for e in self.entries}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _trim(lines: list[str]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Drop trailing blank lines and horizontal rules: they are separators, not content."""
|
||||
while lines and (not lines[-1].strip() or _RULE.match(lines[-1])):
|
||||
lines = lines[:-1]
|
||||
return lines
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse(text: str) -> Ledger:
|
||||
lines = text.splitlines()
|
||||
header: list[str] = []
|
||||
entries: list[Entry] = []
|
||||
footer: list[str] = []
|
||||
cur: Entry | None = None
|
||||
in_footer = False
|
||||
for ln in lines:
|
||||
m = HEAD.match(ln)
|
||||
if in_footer:
|
||||
if m:
|
||||
# An entry after the footer started: treat it as an entry, keep the footer intact.
|
||||
in_footer = False
|
||||
else:
|
||||
footer.append(ln)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if m:
|
||||
if cur:
|
||||
cur.body = _trim(cur.body)
|
||||
entries.append(cur)
|
||||
cur = Entry(m.group("title").strip(), m.group("date").strip(), m.group("sev"))
|
||||
elif ln.startswith("## ") and entries + ([cur] if cur else []):
|
||||
if cur:
|
||||
cur.body = _trim(cur.body)
|
||||
entries.append(cur)
|
||||
cur = None
|
||||
in_footer = True
|
||||
footer.append(ln)
|
||||
elif cur is not None:
|
||||
cur.body.append(ln)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
header.append(ln)
|
||||
if cur:
|
||||
cur.body = _trim(cur.body)
|
||||
entries.append(cur)
|
||||
return Ledger("\n".join(_trim(header)), entries, "\n".join(footer).rstrip())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ordered(entries: list[Entry], order: str = "severity") -> list[Entry]:
|
||||
# sorted() is stable, so entries that tie keep their existing relative order.
|
||||
newest = sorted(entries, key=lambda e: e.sort_date(), reverse=True)
|
||||
if order == "newest":
|
||||
return newest
|
||||
return sorted(newest, key=lambda e: SEV_RANK.get(e.severity, len(SEVERITIES)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def render(ledger: Ledger, order: str = "severity") -> str:
|
||||
parts = [ledger.header.rstrip()] if ledger.header.strip() else []
|
||||
parts += [e.render() for e in ordered(ledger.entries, order)]
|
||||
if ledger.footer.strip():
|
||||
parts.append(ledger.footer.rstrip())
|
||||
return "\n\n".join(parts) + "\n"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def add_entries(ledger: Ledger, new: list[Entry]) -> tuple[list[Entry], list[Entry]]:
|
||||
"""Add entries whose fingerprint is not already present. Returns (added, duplicates)."""
|
||||
have = ledger.fps()
|
||||
added, dupes = [], []
|
||||
for e in new:
|
||||
if e.fp in have:
|
||||
dupes.append(e)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
have.add(e.fp)
|
||||
ledger.entries.append(e)
|
||||
added.append(e)
|
||||
return added, dupes
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
PATTERNS_HEADING = "## Recurring patterns"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def add_patterns(ledger: Ledger, patterns: list[str]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Append bullets to the Recurring patterns section, creating it if needed."""
|
||||
pats = [one_line(p, 500) for p in patterns if one_line(p)]
|
||||
existing = set(re.findall(r"^\s*-\s+(.*)$", ledger.footer, flags=re.M))
|
||||
pats = [p for p in dict.fromkeys(pats) if p not in existing]
|
||||
if not pats:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
bullets = "\n".join(f"- {p}" for p in pats)
|
||||
footer = ledger.footer
|
||||
if PATTERNS_HEADING in footer:
|
||||
lines = footer.splitlines()
|
||||
start = next(i for i, ln in enumerate(lines) if ln.strip() == PATTERNS_HEADING)
|
||||
end = next((i for i in range(start + 1, len(lines)) if lines[i].startswith("## ") or _RULE.match(lines[i])), len(lines))
|
||||
while end > start + 1 and not lines[end - 1].strip():
|
||||
end -= 1
|
||||
lines[end:end] = bullets.splitlines()
|
||||
ledger.footer = "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
ledger.footer = (PATTERNS_HEADING + "\n\n" + bullets + ("\n\n" + footer if footer.strip() else "")).rstrip()
|
||||
return pats
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def index(ledger: Ledger, prior: dict | None, today: str) -> dict:
|
||||
prior_by_fp = {i.get("fp"): i for i in (prior or {}).get("incidents", []) if isinstance(i, dict)}
|
||||
items = []
|
||||
for e in ordered(ledger.entries):
|
||||
items.append({
|
||||
"fp": e.fp,
|
||||
"title": e.title,
|
||||
"date": e.date,
|
||||
"severity": e.severity,
|
||||
"first_seen": prior_by_fp.get(e.fp, {}).get("first_seen", today),
|
||||
})
|
||||
counts = {"total": len(items)}
|
||||
for s in SEVERITIES:
|
||||
counts[s.lower()] = sum(1 for i in items if i["severity"] == s)
|
||||
return {"generated": today, "counts": counts, "incidents": items}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def dump_index(data: dict) -> str:
|
||||
return json.dumps(data, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def today() -> str:
|
||||
return _dt.date.today().isoformat()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
|
||||
"""One run: scan, gate, judge, write, commit, record.
|
||||
|
||||
The order is what makes it safe to run unattended:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Scan** every configured source. Read-only. Clean sessions are recorded as judged straight
|
||||
away (they carry nothing a judge could file).
|
||||
2. **Gate.** No candidates means no model call at all. A quiet night costs nothing.
|
||||
3. **Judge** the candidates in one call. The answer must parse and validate, or the run fails.
|
||||
4. **Write** the ledger, the run report, ``latest.md`` and ``index.json``, and nothing else.
|
||||
5. **Commit** exactly those files, and push if configured.
|
||||
6. **Record** the judged sessions as seen. Only now: if any earlier step failed, the next run sees
|
||||
the same candidates again.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import fnmatch
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
|
||||
from . import gitops, judge, ledger, report
|
||||
from .config import Config, ConfigError
|
||||
from .envelope import WriteGuard
|
||||
from .hooks import run_hook
|
||||
from .prefilter import Candidate, Patterns, extract
|
||||
from .redact import Redactor
|
||||
from .sources import SourceError, iter_source
|
||||
from .state import RunLock, State
|
||||
|
||||
EXIT_OK, EXIT_FAILED, EXIT_USAGE, EXIT_LOCKED = 0, 1, 2, 3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class SourceStats:
|
||||
total: int = 0
|
||||
new: int = 0
|
||||
clean: int = 0
|
||||
with_candidates: int = 0
|
||||
deferred: int = 0
|
||||
excluded: int = 0
|
||||
baseline: int = 0
|
||||
unreadable: int = 0
|
||||
missing: bool = False
|
||||
failed: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class ScanResult:
|
||||
candidates: list[Candidate] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
pending: dict[str, set[str]] = field(default_factory=dict) # judged only after a successful write
|
||||
done: dict[str, set[str]] = field(default_factory=dict) # clean, excluded, or baseline: seen now
|
||||
stats: dict[str, SourceStats] = field(default_factory=dict)
|
||||
errors: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
|
||||
def summary(self) -> list[str]:
|
||||
lines = []
|
||||
for name, s in self.stats.items():
|
||||
if s.missing:
|
||||
lines.append(f"**{name}:** no transcripts found at the configured path")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if s.baseline:
|
||||
lines.append(f"**{name}:** first run, {s.baseline} existing session(s) marked as judged without judging")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
bits = [f"{s.new} new session(s)", f"{s.clean} clean", f"{s.with_candidates} with candidates"]
|
||||
if s.deferred:
|
||||
bits.append(f"{s.deferred} deferred to the next run (candidate budget spent)")
|
||||
if s.excluded:
|
||||
bits.append(f"{s.excluded} excluded by config")
|
||||
if s.unreadable:
|
||||
bits.append(f"{s.unreadable} unreadable")
|
||||
lines.append(f"**{name}:** {', '.join(bits)}")
|
||||
lines.append(f"**Candidates:** {len(self.candidates)}")
|
||||
lines += [f"**Error:** {e}" for e in self.errors]
|
||||
return lines
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def patterns_for(cfg: Config) -> Patterns:
|
||||
return Patterns.with_extras(cfg.scan.extra_destructive, cfg.scan.extra_benign, cfg.scan.extra_alarm)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def scan(cfg: Config, state: State, backfill: bool = False) -> ScanResult:
|
||||
"""Read every source and collect candidates. Never writes anything; the caller decides."""
|
||||
res = ScanResult()
|
||||
pats = patterns_for(cfg)
|
||||
budget = cfg.scan.max_candidates
|
||||
for src in cfg.sources:
|
||||
st = res.stats[src.name] = SourceStats()
|
||||
seen = state.seen(src.name)
|
||||
pending = res.pending.setdefault(src.name, set())
|
||||
done = res.done.setdefault(src.name, set())
|
||||
baseline = not state.initialized(src.name) and not backfill and cfg.scan.first_run == "baseline"
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for ref in iter_source(src.type, src.name, src.path):
|
||||
st.total += 1
|
||||
if ref.key in seen:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if baseline:
|
||||
st.baseline += 1
|
||||
done.add(ref.key)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
st.new += 1
|
||||
if any(fnmatch.fnmatch(ref.path, pat) for pat in cfg.scan.exclude):
|
||||
st.excluded += 1
|
||||
done.add(ref.key)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
sess = ref.load()
|
||||
except (OSError, sqlite3.Error, ValueError) as e:
|
||||
# Left unrecorded, so it is tried again next run.
|
||||
st.unreadable += 1
|
||||
res.errors.append(f"{ref.path}: {e}")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
ex = extract(sess, src.name, ref.short_id, pats, cfg.scan.max_per_session)
|
||||
if ex.clean:
|
||||
st.clean += 1
|
||||
done.add(ref.key)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if len(ex.candidates) > budget:
|
||||
# Not shown, not recorded: the next run starts with it. Keep scanning, so clean
|
||||
# sessions further on are still recorded.
|
||||
st.deferred += 1
|
||||
continue
|
||||
budget -= len(ex.candidates)
|
||||
st.with_candidates += 1
|
||||
res.candidates += ex.candidates
|
||||
pending.add(ref.key)
|
||||
except SourceError as e:
|
||||
res.errors.append(f"{src.name}: {e}")
|
||||
st.failed = True
|
||||
st.missing = st.total == 0 and not st.failed
|
||||
for n, c in enumerate(res.candidates, 1):
|
||||
c.id = f"C{n:02d}"
|
||||
return res
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rubric(cfg: Config) -> str:
|
||||
if cfg.judge.prompt_file:
|
||||
with open(cfg.judge.prompt_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
return f.read()
|
||||
return judge.default_rubric()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _judge_label(cfg: Config) -> str:
|
||||
j = cfg.judge
|
||||
if j.backend == "claude":
|
||||
return f"claude CLI, model {j.model or 'default'}"
|
||||
if j.backend == "openai":
|
||||
return f"{j.model} at {j.base_url}"
|
||||
return f"command `{os.path.basename(j.command[0])}`" if j.command else "command"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _read(path: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
return f.read()
|
||||
except FileNotFoundError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _report_path(ledger_dir: str, date: str) -> str:
|
||||
base = os.path.join(ledger_dir, "reports", date)
|
||||
path, n = base + ".md", 2
|
||||
while os.path.exists(path):
|
||||
path, n = f"{base}-{n}.md", n + 1
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Outcome:
|
||||
code: int = EXIT_OK
|
||||
headline: str = ""
|
||||
filed: list = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
excluded: int = 0
|
||||
report_path: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
def summary(self) -> str:
|
||||
out = [self.headline]
|
||||
out += [f"{i.severity:<6} {i.title}" for i in self.filed]
|
||||
if self.report_path:
|
||||
out.append(f"report: {self.report_path}")
|
||||
return "\n".join(out)
|
||||
|
||||
def env(self, status: str) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
sev = lambda s: sum(1 for i in self.filed if i.severity == s) # noqa: E731
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_STATUS": status,
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_HEADLINE": self.headline,
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_FILED": str(len(self.filed)),
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_HIGH": str(sev("HIGH")),
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_MEDIUM": str(sev("MEDIUM")),
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_LOW": str(sev("LOW")),
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_EXCLUDED": str(self.excluded),
|
||||
"AI_INCIDENTS_REPORT": self.report_path,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def headline(date: str, filed: list, excluded: int) -> str:
|
||||
if not filed:
|
||||
return f"ai-incidents {date}: no new incidents" + (f", {excluded} candidate(s) excluded" if excluded else "")
|
||||
high = sum(1 for i in filed if i.severity == "HIGH")
|
||||
return f"ai-incidents {date}: {len(filed)} filed" + (f" ({high} high)" if high else "") + f", {excluded} candidate(s) excluded"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run(
|
||||
cfg: Config,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
dry_run: bool = False,
|
||||
with_judge: bool = False,
|
||||
backfill: bool = False,
|
||||
notify_cmd: str | None = None,
|
||||
use_git: bool | None = None,
|
||||
push: bool | None = None,
|
||||
verbose: bool = False,
|
||||
say=print,
|
||||
) -> Outcome:
|
||||
if not cfg.ledger.dir:
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[ledger] dir is not set")
|
||||
ledger_dir = os.path.realpath(cfg.ledger.dir)
|
||||
guard = WriteGuard(
|
||||
dirs=[ledger_dir],
|
||||
files=[cfg.state.file, cfg.state.file + ".lock", cfg.state.seen_list],
|
||||
)
|
||||
notify = cfg.hooks.notify_cmd if notify_cmd is None else notify_cmd
|
||||
git_on = cfg.git.enabled if use_git is None else use_git
|
||||
git_on = git_on and gitops.is_repo(ledger_dir)
|
||||
do_push = git_on and (cfg.git.push if push is None else push)
|
||||
date = ledger.today()
|
||||
redact = Redactor(cfg.privacy.extra_redact_patterns, enabled=cfg.privacy.redact)
|
||||
|
||||
def fail(msg: str, outcome: Outcome | None = None) -> Outcome:
|
||||
o = outcome or Outcome()
|
||||
o.code = EXIT_FAILED
|
||||
# An error can quote the judge's answer, which can quote a transcript: mask it like the rest.
|
||||
o.headline = f"ai-incidents {date}: FAILED: {redact(msg)}"
|
||||
say(o.headline)
|
||||
if not dry_run:
|
||||
run_hook(cfg.hooks.on_failure_cmd, o.summary(), o.env("failed"), cfg.hooks.timeout)
|
||||
return o
|
||||
|
||||
lock = None
|
||||
if not dry_run:
|
||||
lock = RunLock(guard, cfg.state.file)
|
||||
lock.__enter__() # LockedError propagates to the CLI
|
||||
try:
|
||||
state = State(cfg.state.file, cfg.state.seen_list)
|
||||
warnings = []
|
||||
if do_push and not dry_run:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
w = gitops.pull(ledger_dir, cfg.git)
|
||||
except gitops.GitError as e:
|
||||
return fail(str(e))
|
||||
if w:
|
||||
warnings.append(w)
|
||||
|
||||
res = scan(cfg, state, backfill=backfill)
|
||||
for line in res.summary():
|
||||
say(line.replace("**", ""))
|
||||
for w in warnings:
|
||||
say(f"warning: {w}")
|
||||
|
||||
if not dry_run:
|
||||
for name, keys in res.done.items():
|
||||
state.mark_seen(name, keys)
|
||||
for src in cfg.sources:
|
||||
# A source that could not be read has not had its baseline taken; the next run must
|
||||
# still treat it as a first run rather than judging its whole history.
|
||||
if not res.stats[src.name].failed:
|
||||
state.mark_initialized(src.name)
|
||||
|
||||
if not res.candidates:
|
||||
o = Outcome(headline=f"ai-incidents {date}: no new candidate incidents; judge not invoked")
|
||||
say(o.headline)
|
||||
if not dry_run:
|
||||
state.record_run({"result": "quiet", "candidates": 0})
|
||||
state.save(guard)
|
||||
if do_push:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
gitops.push(ledger_dir, cfg.git) # deliver anything an earlier run could not
|
||||
except gitops.GitError as e:
|
||||
return fail(str(e), o)
|
||||
run_hook(cfg.hooks.on_success_cmd, o.summary(), o.env("ok"), cfg.hooks.timeout)
|
||||
return o
|
||||
|
||||
for c in res.candidates:
|
||||
c.body = redact(c.body)
|
||||
|
||||
led_path = os.path.join(ledger_dir, "incidents.md")
|
||||
text = _read(led_path)
|
||||
led = ledger.parse(text) if text is not None else ledger.Ledger(ledger.DEFAULT_HEADER.format(title=cfg.ledger.title))
|
||||
message = judge.build_message(res.candidates, ledger.ordered(led.entries), date)
|
||||
|
||||
if not dry_run:
|
||||
state.save(guard) # clean and baseline sessions are durable even if the judge fails
|
||||
|
||||
if dry_run and not with_judge:
|
||||
say(f"dry run: would send {len(res.candidates)} candidate(s), {len(message):,} characters, "
|
||||
f"to the judge ({_judge_label(cfg)}). Nothing was sent and nothing was written.")
|
||||
if verbose:
|
||||
say("\n" + message)
|
||||
return Outcome(headline=f"ai-incidents {date}: dry run, {len(res.candidates)} candidate(s)")
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
answer, usage = judge.call(cfg.judge, _rubric(cfg), message)
|
||||
verdict = judge.parse_verdict(answer, res.candidates, date, redact)
|
||||
except (judge.JudgeError, OSError) as e:
|
||||
return fail(f"judge: {e}")
|
||||
verdict.usage = usage
|
||||
|
||||
entries = [(i, i.entry()) for i in verdict.incidents]
|
||||
added, _ = ledger.add_entries(led, [e for _, e in entries])
|
||||
added_ids = {id(e) for e in added}
|
||||
filed = [i for i, e in entries if id(e) in added_ids]
|
||||
already = [i for i, e in entries if id(e) not in added_ids]
|
||||
added_patterns = ledger.add_patterns(led, verdict.patterns)
|
||||
verdict.patterns = added_patterns
|
||||
excluded = sum(len(e.candidates) or 1 for e in verdict.excluded)
|
||||
|
||||
o = Outcome(filed=filed, excluded=excluded)
|
||||
o.headline = headline(date, filed, excluded)
|
||||
rep_path = _report_path(ledger_dir, date)
|
||||
rep = report.render(date, res.summary(), res.candidates, verdict, filed, already, _judge_label(cfg))
|
||||
idx_path = os.path.join(ledger_dir, "index.json")
|
||||
prior = None
|
||||
if (raw := _read(idx_path)) is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
prior = json.loads(raw)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
prior = None
|
||||
new_ledger = ledger.render(led, cfg.ledger.order)
|
||||
new_index = ledger.dump_index(ledger.index(led, prior, date))
|
||||
|
||||
if dry_run:
|
||||
say(o.headline + " (dry run: nothing written)")
|
||||
say("\n" + rep)
|
||||
return o
|
||||
|
||||
latest = os.path.join(ledger_dir, "latest.md")
|
||||
guard.makedirs(os.path.join(ledger_dir, "reports"))
|
||||
guard.write_text(led_path, new_ledger)
|
||||
guard.write_text(rep_path, rep)
|
||||
guard.write_text(latest, rep)
|
||||
guard.write_text(idx_path, new_index)
|
||||
o.report_path = rep_path
|
||||
|
||||
if not git_on and cfg.git.enabled and use_git is None:
|
||||
say(f"note: {ledger_dir} is not a git repository; the ledger was written but not committed")
|
||||
if git_on:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
sha = gitops.commit(ledger_dir, [led_path, rep_path, latest, idx_path], o.headline, cfg.git)
|
||||
if sha:
|
||||
say(f"committed {sha}")
|
||||
except gitops.GitError as e:
|
||||
return fail(str(e), o)
|
||||
|
||||
# The verdict is on disk (and committed): these sessions are now safely judged.
|
||||
for name, keys in res.pending.items():
|
||||
state.mark_seen(name, keys)
|
||||
state.record_run({"result": "judged", "candidates": len(res.candidates),
|
||||
"filed": len(filed), "excluded": excluded})
|
||||
state.save(guard)
|
||||
|
||||
if do_push:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
gitops.push(ledger_dir, cfg.git)
|
||||
say(f"pushed to {cfg.git.remote}")
|
||||
except gitops.GitError as e:
|
||||
# The ledger is committed locally and the sessions are recorded; the next run pushes.
|
||||
return fail(f"push: {e}", o)
|
||||
|
||||
say(o.summary())
|
||||
if filed:
|
||||
run_hook(notify, o.summary(), o.env("ok"), cfg.hooks.timeout)
|
||||
run_hook(cfg.hooks.on_success_cmd, o.summary(), o.env("ok"), cfg.hooks.timeout)
|
||||
return o
|
||||
except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
|
||||
# Includes an EnvelopeError (a write outside the envelope) and a corrupt state file.
|
||||
return fail(f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}")
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
if lock:
|
||||
lock.__exit__(None, None, None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reindex(cfg: Config, say=print) -> int:
|
||||
"""Re-rank ``incidents.md`` and regenerate ``index.json`` after hand edits. Commits nothing."""
|
||||
if not cfg.ledger.dir:
|
||||
raise ConfigError("[ledger] dir is not set")
|
||||
ledger_dir = os.path.realpath(cfg.ledger.dir)
|
||||
guard = WriteGuard(dirs=[ledger_dir])
|
||||
led_path = os.path.join(ledger_dir, "incidents.md")
|
||||
text = _read(led_path)
|
||||
if text is None:
|
||||
say(f"no ledger at {led_path}")
|
||||
return EXIT_FAILED
|
||||
led = ledger.parse(text)
|
||||
idx_path = os.path.join(ledger_dir, "index.json")
|
||||
prior = None
|
||||
if (raw := _read(idx_path)) is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
prior = json.loads(raw)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
guard.write_text(led_path, ledger.render(led, cfg.ledger.order))
|
||||
guard.write_text(idx_path, ledger.dump_index(ledger.index(led, prior, ledger.today())))
|
||||
say(f"reindexed {len(led.entries)} incident(s)")
|
||||
return EXIT_OK
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
|
||||
"""Deterministic pre-filter: find the moments in a session worth showing to the judge.
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing here calls a model. The pre-filter is tuned for recall, and it is cheap, so it can look at
|
||||
every session; the judge is tuned for precision, and it is expensive, so it only sees what survives
|
||||
this step.
|
||||
|
||||
A session produces candidates in three shapes:
|
||||
|
||||
* SNIPPET: somebody *said* something. The user corrected or blamed the agent, or the agent admitted
|
||||
a mistake, raised an alarm, or blamed somebody else's code. The surrounding turns come with it.
|
||||
* EVIDENCE: what a session that produced snippets actually *did*: its destructive commands and its
|
||||
notable failures, attached to those snippets.
|
||||
* DIGEST: nobody said anything, but the session ran something destructive or something notably
|
||||
broke. The task, the commands and the failures are shown instead.
|
||||
|
||||
Recall cannot depend on the culprit choosing the right words. The worst incidents are often the
|
||||
ones nobody narrates, so tool calls and tool output are read as well as conversation text.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
|
||||
from .sources import Session
|
||||
|
||||
# High-precision signals: agent self-admissions ...
|
||||
AI_ADMIT = re.compile(
|
||||
r"\b(i made a mistake|my (fault|mistake|error)|i broke|i accidentally|"
|
||||
r"i shouldn'?t have|i should not have|credential exposure|real credential|"
|
||||
r"leaked|data loss|i deleted|i overwrote|i wiped|i blinded|i clobbered|"
|
||||
r"i corrupted|i destroyed|i lost|i caused|i introduced|i polluted|i swept in|"
|
||||
r"premature (exclusion|delete|deletion)|unplanned reboot|that was wrong of me|"
|
||||
r"that was my (error|mistake|fault)|(that|the) (outage|breakage|damage) was mine|"
|
||||
r"i wrongly|hard to undo|blast radius|was mine\b|apolog(y|ise|ize)|"
|
||||
r"i had to (kill|revert|undo|roll back)|undo(ing)? (my|the damage)|"
|
||||
r"i (just )?(reverted|rolled back)|no damage|left (it|things) (broken|dirty)|"
|
||||
r"went blind|stopped being (monitored|watched)|silently (failed|stopped|broke))\b",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ... and direct user blame or correction.
|
||||
USER_SIG = re.compile(
|
||||
r"\b(you (broke|deleted|overwrote|wiped|lost|removed|nuked|corrupted|clobbered)|"
|
||||
r"why did you|that'?s (wrong|not what|broken)|what merge|something you did|"
|
||||
r"revert (that|it|the)|undo (that|it|the)|roll ?back|stop,? (you|that)|"
|
||||
r"you shouldn'?t|you weren'?t supposed|don'?t do that|that broke|"
|
||||
r"put (it|that) back|restore (it|that))\b",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# "User" turns injected by the agent harness. They are not a person complaining.
|
||||
SYNTHETIC = re.compile(
|
||||
r"^\s*(<task-notification|<command-|<local-command-|<bash-(input|stdout|stderr)>|"
|
||||
r"<user-prompt-submit-hook|\[SYSTEM NOTIFICATION|"
|
||||
r"<system-reminder|This session is being continued|Caveat: The messages)",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# What damage and remediation look like as commands, whatever anybody said about them.
|
||||
DESTRUCTIVE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(git\s+(reset\s+--hard|revert|checkout\s+--|clean\s+-[a-z]*f|push\s+(-f|--force))"
|
||||
r"|rm\s+-[a-z]*[rf]|shred\b|truncate\b|>\s*/dev/(sd|nvme)"
|
||||
r"|DROP\s+(TABLE|DATABASE)|DELETE\s+FROM|TRUNCATE\s+TABLE"
|
||||
r"|pkill|kill\s+-9|kill\s+-KILL|killall"
|
||||
r"|systemctl[^\n]*\b(stop|disable|mask)\b"
|
||||
r"|docker[^\n]*\b(rm|kill|down|prune)\b|zfs\s+destroy|--restore\b"
|
||||
r"|chown\s+-R|chmod\s+-R|mv\s+[^\n]*\.(bak|old|orig)\b)",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Monitoring and billing alarms. If a session trips them, that is the incident, confessed or not.
|
||||
ALARM = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(scrape_error\s+1|node_textfile_scrape_error"
|
||||
r"|spend limit|silently (failed|stopped|broke)|stopped being (monitored|watched)"
|
||||
r"|went blind|data ?loss|corrupt(ed|ion)?)\b",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Misattribution: the agent deciding somebody else's code is at fault. It hides itself (no
|
||||
# confession, no complaint, no destructive command), so it needs its own signal: the language of
|
||||
# blame. High recall on purpose; most hits are correct diagnoses and the judge says so in one line.
|
||||
BLAME = re.compile(
|
||||
r"((this|that|it)('?s| is) an? (known )?(bug|issue|limitation|quirk|restriction) (in|with)"
|
||||
r"|(is|are) (being |just )?(strict|picky|fussy|weird|broken|buggy) (about|here|with)"
|
||||
r"|(bug|issue|regression|limitation) (in|with) (the )?(upstream|library|package|module|tool|api|sdk|"
|
||||
r"framework|kernel|driver|compiler|runtime)"
|
||||
r"|upstream (bug|issue|problem|regression)|known (bug|issue) (in|with)"
|
||||
r"|must be a bug|looks like a bug in|appears to be a bug in|seems to be a bug in"
|
||||
r"|work ?around (for|the) |workaround for a|monkey.?patch"
|
||||
r"|pin(ning)? (it |the )?(to|back to) (an? )?(older|previous|earlier)"
|
||||
r"|(broken|regressed) (in|since) (version|v?\d)"
|
||||
r"|file (an? )?(bug|issue) (upstream|against)|report(ing)? (it|this) upstream"
|
||||
r"|not our (bug|fault|problem)|nothing (we|i) can do about)",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Commands that do their damage while SUCCEEDING and say so in output nobody reads. A short,
|
||||
# high-signal list; this is not a place to grep for the word "warning".
|
||||
WARN_NOTABLE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(adding embedded git repository"
|
||||
r"|would be overwritten by (merge|checkout)"
|
||||
r"|untracked working tree files would be overwritten"
|
||||
r"|non-fast-forward|have diverged|detached HEAD"
|
||||
r"|forced update|\(forced update\))",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# A failed tool call is not automatically interesting: most are a typo'd path or a grep that
|
||||
# matched nothing. Only failures that mean something broke.
|
||||
ERR_NOTABLE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(Traceback \(most recent|Segmentation fault|Out of memory|\bOOM\b|\bKilled\b"
|
||||
r"|spend limit|scrape_error|would be overwritten|non-fast-forward|diverged"
|
||||
r"|corrupt|permission denied.*(/etc|/var|/mnt)|disk (full|quota))",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# A traceback from the agent's own inline one-liner (`python -c`, a heredoc on stdin) is routine
|
||||
# iteration, not something breaking. Only a traceback from real code counts on its own.
|
||||
ADHOC_TRACEBACK = re.compile(r'File "<(string|stdin)>"')
|
||||
|
||||
# Destructive-looking but routine: a session clearing its own scratch space, a worktree being torn
|
||||
# down, a throwaway container removed. Filtered here, for free, rather than paying a model to say
|
||||
# "this is fine".
|
||||
BENIGN = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(scratchpad|/tmp/claude-|/tmp/wt-"
|
||||
r"|rm\s+-[a-z]*[rf][a-z]*\s+[\"']?(/tmp/|/var/tmp/|\$?\{?TMP|\$?\{?WT)"
|
||||
r"|git\s+worktree\s+(remove|prune|add)"
|
||||
r"|docker\s+(rm|kill)\s+[^\n]*\b(test|tmp|scratch|throwaway)\b"
|
||||
r"|rm\s+-[a-z]*f?\s+[\"']?/tmp/)",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Excerpt sizes. Enough context to judge, small enough that fifty candidates fit in one prompt.
|
||||
TURN_CHARS = 280
|
||||
CMD_CHARS = 160
|
||||
ERR_CHARS = 160
|
||||
WARN_CHARS = 150
|
||||
TASK_CHARS = 200
|
||||
MAX_COMMANDS = 8
|
||||
MAX_FAILURES = 5
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def danger_rank(cmd: str) -> int:
|
||||
"""Lower is worse. The evidence block is capped, so the cap must keep the WORST commands, not
|
||||
the first ones: rewriting history or deleting real paths outranks stopping a service, which
|
||||
outranks anything confined to /tmp."""
|
||||
c = cmd.lower()
|
||||
if re.search(r"git\s+(rm|reset\s+--hard|checkout\s+--|push\s+(-f|--force)|commit\s+--amend|clean)", c):
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
if re.search(r"(zfs\s+destroy|drop\s+(table|database)|delete\s+from|truncate|shred|>\s*/dev/)", c):
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
if re.search(r"rm\s+-[a-z]*[rf]", c) and not re.search(r"/tmp|/var/tmp|scratch", c):
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
if re.search(r"(systemctl[^\n]*\b(stop|disable|mask)|docker[^\n]*\b(rm|kill|down|prune))", c):
|
||||
return 2
|
||||
if re.search(r"(pkill|kill\s+-9|kill\s+-kill|killall)", c):
|
||||
return 3
|
||||
return 4
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Patterns:
|
||||
"""The regexes in force, plus any the user configured."""
|
||||
|
||||
destructive: list[re.Pattern] = field(default_factory=lambda: [DESTRUCTIVE])
|
||||
benign: list[re.Pattern] = field(default_factory=lambda: [BENIGN])
|
||||
alarm: list[re.Pattern] = field(default_factory=lambda: [ALARM])
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def with_extras(cls, destructive=(), benign=(), alarm=()) -> "Patterns":
|
||||
p = cls()
|
||||
p.destructive += [re.compile(x, re.I) for x in destructive]
|
||||
p.benign += [re.compile(x, re.I) for x in benign]
|
||||
p.alarm += [re.compile(x, re.I) for x in alarm]
|
||||
return p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _any(pats, s) -> bool:
|
||||
return any(p.search(s) for p in pats)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def flat(s: str, limit: int) -> str:
|
||||
"""One line, at most ``limit`` characters: an excerpt must not break the block around it."""
|
||||
return re.sub(r"\s+", " ", s).strip()[:limit]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def notable_failure(text: str) -> bool:
|
||||
if not ERR_NOTABLE.search(text):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if ADHOC_TRACEBACK.search(text):
|
||||
return bool(ERR_NOTABLE.search(text.replace("Traceback (most recent", "")))
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Candidate:
|
||||
kind: str # SNIPPET | EVIDENCE | DIGEST
|
||||
source: str
|
||||
session: str
|
||||
date: str
|
||||
body: str # indented lines, ready to show the judge
|
||||
id: str = "" # assigned per run: C01, C02, ...
|
||||
|
||||
def render(self) -> str:
|
||||
note = {
|
||||
"EVIDENCE": " -- what this session actually did; read with its snippets",
|
||||
"DIGEST": " -- nobody said anything; the commands did",
|
||||
}.get(self.kind, "")
|
||||
head = f"[{self.id}] {self.kind} · {self.source} · {self.session} · {self.date or 'undated'}{note}"
|
||||
return head + "\n" + self.body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Extraction:
|
||||
candidates: list[Candidate]
|
||||
clean: bool # nothing at all to judge
|
||||
dropped: int = 0 # snippets cut by the per-session limit
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_hit(role: str, text: str, pats: Patterns) -> bool:
|
||||
if role == "user":
|
||||
return not SYNTHETIC.match(text) and bool(USER_SIG.search(text))
|
||||
if role == "assistant":
|
||||
return bool(AI_ADMIT.search(text) or BLAME.search(text) or _any(pats.alarm, text))
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def behaviour(sess: Session, pats: Patterns) -> tuple[list[str], list[str]]:
|
||||
"""Destructive commands run, and notable failures or warnings seen, for one session."""
|
||||
danger, failures = [], []
|
||||
for call in sess.calls:
|
||||
if call.command and _any(pats.destructive, call.command) and not _any(pats.benign, call.command):
|
||||
danger.append(f"{call.name}: {flat(call.command, CMD_CHARS)}")
|
||||
for res in sess.results:
|
||||
if res.is_error:
|
||||
if notable_failure(res.text):
|
||||
failures.append(flat(res.text, ERR_CHARS))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# A command that SUCCEEDED can still have announced the damage in its output.
|
||||
hits = [ln.strip() for ln in res.text.splitlines() if WARN_NOTABLE.search(ln)]
|
||||
if hits:
|
||||
failures.append(flat(hits[0], WARN_CHARS) + (f" (x{len(hits)})" if len(hits) > 1 else ""))
|
||||
return danger, failures
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _behaviour_lines(danger: list[str], failures: list[str]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
out = []
|
||||
if danger:
|
||||
out.append(" [destructive commands run]")
|
||||
for d in sorted(dict.fromkeys(danger), key=danger_rank)[:MAX_COMMANDS]:
|
||||
out.append(f" ! {d}")
|
||||
if failures:
|
||||
out.append(" [notable failures]")
|
||||
for e in list(dict.fromkeys(failures))[:MAX_FAILURES]:
|
||||
out.append(f" x {e}")
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def extract(
|
||||
sess: Session,
|
||||
source: str,
|
||||
short_id: str,
|
||||
pats: Patterns | None = None,
|
||||
per_session: int = 12,
|
||||
) -> Extraction:
|
||||
"""Candidates for one session, at most ``per_session`` of them.
|
||||
|
||||
A session with no hit, no destructive command and no notable failure is ``clean``: it has been
|
||||
examined, deterministically, and found empty. That costs nothing and needs no judge.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if per_session < 2:
|
||||
raise ValueError("per_session must be at least 2")
|
||||
pats = pats or Patterns()
|
||||
turns = sess.turns
|
||||
danger, failures = behaviour(sess, pats)
|
||||
hit_idx = [i for i, t in enumerate(turns) if is_hit(t.role, t.text, pats)]
|
||||
|
||||
if not hit_idx and not danger and not failures:
|
||||
return Extraction([], clean=True)
|
||||
|
||||
out: list[Candidate] = []
|
||||
for i in hit_idx:
|
||||
ctx = "\n".join(
|
||||
f" [{turns[j].role}] {flat(turns[j].text, TURN_CHARS)}"
|
||||
for j in range(max(0, i - 1), min(len(turns), i + 2))
|
||||
)
|
||||
out.append(Candidate("SNIPPET", source, short_id, turns[i].date, ctx))
|
||||
|
||||
date = turns[0].date if turns else ""
|
||||
if danger or failures:
|
||||
# A session that talked is still a session that did. Its words must never decide whether
|
||||
# its actions are examined, so behaviour rides along with snippets as well as standing alone.
|
||||
if hit_idx:
|
||||
out.append(Candidate("EVIDENCE", source, short_id, date, "\n".join(_behaviour_lines(danger, failures))))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
task = next((t.text for t in turns if t.role == "user" and not SYNTHETIC.match(t.text)), "")
|
||||
ended = next((t.text for t in reversed(turns) if t.role == "assistant"), "")
|
||||
lines = [f" [task] {flat(task, TASK_CHARS)}"] + _behaviour_lines(danger, failures)
|
||||
lines.append(f" [ended] {flat(ended, TASK_CHARS)}")
|
||||
out.append(Candidate("DIGEST", source, short_id, date, "\n".join(lines)))
|
||||
|
||||
dropped = 0
|
||||
if len(out) > per_session:
|
||||
# A very talkative session is cut here, once, rather than split across runs. Splitting it
|
||||
# would re-show the same first snippets on every run and never finish the session. The
|
||||
# behaviour block is always kept: it is what a chatty transcript would otherwise crowd out.
|
||||
keep_tail = [out[-1]] if out[-1].kind == "EVIDENCE" else []
|
||||
head = out[: per_session - len(keep_tail)]
|
||||
dropped = len(out) - len(head) - len(keep_tail)
|
||||
out = head + keep_tail
|
||||
out[-1].body += f"\n ({dropped} more snippet(s) from this session not shown)"
|
||||
return Extraction(out, clean=False, dropped=dropped)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
|
||||
You are the judge for an incident ledger. You are reading excerpts from one person's AI
|
||||
coding-agent sessions. Your job is to decide which of the candidate moments below were **real
|
||||
incidents caused by AI-generated work**, and to write each confirmed one up so that its lesson is
|
||||
not lost.
|
||||
|
||||
You are this person's memory of their agents' mistakes. Nobody else writes this down. A miss is a
|
||||
lesson lost; a false positive is noise that makes the ledger worth less. Be strict and be honest,
|
||||
including about incidents caused by agents much like you.
|
||||
|
||||
You have no tools. Everything you may use is in this message. Judge only from the excerpts shown.
|
||||
Do not invent detail beyond what they show.
|
||||
|
||||
## The candidates
|
||||
|
||||
A deterministic pre-filter found these moments. Each has an id like `C07` and comes in one of three
|
||||
shapes:
|
||||
|
||||
- **SNIPPET**: somebody *said* something. The user corrected or blamed the agent, or the agent
|
||||
admitted a mistake, raised an alarm, or blamed somebody else's code. You get the surrounding turns.
|
||||
- **EVIDENCE**: the destructive commands and notable failures of a session that also produced
|
||||
snippets. It carries the same session id as those snippets and is part of them: the snippets are
|
||||
what was said, the evidence is what was done. When evidence shows a destructive command whose
|
||||
consequence you can see, that IS concrete evidence. Do not hold out for a sentence in which
|
||||
somebody admits to it.
|
||||
- **DIGEST**: nobody confessed and nobody complained, but the session did something destructive or
|
||||
something notably broke. You get the task, the commands, the failures and how the session ended.
|
||||
The worst incidents are often the ones nobody narrates, so judge a digest on its evidence, not on
|
||||
the absence of an apology. Equally, a digest is not an accusation: destructive commands are often
|
||||
correct and intended (clearing scratch files, a deliberate revert, stopping something the user
|
||||
asked to stop). If the commands were the right thing to do and nothing was harmed, it is not an
|
||||
incident. Say so in one line.
|
||||
|
||||
## What counts
|
||||
|
||||
An **incident** is: AI-generated work caused a real problem.
|
||||
|
||||
- **data-loss**: data was deleted, overwritten or corrupted.
|
||||
- **outage**: something that worked broke; a crash, a service down, an unplanned reboot.
|
||||
- **credential-leak**: a real secret was exposed (printed to a transcript, committed, sent somewhere).
|
||||
- **destructive-action**: a destructive or hard-to-reverse action on something that was not the
|
||||
agent's to destroy (pushed to a shared branch, deleted someone else's work, rewrote history).
|
||||
- **debug-spiral**: an AI decision sent the work into a long, expensive loop of fixing its own fallout;
|
||||
over-engineering with the wrong tool belongs here.
|
||||
- **unmetered-cost**: an agent or job burned money, tokens or quota that nobody was measuring.
|
||||
- **misattribution**: see below.
|
||||
- **other**: a real cost that fits none of the above.
|
||||
|
||||
**Misattribution is an incident in its own right.** Blaming a tool, library, upstream project, API
|
||||
or "a known bug" for a problem the agent actually caused, and acting on that belief, is a footgun
|
||||
even when nothing else breaks. It sends the human to debug, report or work around something that was
|
||||
never broken; the real bug survives because nobody is looking for it any more; and it hides itself,
|
||||
because a mistake that has been blamed on someone else is a mistake nobody will look for. The tell is
|
||||
a fix that works around someone else's code instead of correcting the agent's own: a pin to an old
|
||||
version, a "workaround for <library> bug" comment, a retry loop around a call made wrongly, a
|
||||
monkey-patch, an issue filed upstream. It is **not** misattribution if the upstream bug was real, and
|
||||
it is not misattribution to be uncertain out loud. The footgun is confident, acted-upon blame that
|
||||
turns out to be wrong.
|
||||
|
||||
**Not** an incident: routine iteration; the user changing their mind; a preemptive "don't touch X";
|
||||
a planned or expected revert; the agent catching its own mistake before it cost anything.
|
||||
|
||||
The bar is a **cost**: something was actually lost, broken, leaked or wasted. Better one solid
|
||||
incident than five weak ones.
|
||||
|
||||
## Severity is the cost
|
||||
|
||||
- **HIGH**: data loss, an outage, or a real credential exposure.
|
||||
- **MEDIUM**: wasted rework, a bad decision pushed to a shared branch, a debug spiral.
|
||||
- **LOW**: a self-inflicted mess, cleaned up cheaply.
|
||||
|
||||
## Duplicates
|
||||
|
||||
The same incident often shows up in several candidates, and may already be in the ledger (listed
|
||||
below with ids like `E03`). Check by substance, not by wording. Never file an incident that is
|
||||
already in the ledger; exclude those candidates with `duplicate_of` set to the ledger id.
|
||||
|
||||
## Recurring patterns
|
||||
|
||||
If, and only if, this run turns up a pattern that now spans three or more incidents (counting the
|
||||
ledger), add one line describing it to `patterns`. Otherwise leave `patterns` empty.
|
||||
|
||||
## Answer format
|
||||
|
||||
Answer with a single JSON object and nothing else: no prose before or after it, no code fence.
|
||||
Every candidate id must appear exactly once, either in an incident's `candidates` or in an
|
||||
`excluded` entry.
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
"incidents": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"title": "short, specific title (under 100 characters)",
|
||||
"date": "YYYY-MM-DD: the date of the incident from the candidate, not today",
|
||||
"severity": "HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW",
|
||||
"category": "data-loss | outage | credential-leak | destructive-action | debug-spiral | unmetered-cost | misattribution | other",
|
||||
"what": "one sentence: what the agent did",
|
||||
"cost": "one sentence: what it actually cost",
|
||||
"lesson": "one actionable sentence: how not to repeat it",
|
||||
"candidates": ["C03", "C04"],
|
||||
"why": "one line: why it cleared the bar"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"excluded": [
|
||||
{"candidates": ["C01", "C02"], "reason": "one line: why it did not clear the bar", "duplicate_of": ""}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"patterns": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Never copy a secret, password, token or key into your answer, even when an excerpt shows one.
|
||||
Describe it ("the database password") instead. Refer to people other than the user by role, not
|
||||
by name.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
"""Best-effort removal of secret-shaped strings.
|
||||
|
||||
Applied twice: to transcript excerpts before they leave the machine for the judge, and to the
|
||||
judge's verdict before anything is written to the ledger. A ledger that records credential leaks
|
||||
must not become one.
|
||||
|
||||
This is pattern matching, not a guarantee. It catches the common token formats and ``key=value``
|
||||
assignments of secret-named keys; it cannot recognise a bare password with no context around it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import re
|
||||
|
||||
MASK = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
|
||||
_TOKEN_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
# PEM private keys, whole block
|
||||
r"-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(-----END [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|$)",
|
||||
r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b", # GitHub tokens
|
||||
r"\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b",
|
||||
r"\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b", # GitLab
|
||||
r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b", # OpenAI / Anthropic style API keys
|
||||
r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b", # AWS access key id
|
||||
r"\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b", # Slack
|
||||
r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b", # JWT
|
||||
r"\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b", # Google API key
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# Authorization headers: keep the scheme, drop the credential.
|
||||
_BEARER = re.compile(r"\b(Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{16,}", re.I)
|
||||
|
||||
# key = value / key: value / "key": "value" for secret-named keys.
|
||||
_ASSIGN = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?P<key>[\"']?[A-Za-z0-9_.-]*(?:password|passwd|passphrase|secret|token|api[_-]?key|"
|
||||
r"access[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|client[_-]?secret)[A-Za-z0-9_.-]*[\"']?)"
|
||||
r"(?P<sep>\s*[:=]\s*)"
|
||||
r"(?P<q>[\"']?)(?P<val>[^\s\"',;&]{6,})",
|
||||
re.I,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# scheme://user:password@host
|
||||
_URL_CREDS = re.compile(r"(?P<pre>[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*://[^\s:/@]+:)(?P<pw>[^\s@/]+)(?P<at>@)", re.I)
|
||||
|
||||
_VALUE_ALLOW = re.compile(
|
||||
r"^(\[REDACTED\]|\$\{?[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\}?|true|false|null|none|\*+|[0-9][0-9.,_kKmMbB]*)$", re.I
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class Redactor:
|
||||
def __init__(self, extra_patterns: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] = (), enabled: bool = True):
|
||||
self.enabled = enabled
|
||||
self.tokens = [re.compile(p) for p in _TOKEN_PATTERNS] + [re.compile(p) for p in extra_patterns]
|
||||
|
||||
def __call__(self, text: str) -> str:
|
||||
if not self.enabled or not text:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
for pat in self.tokens:
|
||||
text = pat.sub(MASK, text)
|
||||
text = _BEARER.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)} {MASK}", text)
|
||||
text = _URL_CREDS.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group('pre')}{MASK}{m.group('at')}", text)
|
||||
|
||||
def assign(m: re.Match) -> str:
|
||||
val = m.group("val")
|
||||
# Leave variable references and obvious placeholders alone: `password=$PW` shows how a
|
||||
# secret was passed, which is often the lesson, and is not itself a secret.
|
||||
if _VALUE_ALLOW.match(val):
|
||||
return m.group(0)
|
||||
return f"{m.group('key')}{m.group('sep')}{m.group('q')}{MASK}"
|
||||
|
||||
return _ASSIGN.sub(assign, text)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
"""The per-run report: the judge's reasoning, shown plainly.
|
||||
|
||||
Confirmed incidents get one line on why they cleared the bar; every excluded candidate gets one
|
||||
line on why it did not. The exclusions are the point: they keep the bar visible and arguable, and
|
||||
they are where a judge drifting lax or strict shows up first.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from .judge import Incident, Verdict
|
||||
from .prefilter import Candidate
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _refs(ids: list[str], by_id: dict[str, Candidate]) -> str:
|
||||
seen, out = set(), []
|
||||
for i in ids:
|
||||
c = by_id.get(i)
|
||||
if not c:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
tag = f"{c.source} {c.session}"
|
||||
if tag not in seen:
|
||||
seen.add(tag)
|
||||
out.append(f"`{c.session}` ({c.source}, {c.date or 'undated'})")
|
||||
return ", ".join(out)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def render(
|
||||
date: str,
|
||||
scan_summary: list[str],
|
||||
candidates: list[Candidate],
|
||||
verdict: Verdict,
|
||||
filed: list[Incident],
|
||||
already: list[Incident],
|
||||
judge_label: str,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
by_id = {c.id: c for c in candidates}
|
||||
out = [f"# AI-incidents run · {date}", "", "## What the pre-filter found", ""]
|
||||
out += [f"- {line}" for line in scan_summary]
|
||||
out += [f"- **Judge:** {judge_label}"]
|
||||
if verdict.usage:
|
||||
u = verdict.usage
|
||||
bits = []
|
||||
if u.get("input_tokens") is not None:
|
||||
bits.append(f"{u['input_tokens']:,} input tokens")
|
||||
if u.get("output_tokens") is not None:
|
||||
bits.append(f"{u['output_tokens']:,} output tokens")
|
||||
if u.get("total_cost_usd") is not None:
|
||||
bits.append(f"${float(u['total_cost_usd']):.2f} at API rates")
|
||||
if bits:
|
||||
out.append(f"- **Judge cost:** {', '.join(bits)}")
|
||||
out += ["", f"## Confirmed incidents ({len(filed)})", ""]
|
||||
if not filed:
|
||||
out += ["Nothing cleared the bar. A quiet run is a real result, not a failure.", ""]
|
||||
for i in filed:
|
||||
out += [
|
||||
f"### {i.title} · {i.date} · {i.severity}",
|
||||
f"**Category:** {i.category} · **Sessions:** {_refs(i.candidates, by_id) or 'not given'}",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"Clears the bar: {i.why or '(no reason given)'}",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
]
|
||||
if already:
|
||||
out += [f"## Confirmed but already in the ledger ({len(already)})", ""]
|
||||
out += [f"- **{i.title}** ({i.severity}): same title as an existing entry; not filed again." for i in already]
|
||||
out.append("")
|
||||
out += [f"## Excluded candidates ({sum(len(e.candidates) or 1 for e in verdict.excluded)})", ""]
|
||||
if not verdict.excluded:
|
||||
out += ["None.", ""]
|
||||
for e in verdict.excluded:
|
||||
ids = ", ".join(e.candidates) or "?"
|
||||
dup = f" Already filed as {e.duplicate_of}." if e.duplicate_of else ""
|
||||
out.append(f"- **{ids}** {_refs(e.candidates, by_id)}: {e.reason}{dup}")
|
||||
out.append("")
|
||||
if verdict.unaddressed or verdict.rejected:
|
||||
out += ["## Loose ends", ""]
|
||||
if verdict.unaddressed:
|
||||
out.append(f"- The judge did not address: {', '.join(verdict.unaddressed)}.")
|
||||
for r in verdict.rejected:
|
||||
out.append(f"- Rejected a malformed incident from the judge: {r}.")
|
||||
out.append("")
|
||||
if verdict.patterns:
|
||||
out += ["## Recurring patterns added", ""] + [f"- {p}" for p in verdict.patterns] + [""]
|
||||
out += ["## Candidates shown to the judge", ""]
|
||||
for c in candidates:
|
||||
out.append(f"- **{c.id}** {c.kind} · {c.source} · `{c.session}` · {c.date or 'undated'}")
|
||||
return "\n".join(out).rstrip() + "\n"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
|
||||
"""Read agent session transcripts. Read-only, always.
|
||||
|
||||
Every source yields ``SessionRef`` objects cheaply (a stat or one small query), so a run can skip
|
||||
sessions it has already judged without opening them. ``SessionRef.load()`` then reads one session
|
||||
into a ``Session`` that the pre-filter understands, whatever tool produced it.
|
||||
|
||||
Two formats are supported:
|
||||
|
||||
* Claude Code: one JSONL file per session under ``~/.claude/projects/``. Subagent sessions live
|
||||
alongside their parent and are read too.
|
||||
* opencode 1.x: the SQLite store under ``~/.local/share/opencode/``. It is opened with
|
||||
``mode=ro``; nothing here can write to it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import datetime as _dt
|
||||
import glob
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
from typing import Callable, Iterator
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Turn:
|
||||
"""One human-readable message: what somebody *said*."""
|
||||
|
||||
role: str # "user" | "assistant"
|
||||
date: str # YYYY-MM-DD (UTC), or "" when unknown
|
||||
text: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class ToolCall:
|
||||
name: str
|
||||
command: str # the shell command; empty for tools that take no command
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class ToolResult:
|
||||
is_error: bool
|
||||
text: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class Session:
|
||||
"""What a session said (turns) and what it did (tool calls and their results)."""
|
||||
|
||||
turns: list[Turn] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
calls: list[ToolCall] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
results: list[ToolResult] = field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class SessionRef:
|
||||
source: str # the configured source name, e.g. "claude-code"
|
||||
key: str # changes whenever the session's content changes
|
||||
short_id: str # a short, stable handle for reports
|
||||
path: str # where it lives, for exclusion rules and error messages
|
||||
loader: Callable[[], Session]
|
||||
|
||||
def load(self) -> Session:
|
||||
return self.loader()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class SourceError(Exception):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Claude Code ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def claude_key(path: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""``<file name>:<int mtime>:<size>``.
|
||||
|
||||
The shape is deliberate and stable: an external cleanup job can read the exported seen-list and
|
||||
refuse to delete any transcript whose current key is not in it. A transcript that grows after it
|
||||
was judged gets a new key, so it is judged again rather than silently skipped.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
st = os.stat(path)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return f"{os.path.basename(path)}:{int(st.st_mtime)}:{st.st_size}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _cc_text(content) -> str:
|
||||
if isinstance(content, str):
|
||||
return content
|
||||
if isinstance(content, list):
|
||||
return " ".join(
|
||||
b.get("text", "") for b in content if isinstance(b, dict) and b.get("type") == "text"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _cc_result_text(content) -> str:
|
||||
if isinstance(content, list):
|
||||
return " ".join(x.get("text", "") for x in content if isinstance(x, dict))
|
||||
return str(content or "")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_claude_jsonl(path: str) -> Session:
|
||||
sess = Session()
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
|
||||
for line in f:
|
||||
line = line.strip()
|
||||
if not line:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
obj = json.loads(line)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not isinstance(obj, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
msg = obj.get("message")
|
||||
if not isinstance(msg, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
role = msg.get("role") or obj.get("type", "")
|
||||
date = str(obj.get("timestamp") or "")[:10]
|
||||
content = msg.get("content")
|
||||
text = _cc_text(content).strip()
|
||||
if text:
|
||||
sess.turns.append(Turn(role, date, text))
|
||||
if not isinstance(content, list):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
for block in content:
|
||||
if not isinstance(block, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if block.get("type") == "tool_use":
|
||||
inp = block.get("input") or {}
|
||||
cmd = inp.get("command") if isinstance(inp, dict) else None
|
||||
sess.calls.append(
|
||||
ToolCall(block.get("name", "?"), cmd.strip() if isinstance(cmd, str) else "")
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif block.get("type") == "tool_result":
|
||||
sess.results.append(
|
||||
ToolResult(bool(block.get("is_error")), _cc_result_text(block.get("content")))
|
||||
)
|
||||
return sess
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def iter_claude_code(name: str, root: str) -> Iterator[SessionRef]:
|
||||
root = os.path.expanduser(root)
|
||||
if not os.path.isdir(root):
|
||||
return
|
||||
for path in sorted(glob.glob(os.path.join(root, "**", "*.jsonl"), recursive=True)):
|
||||
key = claude_key(path)
|
||||
if not key:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
base = os.path.basename(path)[: -len(".jsonl")]
|
||||
yield SessionRef(name, key, base[:8], path, lambda p=path: parse_claude_jsonl(p))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- opencode -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _ms_date(ms) -> str:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return _dt.datetime.fromtimestamp(int(ms) / 1000, _dt.timezone.utc).date().isoformat()
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError, OSError):
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def open_readonly(db_path: str) -> sqlite3.Connection:
|
||||
"""Open an SQLite database so that this process cannot write to it.
|
||||
|
||||
``mode=ro`` is enforced by SQLite itself, and ``query_only`` on top of it. One caveat is
|
||||
inherent to SQLite's WAL mode, which opencode uses: even a read-only reader coordinates through
|
||||
the ``-shm`` shared-memory index next to the database, and may create or update it. That file is
|
||||
lock bookkeeping, not data. It is only a problem when it is created by a *different* user, who
|
||||
then owns a sidecar the database's real owner can no longer write. So this happens only when
|
||||
we are the database's owner; for anyone else's database the connection is ``immutable=1``, which
|
||||
never touches a sidecar file but may not see sessions written since the last checkpoint (they
|
||||
are picked up on a later run).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
path = os.path.abspath(db_path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
foreign = os.stat(path).st_uid != os.geteuid()
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
foreign = False
|
||||
uri = "file:" + path + ("?mode=ro&immutable=1" if foreign else "?mode=ro")
|
||||
con = sqlite3.connect(uri, uri=True, timeout=10)
|
||||
con.execute("PRAGMA query_only = ON")
|
||||
return con
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _load_opencode_session(db_path: str, session_id: str) -> Session:
|
||||
sess = Session()
|
||||
con = open_readonly(db_path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
roles: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {}
|
||||
order: list[str] = []
|
||||
for mid, created, data in con.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT id, time_created, data FROM message WHERE session_id = ? "
|
||||
"ORDER BY time_created, id",
|
||||
(session_id,),
|
||||
):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
role = json.loads(data).get("role", "")
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
role = ""
|
||||
roles[mid] = (role, _ms_date(created))
|
||||
order.append(mid)
|
||||
parts: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
|
||||
for mid, data in con.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT message_id, data FROM part WHERE session_id = ? ORDER BY time_created, id",
|
||||
(session_id,),
|
||||
):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parts.setdefault(mid, []).append(json.loads(data))
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
con.close()
|
||||
|
||||
for mid in order:
|
||||
role, date = roles[mid]
|
||||
texts = []
|
||||
for p in parts.get(mid, []):
|
||||
ptype = p.get("type")
|
||||
if ptype == "text":
|
||||
# Text opencode injected on the user's behalf (file attachments, reminders) is not
|
||||
# something the user said.
|
||||
if not p.get("synthetic") and not p.get("ignored"):
|
||||
texts.append(str(p.get("text") or ""))
|
||||
elif ptype == "tool":
|
||||
state = p.get("state") or {}
|
||||
inp = state.get("input") or {}
|
||||
cmd = inp.get("command") if isinstance(inp, dict) else None
|
||||
sess.calls.append(
|
||||
ToolCall(str(p.get("tool") or "?"), cmd.strip() if isinstance(cmd, str) else "")
|
||||
)
|
||||
status = state.get("status")
|
||||
if status == "error":
|
||||
sess.results.append(ToolResult(True, str(state.get("error") or "")))
|
||||
elif status == "completed":
|
||||
sess.results.append(ToolResult(False, str(state.get("output") or "")))
|
||||
text = " ".join(t for t in texts if t).strip()
|
||||
if text and role in ("user", "assistant"):
|
||||
sess.turns.append(Turn(role, date, text))
|
||||
return sess
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def iter_opencode(name: str, pattern: str) -> Iterator[SessionRef]:
|
||||
for db_path in sorted(glob.glob(os.path.expanduser(pattern))):
|
||||
if not os.path.isfile(db_path):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
con = open_readonly(db_path)
|
||||
except sqlite3.Error as e:
|
||||
raise SourceError(f"{db_path}: cannot open read-only: {e}") from e
|
||||
try:
|
||||
rows = con.execute("SELECT id, time_updated FROM session ORDER BY time_created, id").fetchall()
|
||||
except sqlite3.Error as e:
|
||||
raise SourceError(f"{db_path}: not an opencode 1.x database ({e})") from e
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
con.close()
|
||||
for sid, updated in rows:
|
||||
short = sid[4:12] if sid.startswith("ses_") else sid[:8]
|
||||
yield SessionRef(
|
||||
name,
|
||||
f"{sid}:{updated}",
|
||||
short,
|
||||
f"{db_path}#{sid}",
|
||||
lambda d=db_path, s=sid: _load_opencode_session(d, s),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SOURCE_TYPES = {
|
||||
"claude-code": iter_claude_code,
|
||||
"opencode": iter_opencode,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def iter_source(kind: str, name: str, path: str) -> Iterator[SessionRef]:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
fn = SOURCE_TYPES[kind]
|
||||
except KeyError:
|
||||
raise SourceError(f"unknown source type {kind!r}; expected one of {sorted(SOURCE_TYPES)}") from None
|
||||
return fn(name, path)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
|
||||
"""Which sessions have already been judged.
|
||||
|
||||
A session is recorded as *seen* only once its candidates can no longer be lost:
|
||||
|
||||
* a session the pre-filter found clean is seen immediately (it has nothing a judge could file);
|
||||
* a session with candidates is seen only after the judge's verdict has been written to the ledger
|
||||
(and committed, when git is configured). If the judge fails, times out, hits a quota, or returns
|
||||
something that is not a valid verdict, nothing is recorded and the next run shows it again.
|
||||
|
||||
Keys include size and modification time (or opencode's ``time_updated``), so a session that grows
|
||||
after it was judged is looked at again.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import datetime as _dt
|
||||
import fcntl
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
from .envelope import WriteGuard
|
||||
|
||||
VERSION = 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class LockedError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RunLock:
|
||||
"""One run at a time per state file. Non-blocking: a second run exits instead of queueing."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, guard: WriteGuard, state_path: str):
|
||||
self.path = guard.check(state_path + ".lock")
|
||||
self.fh = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __enter__(self):
|
||||
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(self.path), exist_ok=True)
|
||||
self.fh = open(self.path, "a")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
fcntl.flock(self.fh, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
self.fh.close()
|
||||
raise LockedError(f"another run holds {self.path}") from None
|
||||
return self
|
||||
|
||||
def __exit__(self, *exc):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
fcntl.flock(self.fh, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
self.fh.close()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class State:
|
||||
def __init__(self, path: str, seen_list: str = "", seen_list_source: str = "claude-code"):
|
||||
self.path = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(path))
|
||||
self.seen_list = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(seen_list)) if seen_list else ""
|
||||
self.seen_list_source = seen_list_source
|
||||
self.data = {"version": VERSION, "sources": {}, "last_run": None}
|
||||
self._load()
|
||||
|
||||
def _load(self) -> None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with open(self.path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
data = json.load(f)
|
||||
except FileNotFoundError:
|
||||
data = None
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"state file {self.path} is not valid JSON: {e}") from e
|
||||
if data:
|
||||
if data.get("version") != VERSION:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"state file {self.path} has unsupported version {data.get('version')!r}")
|
||||
self.data = data
|
||||
for src in self.data["sources"].values():
|
||||
src["seen"] = set(src.get("seen", []))
|
||||
# The optional seen-list is read as well as written, so an external cleanup job's view and
|
||||
# ours can never disagree, and an existing list (from an earlier install) is honoured.
|
||||
if self.seen_list and os.path.exists(self.seen_list):
|
||||
with open(self.seen_list, encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
keys = {ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip()}
|
||||
if keys:
|
||||
src = self._src(self.seen_list_source)
|
||||
src["seen"] |= keys
|
||||
src["initialized"] = True
|
||||
|
||||
def _src(self, name: str) -> dict:
|
||||
return self.data["sources"].setdefault(name, {"initialized": False, "seen": set()})
|
||||
|
||||
def initialized(self, name: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return bool(self._src(name).get("initialized"))
|
||||
|
||||
def seen(self, name: str) -> set[str]:
|
||||
return self._src(name)["seen"]
|
||||
|
||||
def mark_seen(self, name: str, keys) -> None:
|
||||
src = self._src(name)
|
||||
src["seen"] |= set(keys)
|
||||
src["initialized"] = True
|
||||
|
||||
def mark_initialized(self, name: str) -> None:
|
||||
self._src(name)["initialized"] = True
|
||||
|
||||
def record_run(self, summary: dict) -> None:
|
||||
self.data["last_run"] = {"at": _dt.datetime.now(_dt.timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="seconds"), **summary}
|
||||
|
||||
def save(self, guard: WriteGuard) -> None:
|
||||
out = {
|
||||
"version": VERSION,
|
||||
"sources": {
|
||||
name: {"initialized": bool(s.get("initialized")), "seen": sorted(s["seen"])}
|
||||
for name, s in sorted(self.data["sources"].items())
|
||||
},
|
||||
"last_run": self.data.get("last_run"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
guard.write_text(self.path, json.dumps(out, indent=1) + "\n")
|
||||
if self.seen_list:
|
||||
keys = sorted(self.seen(self.seen_list_source))
|
||||
guard.write_text(self.seen_list, "\n".join(keys) + ("\n" if keys else ""))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
"""A stand-in judge for tests. Reads the prompt on stdin and answers according to FAKE_JUDGE_MODE.
|
||||
|
||||
file-first file the first candidate as a HIGH incident, exclude the rest (default)
|
||||
exclude-all exclude every candidate
|
||||
fail exit non-zero
|
||||
prose exit 0 with a provider message instead of a verdict
|
||||
leak file an incident whose text contains a secret
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
prompt = sys.stdin.read()
|
||||
marker = os.environ.get("FAKE_JUDGE_MARKER")
|
||||
if marker:
|
||||
with open(marker, "a") as f:
|
||||
f.write(prompt + "\n=====\n")
|
||||
|
||||
mode = os.environ.get("FAKE_JUDGE_MODE", "file-first")
|
||||
ids = re.findall(r"^\[(C\d+)\]", prompt, flags=re.M)
|
||||
title = os.environ.get("FAKE_JUDGE_TITLE", "Deleted the production table on a hunch")
|
||||
|
||||
if mode == "fail":
|
||||
print("upstream exploded", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
sys.exit(3)
|
||||
if mode == "prose":
|
||||
print("You've hit your monthly spend limit. Raise it to keep going.")
|
||||
sys.exit(0)
|
||||
|
||||
incidents, excluded = [], []
|
||||
if mode in ("file-first", "leak") and ids:
|
||||
what = "ran DROP TABLE on the live database"
|
||||
if mode == "leak":
|
||||
what += " and printed password=" + "hunter2hunter2"
|
||||
incidents.append({
|
||||
"title": title, "date": "2026-07-14", "severity": "HIGH", "category": "data-loss",
|
||||
"what": what, "cost": "a day of orders was lost",
|
||||
"lesson": "never run destructive SQL without a backup", "candidates": [ids[0]],
|
||||
"why": "real, unrecoverable data loss",
|
||||
})
|
||||
rest = ids[1:]
|
||||
else:
|
||||
rest = ids
|
||||
if rest:
|
||||
excluded.append({"candidates": rest, "reason": "routine cleanup of its own scratch files"})
|
||||
print("Here is my verdict:\n```json\n" + json.dumps({"incidents": incidents, "excluded": excluded, "patterns": []}) + "\n```")
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
|
||||
"""Builders for synthetic transcripts in both supported formats."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_JUDGE = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "fake_judge.py")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cc(role: str, text: str | None = None, *, ts: str = "2026-07-14T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
tool_use: str | None = None, tool_name: str = "Bash",
|
||||
tool_result: str | None = None, is_error: bool = False) -> str:
|
||||
"""One Claude Code JSONL line."""
|
||||
content: list | str
|
||||
blocks = []
|
||||
if text is not None:
|
||||
blocks.append({"type": "text", "text": text})
|
||||
if tool_use is not None:
|
||||
blocks.append({"type": "tool_use", "id": "t1", "name": tool_name, "input": {"command": tool_use}})
|
||||
if tool_result is not None:
|
||||
blocks.append({"type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "t1", "is_error": is_error,
|
||||
"content": [{"type": "text", "text": tool_result}]})
|
||||
content = blocks
|
||||
return json.dumps({"type": role, "timestamp": ts, "message": {"role": role, "content": content}})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_session(root: str, project: str, sid: str, lines: list[str]) -> str:
|
||||
d = os.path.join(root, project)
|
||||
os.makedirs(d, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
path = os.path.join(d, f"{sid}.jsonl")
|
||||
with open(path, "w") as f:
|
||||
f.write("\n".join(lines) + "\n")
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
OC_SCHEMA = """
|
||||
CREATE TABLE session (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, project_id TEXT NOT NULL, parent_id TEXT, slug TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
directory TEXT NOT NULL, title TEXT NOT NULL, version TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
time_created INTEGER NOT NULL, time_updated INTEGER NOT NULL);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE message (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, session_id TEXT NOT NULL, time_created INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
time_updated INTEGER NOT NULL, data TEXT NOT NULL);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE part (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, message_id TEXT NOT NULL, session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
time_created INTEGER NOT NULL, time_updated INTEGER NOT NULL, data TEXT NOT NULL);
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def oc_db(path: str) -> sqlite3.Connection:
|
||||
con = sqlite3.connect(path)
|
||||
con.executescript(OC_SCHEMA)
|
||||
con.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
|
||||
return con
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def oc_session(con: sqlite3.Connection, sid: str, turns: list[tuple[str, list[dict]]], t0: int = 1784023200000) -> None:
|
||||
"""turns: [(role, [part dicts]), ...]"""
|
||||
t = t0
|
||||
con.execute("INSERT INTO session VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
|
||||
(sid, "p1", None, "slug", "/work", "title", "1.0.0", t, t + 1000 * len(turns)))
|
||||
for n, (role, parts) in enumerate(turns):
|
||||
mid = f"msg_{sid}_{n:03d}"
|
||||
t += 1000
|
||||
con.execute("INSERT INTO message VALUES (?,?,?,?,?)", (mid, sid, t, t, json.dumps({"role": role})))
|
||||
for k, p in enumerate(parts):
|
||||
con.execute("INSERT INTO part VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
|
||||
(f"prt_{sid}_{n:03d}_{k}", mid, sid, t + k, t + k, json.dumps(p)))
|
||||
con.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def judge_cmd() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [sys.executable, FAKE_JUDGE]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def config_toml(tmp, *, claude_root="", oc_glob="", ledger="", state="", seen_list="", extra="") -> str:
|
||||
parts = []
|
||||
if claude_root:
|
||||
parts.append(f'[[source]]\ntype = "claude-code"\npath = "{claude_root}"\n')
|
||||
if oc_glob:
|
||||
parts.append(f'[[source]]\ntype = "opencode"\npath = "{oc_glob}"\n')
|
||||
cmd = ", ".join(json.dumps(x) for x in judge_cmd())
|
||||
parts.append(f'[judge]\nbackend = "command"\ncommand = [{cmd}]\ntimeout = 60\n')
|
||||
parts.append(f'[ledger]\ndir = "{ledger}"\n')
|
||||
parts.append(f'[state]\nfile = "{state}"\n' + (f'seen_list = "{seen_list}"\n' if seen_list else ""))
|
||||
parts.append(extra)
|
||||
path = os.path.join(tmp, "config.toml")
|
||||
with open(path, "w") as f:
|
||||
f.write("\n".join(parts))
|
||||
return path
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
|
||||
import http.server
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
from ai_incidents import judge
|
||||
from ai_incidents.judge import JudgeConfig, JudgeError, build_message, claude_argv, extract_json, parse_verdict
|
||||
from ai_incidents.ledger import Entry
|
||||
from ai_incidents.prefilter import Candidate
|
||||
from ai_incidents.redact import Redactor
|
||||
from helpers import judge_cmd
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cands(n=3):
|
||||
out = []
|
||||
for i in range(1, n + 1):
|
||||
c = Candidate("SNIPPET", "claude-code", f"sess{i:04d}", "2026-07-1" + str(i), f" [user] thing {i}")
|
||||
c.id = f"C{i:02d}"
|
||||
out.append(c)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
GOOD = {
|
||||
"incidents": [{
|
||||
"title": "Wiped the cache", "date": "2026-07-12", "severity": "high", "category": "data-loss",
|
||||
"what": "w", "cost": "c", "lesson": "l", "candidates": ["C01", "C99"], "why": "because",
|
||||
}],
|
||||
"excluded": [{"candidates": ["C02"], "reason": "routine", "duplicate_of": "E01"}],
|
||||
"patterns": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_extract_json_tolerates_fences_and_prose():
|
||||
assert extract_json('Sure!\n```json\n{"a": 1}\n```\nthanks') == {"a": 1}
|
||||
assert extract_json('verdict: {"a": {"b": 2}} trailing') == {"a": {"b": 2}}
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError):
|
||||
extract_json("You've hit your monthly spend limit.")
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError):
|
||||
extract_json("{not json")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parse_verdict_validates_and_normalises():
|
||||
v = parse_verdict(json.dumps(GOOD), cands(), "2026-09-21")
|
||||
[i] = v.incidents
|
||||
assert i.severity == "HIGH" and i.candidates == ["C01"] # unknown id dropped
|
||||
assert v.excluded[0].duplicate_of == "E01"
|
||||
assert v.unaddressed == ["C03"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_incidents_are_rejected_not_filed():
|
||||
bad = {"incidents": [{"title": "x", "severity": "CATASTROPHIC", "what": "w", "cost": "c", "lesson": "l"},
|
||||
{"title": "no lesson", "severity": "LOW", "what": "w", "cost": "c"},
|
||||
"not an object"],
|
||||
"excluded": []}
|
||||
v = parse_verdict(json.dumps(bad), cands(), "2026-09-21")
|
||||
assert v.incidents == [] and len(v.rejected) == 3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_bad_date_falls_back_to_candidate_date():
|
||||
raw = {"incidents": [dict(GOOD["incidents"][0], date="last Tuesday", candidates=["C02"])], "excluded": []}
|
||||
assert parse_verdict(json.dumps(raw), cands(), "2026-09-21").incidents[0].date == "2026-07-12"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_category_becomes_other():
|
||||
raw = {"incidents": [dict(GOOD["incidents"][0], category="vibes")], "excluded": []}
|
||||
assert parse_verdict(json.dumps(raw), cands(), "2026-09-21").incidents[0].category == "other"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_verdict_text_is_redacted():
|
||||
raw = {"incidents": [dict(GOOD["incidents"][0], what="printed password=abcdef123456 to the log")],
|
||||
"excluded": []}
|
||||
v = parse_verdict(json.dumps(raw), cands(), "2026-09-21", Redactor())
|
||||
assert "abcdef123456" not in v.incidents[0].what
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_object_answers_fail():
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError):
|
||||
parse_verdict('{"incidents": "none"}', cands(), "2026-09-21")
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError):
|
||||
parse_verdict('{"summary": "all quiet"}', cands(), "2026-09-21")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_build_message_lists_candidates_and_ledger():
|
||||
msg = build_message(cands(2), [Entry.new("Old one", "2026-07-01", "LOW", "what it did", "c", "l")], "2026-09-21")
|
||||
assert "[C01] SNIPPET · claude-code · sess0001" in msg
|
||||
assert "[E01] Old one · 2026-07-01 · LOW -- what it did" in msg
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claude_argv_disables_every_tool_and_keeps_content_off_argv():
|
||||
argv = claude_argv(JudgeConfig(model="sonnet"), "RUBRIC")
|
||||
assert argv[:2] == ["claude", "-p"]
|
||||
i = argv.index("--tools")
|
||||
assert argv[i + 1] == ""
|
||||
for flag in ("--strict-mcp-config", "--no-session-persistence"):
|
||||
assert flag in argv
|
||||
assert "--mcp-config" not in argv
|
||||
assert argv[argv.index("--model") + 1] == "sonnet"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _fake_claude(tmp_path, envelope: dict | str, code: int = 0) -> str:
|
||||
"""A stand-in `claude` binary that also records its argv and stdin."""
|
||||
p = tmp_path / "claude"
|
||||
out = envelope if isinstance(envelope, str) else json.dumps(envelope)
|
||||
p.write_text(
|
||||
"#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport sys, json, os\n"
|
||||
f"open({str(tmp_path / 'argv.json')!r}, 'w').write(json.dumps(sys.argv[1:]))\n"
|
||||
f"open({str(tmp_path / 'stdin.txt')!r}, 'w').write(sys.stdin.read())\n"
|
||||
f"open({str(tmp_path / 'cwd.txt')!r}, 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n"
|
||||
f"sys.stdout.write({out!r})\nsys.exit({code})\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
p.chmod(0o755)
|
||||
return str(p)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claude_backend_reads_envelope_and_usage(tmp_path):
|
||||
env = {"type": "result", "subtype": "success", "is_error": False, "result": json.dumps(GOOD),
|
||||
"total_cost_usd": 0.12, "usage": {"input_tokens": 10, "cache_read_input_tokens": 5, "output_tokens": 7}}
|
||||
cfg = JudgeConfig(binary=_fake_claude(tmp_path, env))
|
||||
text, usage = judge.call(cfg, "RUBRIC", "CANDIDATES GO HERE")
|
||||
assert json.loads(text) == GOOD
|
||||
assert usage == {"total_cost_usd": 0.12, "input_tokens": 15, "output_tokens": 7}
|
||||
assert (tmp_path / "stdin.txt").read_text() == "CANDIDATES GO HERE"
|
||||
assert "CANDIDATES GO HERE" not in (tmp_path / "argv.json").read_text()
|
||||
assert "ai-incidents-judge-" in (tmp_path / "cwd.txt").read_text()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claude_backend_errors(tmp_path):
|
||||
cfg = JudgeConfig(binary=_fake_claude(tmp_path, {"is_error": True, "result": "You've hit your spend limit"}))
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError, match="spend limit"):
|
||||
judge.call(cfg, "R", "M")
|
||||
cfg = JudgeConfig(binary=_fake_claude(tmp_path, "plain text, no envelope"))
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError, match="envelope"):
|
||||
judge.call(cfg, "R", "M")
|
||||
cfg = JudgeConfig(binary=_fake_claude(tmp_path, "", code=1))
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError, match="exited 1"):
|
||||
judge.call(cfg, "R", "M")
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError, match="not found"):
|
||||
judge.call(JudgeConfig(binary=str(tmp_path / "missing")), "R", "M")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_command_backend(monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("FAKE_JUDGE_MODE", "file-first")
|
||||
cfg = JudgeConfig(backend="command", command=judge_cmd())
|
||||
text, _ = judge.call(cfg, "RUBRIC", "[C01] SNIPPET · x\n[C02] SNIPPET · y")
|
||||
v = parse_verdict(text, cands(2), "2026-09-21")
|
||||
assert [i.candidates for i in v.incidents] == [["C01"]] and v.excluded[0].candidates == ["C02"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_command_backend_timeout(tmp_path):
|
||||
cfg = JudgeConfig(backend="command", command=["sleep", "5"], timeout=1)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError, match="timed out"):
|
||||
judge.call(cfg, "R", "M")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
|
||||
seen = {}
|
||||
|
||||
def do_POST(self):
|
||||
body = json.loads(self.rfile.read(int(self.headers["Content-Length"])))
|
||||
_Handler.seen = {"path": self.path, "body": body, "auth": self.headers.get("Authorization")}
|
||||
resp = {"choices": [{"message": {"content": json.dumps(GOOD)}}],
|
||||
"usage": {"prompt_tokens": 100, "completion_tokens": 20}}
|
||||
data = json.dumps(resp).encode()
|
||||
self.send_response(200)
|
||||
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
|
||||
self.end_headers()
|
||||
self.wfile.write(data)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_message(self, *a):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_openai_backend(monkeypatch):
|
||||
srv = http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _Handler)
|
||||
t = threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True)
|
||||
t.start()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("LOCAL_LLM_KEY", "k-123")
|
||||
cfg = JudgeConfig(backend="openai", model="qwen3", base_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{srv.server_port}/v1",
|
||||
api_key_env="LOCAL_LLM_KEY")
|
||||
text, usage = judge.call(cfg, "RUBRIC", "MSG")
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
srv.shutdown()
|
||||
assert json.loads(text) == GOOD
|
||||
assert usage == {"input_tokens": 100, "output_tokens": 20}
|
||||
s = _Handler.seen
|
||||
assert s["path"] == "/v1/chat/completions" and s["auth"] == "Bearer k-123"
|
||||
assert s["body"]["messages"][0] == {"role": "system", "content": "RUBRIC"}
|
||||
assert s["body"]["response_format"] == {"type": "json_object"} and s["body"]["temperature"] == 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_openai_backend_missing_key_and_unreachable(monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("NOPE_KEY", raising=False)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError, match="NOPE_KEY"):
|
||||
judge.call(JudgeConfig(backend="openai", api_key_env="NOPE_KEY"), "R", "M")
|
||||
with pytest.raises(JudgeError, match="unreachable"):
|
||||
judge.call(JudgeConfig(backend="openai", base_url="http://127.0.0.1:9/v1", timeout=2), "R", "M")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_default_rubric_ships_with_the_package():
|
||||
r = judge.default_rubric()
|
||||
assert "Answer format" in r and "misattribution" in r.lower()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
from ai_incidents import ledger
|
||||
from ai_incidents.ledger import Entry, add_entries, add_patterns, fingerprint, index, parse, render
|
||||
|
||||
HAND = """# AI incidents
|
||||
|
||||
Times AI-generated work bit me.
|
||||
|
||||
> Seeded by hand.
|
||||
|
||||
## Newer low thing · 2026-09-04 · LOW
|
||||
- **What:** a
|
||||
- **Cost:** b
|
||||
- **Lesson:** c
|
||||
|
||||
## Leaked a key into the transcript · 2026-07-13 · HIGH
|
||||
- **What:** printed the config
|
||||
and a continuation line written by hand
|
||||
- **Cost:** rotation
|
||||
- **Lesson:** never cat a config
|
||||
|
||||
## Spiral with a version range · v0.5.8–v0.6.0 · MEDIUM
|
||||
- **Project:** a hand-added field
|
||||
- **What:** x
|
||||
- **Cost:** y
|
||||
- **Lesson:** z
|
||||
|
||||
## Recurring patterns
|
||||
- **Config dumps leak secrets** -- redact at the source.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
*Add new incidents at the top.*
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parse_keeps_header_entries_and_footer():
|
||||
led = parse(HAND)
|
||||
assert led.header.startswith("# AI incidents") and led.header.endswith("> Seeded by hand.")
|
||||
assert [(e.title, e.date, e.severity) for e in led.entries] == [
|
||||
("Newer low thing", "2026-09-04", "LOW"),
|
||||
("Leaked a key into the transcript", "2026-07-13", "HIGH"),
|
||||
("Spiral with a version range", "v0.5.8–v0.6.0", "MEDIUM"),
|
||||
]
|
||||
assert led.footer.startswith("## Recurring patterns")
|
||||
assert led.footer.endswith("*Add new incidents at the top.*")
|
||||
assert " and a continuation line written by hand" in led.entries[1].body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_render_ranks_by_severity_then_date():
|
||||
out = render(parse(HAND))
|
||||
heads = [ln for ln in out.splitlines() if ln.startswith("## ") and "·" in ln]
|
||||
assert heads == [
|
||||
"## Leaked a key into the transcript · 2026-07-13 · HIGH",
|
||||
"## Spiral with a version range · v0.5.8–v0.6.0 · MEDIUM",
|
||||
"## Newer low thing · 2026-09-04 · LOW",
|
||||
]
|
||||
assert out.index("## Recurring patterns") > out.index("## Newer low thing")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_render_newest_order():
|
||||
out = render(parse(HAND), order="newest")
|
||||
heads = [ln.split(" · ")[0] for ln in out.splitlines() if ln.startswith("## ") and "·" in ln]
|
||||
# undated (non-ISO) entries sort last
|
||||
assert heads == ["## Newer low thing", "## Leaked a key into the transcript", "## Spiral with a version range"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_round_trip_is_stable_and_lossless():
|
||||
once = render(parse(HAND))
|
||||
assert render(parse(once)) == once
|
||||
for line in HAND.splitlines():
|
||||
if line.strip() and line.strip() != "---":
|
||||
assert line in once, line
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_severity_ties_keep_existing_order():
|
||||
text = "# L\n\n## B · 2026-01-01 · LOW\n- x\n\n## A · 2026-01-01 · LOW\n- y\n"
|
||||
assert [e.title for e in ledger.ordered(parse(text).entries)] == ["B", "A"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_add_entries_dedupes_by_title_fingerprint():
|
||||
led = parse(HAND)
|
||||
new = [Entry.new("leaked a KEY into the transcript!", "2026-07-20", "LOW", "w", "c", "l"),
|
||||
Entry.new("Something new", "2026-09-10", "MEDIUM", "w", "c", "l")]
|
||||
added, dupes = add_entries(led, new)
|
||||
assert [e.title for e in added] == ["Something new"]
|
||||
assert [e.title for e in dupes] == ["leaked a KEY into the transcript!"]
|
||||
assert fingerprint("Leaked a key into the transcript") == fingerprint("leaked a KEY into the transcript!")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_model_output_cannot_break_the_structure():
|
||||
e = Entry.new("## Title · with a dot\nand a newline", "2026-01-01", "HIGH",
|
||||
"what\n## Injected heading · 2026-01-01 · HIGH", "cost", "lesson")
|
||||
led = ledger.Ledger("# L", [e])
|
||||
reparsed = parse(render(led))
|
||||
assert len(reparsed.entries) == 1
|
||||
assert reparsed.entries[0].title == "Title - with a dot and a newline"
|
||||
assert "Injected heading" in reparsed.entries[0].body[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_new_entry_format():
|
||||
e = Entry.new("Pushed to main", "2026-07-11", "MEDIUM", "pushed", "a revert", "ask first")
|
||||
assert e.render() == (
|
||||
"## Pushed to main · 2026-07-11 · MEDIUM\n"
|
||||
"- **What:** pushed\n- **Cost:** a revert\n- **Lesson:** ask first"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_patterns_append_to_existing_section_and_dedupe():
|
||||
led = parse(HAND)
|
||||
added = add_patterns(led, ["Matching by name instead of an owned id", "Matching by name instead of an owned id"])
|
||||
assert added == ["Matching by name instead of an owned id"]
|
||||
lines = led.footer.splitlines()
|
||||
i = lines.index("- Matching by name instead of an owned id")
|
||||
assert lines[i - 1].startswith("- **Config dumps")
|
||||
assert led.footer.rstrip().endswith("*Add new incidents at the top.*")
|
||||
assert add_patterns(led, ["Matching by name instead of an owned id"]) == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_patterns_section_created_when_missing():
|
||||
led = ledger.Ledger("# L", [Entry.new("t", "2026-01-01", "LOW", "w", "c", "l")])
|
||||
add_patterns(led, ["a pattern"])
|
||||
assert render(led).rstrip().endswith("## Recurring patterns\n\n- a pattern")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_index_preserves_first_seen_and_counts():
|
||||
led = parse(HAND)
|
||||
fp = fingerprint("Leaked a key into the transcript")
|
||||
prior = {"incidents": [{"fp": fp, "first_seen": "2026-07-13"}]}
|
||||
idx = index(led, prior, "2026-09-21")
|
||||
assert idx["counts"] == {"total": 3, "high": 1, "medium": 1, "low": 1}
|
||||
by = {i["fp"]: i for i in idx["incidents"]}
|
||||
assert by[fp]["first_seen"] == "2026-07-13"
|
||||
assert by[fingerprint("Newer low thing")]["first_seen"] == "2026-09-21"
|
||||
json.loads(ledger.dump_index(idx))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fingerprint_matches_the_original_scheme():
|
||||
# Same algorithm as the state.json of the sweep this was extracted from, so an existing index
|
||||
# keeps its first_seen dates.
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
t = "Committed 14 embedded git repos to `main` with `git add -A`"
|
||||
norm = "committed-14-embedded-git-repos-to-main-with-git-add-a"
|
||||
assert fingerprint(t) == hashlib.sha1(norm.encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sample_ledger_is_in_canonical_form():
|
||||
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "examples", "sample-ledger.md")
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
text = f.read()
|
||||
led = parse(text)
|
||||
assert 4 <= len(led.entries) <= 6
|
||||
assert render(led) == text
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
|
||||
"""End-to-end runs against synthetic transcripts and a stand-in judge.
|
||||
|
||||
The state tests port the verification scenarios of the sweep this tool was extracted from:
|
||||
first run seeds a baseline; a failed judge loses nothing (the same candidates come back);
|
||||
success records the sessions; a recorded session is not shown again; a clean session is recorded
|
||||
without a judge; the candidate budget defers whole sessions without stranding clean ones after them.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
from ai_incidents import cli, config, pipeline
|
||||
from ai_incidents.envelope import EnvelopeError, WriteGuard
|
||||
from ai_incidents.state import LockedError, RunLock, State
|
||||
from helpers import cc, config_toml, oc_db, oc_session, write_session
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture
|
||||
def env(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("FAKE_JUDGE_MODE", "file-first")
|
||||
marker = tmp_path / "judge-calls.txt"
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("FAKE_JUDGE_MARKER", str(marker))
|
||||
root = tmp_path / "claude"
|
||||
root.mkdir()
|
||||
led = tmp_path / "ledger"
|
||||
st = tmp_path / "state" / "state.json"
|
||||
cfgp = config_toml(str(tmp_path), claude_root=str(root), ledger=str(led), state=str(st),
|
||||
extra="[scan]\nfirst_run = \"backfill\"\n")
|
||||
|
||||
class E:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
e = E()
|
||||
e.tmp, e.root, e.ledger, e.state, e.cfg_path, e.marker = tmp_path, root, led, st, cfgp, marker
|
||||
e.cfg = lambda **kw: config.load(cfgp)
|
||||
e.calls = lambda: marker.read_text().count("=====") if marker.exists() else 0
|
||||
return e
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bad_session(root, sid="deadbeef0001", date="2026-07-14"):
|
||||
return write_session(str(root), "-work-proj", sid, [
|
||||
cc("user", "clean up the database", ts=f"{date}T09:00:00Z"),
|
||||
cc("assistant", "Running it.", tool_use="psql -c 'DROP TABLE orders'", ts=f"{date}T09:01:00Z"),
|
||||
cc("assistant", "I made a mistake: that was the live table.", ts=f"{date}T09:02:00Z"),
|
||||
cc("user", "why did you do that", ts=f"{date}T09:03:00Z"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def clean_session(root, sid="c1ea000000001"):
|
||||
return write_session(str(root), "-work-proj", sid, [cc("user", "add a test"), cc("assistant", "Added; passing.")])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def quiet(*a, **k):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run(e, **kw):
|
||||
return pipeline.run(e.cfg(), say=quiet, **kw)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def snapshot(root):
|
||||
out = {}
|
||||
for d, _, files in os.walk(root):
|
||||
for f in files:
|
||||
p = os.path.join(d, f)
|
||||
st = os.stat(p)
|
||||
out[p] = (hashlib.sha1(open(p, "rb").read()).hexdigest(), st.st_mtime_ns)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- the happy path -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_run_files_an_incident_and_writes_only_the_ledger(env):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
clean_session(env.root)
|
||||
o = run(env)
|
||||
assert o.code == 0 and [i.title for i in o.filed] == ["Deleted the production table on a hunch"]
|
||||
text = (env.ledger / "incidents.md").read_text()
|
||||
assert "## Deleted the production table on a hunch · 2026-07-14 · HIGH" in text
|
||||
assert "- **Lesson:** never run destructive SQL without a backup" in text
|
||||
reports = os.listdir(env.ledger / "reports")
|
||||
assert len(reports) == 1
|
||||
rep = (env.ledger / "reports" / reports[0]).read_text()
|
||||
assert rep == (env.ledger / "latest.md").read_text()
|
||||
assert "## Excluded candidates" in rep and "routine cleanup of its own scratch files" in rep
|
||||
idx = json.loads((env.ledger / "index.json").read_text())
|
||||
assert idx["counts"]["high"] == 1
|
||||
assert env.calls() == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_second_run_is_quiet_and_does_not_call_the_judge(env):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
run(env)
|
||||
o = run(env)
|
||||
assert o.code == 0 and "judge not invoked" in o.headline
|
||||
assert env.calls() == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_candidates_are_redacted_before_the_judge_sees_them(env):
|
||||
write_session(str(env.root), "p", "leaky0000001", [
|
||||
cc("assistant", "Oops, I leaked it: password=correcthorsebattery"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
run(env)
|
||||
prompt = env.marker.read_text()
|
||||
assert "correcthorsebattery" not in prompt and "[REDACTED]" in prompt
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_verdict_is_redacted_before_the_ledger(env, monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("FAKE_JUDGE_MODE", "leak")
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
run(env)
|
||||
assert "hunter2hunter2" not in (env.ledger / "incidents.md").read_text()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- state: nothing is lost, nothing is judged twice -----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_first_run_baseline_emits_nothing(env, tmp_path):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
cfgp = config_toml(str(tmp_path), claude_root=str(env.root), ledger=str(env.ledger), state=str(env.state))
|
||||
o = pipeline.run(config.load(cfgp), say=quiet)
|
||||
assert "judge not invoked" in o.headline and env.calls() == 0
|
||||
assert not (env.ledger / "incidents.md").exists()
|
||||
# A session that appears after the baseline is judged.
|
||||
bad_session(env.root, sid="newsession01", date="2026-07-15")
|
||||
o = pipeline.run(config.load(cfgp), say=quiet)
|
||||
assert env.calls() == 1 and len(o.filed) == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_failed_judge_loses_nothing(env, monkeypatch):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
clean_session(env.root)
|
||||
for mode in ("fail", "prose"):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("FAKE_JUDGE_MODE", mode)
|
||||
o = run(env)
|
||||
assert o.code == 1
|
||||
assert not (env.ledger / "incidents.md").exists()
|
||||
s = State(str(env.state))
|
||||
# the clean session was recorded; the bad one was not
|
||||
assert len(s.seen("claude-code")) == 1
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("FAKE_JUDGE_MODE", "file-first")
|
||||
o = run(env)
|
||||
assert o.code == 0 and len(o.filed) == 1
|
||||
assert len(State(str(env.state)).seen("claude-code")) == 2
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_a_grown_session_is_looked_at_again(env):
|
||||
p = bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
run(env)
|
||||
with open(p, "a") as f:
|
||||
f.write(cc("user", "you broke the export too", ts="2026-07-16T10:00:00Z") + "\n")
|
||||
o = run(env)
|
||||
assert env.calls() == 2
|
||||
# the same incident, re-surfaced, is not filed twice
|
||||
assert o.filed == []
|
||||
assert (env.ledger / "incidents.md").read_text().count("## Deleted the production table") == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_budget_defers_whole_sessions_and_still_records_clean_ones(env, tmp_path):
|
||||
for i in range(3):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root, sid=f"bad{i:09d}")
|
||||
clean_session(env.root, sid="zzzclean0001") # sorts after the bad ones
|
||||
cfgp = config_toml(str(tmp_path), claude_root=str(env.root), ledger=str(env.ledger), state=str(env.state),
|
||||
extra="[scan]\nfirst_run = \"backfill\"\nmax_candidates = 4\nmax_per_session = 4\n")
|
||||
cfg = config.load(cfgp)
|
||||
s = State(str(env.state))
|
||||
res = pipeline.scan(cfg, s)
|
||||
assert res.stats["claude-code"].with_candidates == 1
|
||||
assert res.stats["claude-code"].deferred == 2
|
||||
assert res.stats["claude-code"].clean == 1
|
||||
pipeline.run(cfg, say=quiet)
|
||||
pipeline.run(cfg, say=quiet)
|
||||
pipeline.run(cfg, say=quiet)
|
||||
assert env.calls() == 3
|
||||
assert len(State(str(env.state)).seen("claude-code")) == 4
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_seen_list_export_and_import(env, tmp_path):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
clean_session(env.root)
|
||||
seen_list = tmp_path / "external" / "seen.txt"
|
||||
seen_list.parent.mkdir()
|
||||
cfgp = config_toml(str(tmp_path), claude_root=str(env.root), ledger=str(env.ledger), state=str(env.state),
|
||||
seen_list=str(seen_list), extra="[scan]\nfirst_run = \"backfill\"\n")
|
||||
pipeline.run(config.load(cfgp), say=quiet)
|
||||
keys = seen_list.read_text().split()
|
||||
assert sorted(k.split(":")[0] for k in keys) == ["c1ea000000001.jsonl", "deadbeef0001.jsonl"]
|
||||
# A fresh state file with an existing list does not re-judge or re-baseline.
|
||||
os.remove(env.state)
|
||||
o = pipeline.run(config.load(cfgp), say=quiet)
|
||||
assert "judge not invoked" in o.headline and env.calls() == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- dry run, lock, hooks -----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dry_run_calls_no_model_and_writes_nothing(env):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
before = snapshot(env.tmp)
|
||||
o = run(env, dry_run=True)
|
||||
assert o.code == 0 and "dry run" in o.headline
|
||||
assert env.calls() == 0
|
||||
assert snapshot(env.tmp) == before
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dry_run_with_judge_still_writes_nothing(env):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
run(env, dry_run=True, with_judge=True)
|
||||
assert env.calls() == 1
|
||||
assert not env.ledger.exists() and not env.state.exists()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_concurrent_run_is_refused(env):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
guard = WriteGuard(files=[str(env.state) + ".lock"])
|
||||
with RunLock(guard, str(env.state)):
|
||||
with pytest.raises(LockedError):
|
||||
run(env)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_hooks(env, tmp_path):
|
||||
out = tmp_path / "hooks.log"
|
||||
script = tmp_path / "hook.sh"
|
||||
script.write_text(f'#!/bin/sh\nprintf "%s %s %s\\n" "$1" "$AI_INCIDENTS_FILED" "$AI_INCIDENTS_HIGH" >> {out}\ncat >> {out}\n')
|
||||
script.chmod(0o755)
|
||||
text = open(env.cfg_path).read() + (
|
||||
f'\n[hooks]\nnotify_cmd = "{script} notify"\non_success_cmd = "{script} ok"\n'
|
||||
f'on_failure_cmd = "{script} failed"\n')
|
||||
open(env.cfg_path, "w").write(text)
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
run(env)
|
||||
log = out.read_text()
|
||||
assert "notify 1 1" in log and "ok 1 1" in log
|
||||
assert "HIGH Deleted the production table on a hunch" in log
|
||||
out.unlink()
|
||||
run(env) # quiet run: heartbeat only
|
||||
assert out.read_text().startswith("ok 0 0")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_failure_hook(env, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
out = tmp_path / "fail.log"
|
||||
open(env.cfg_path, "a").write(f'\n[hooks]\non_failure_cmd = "sh -c \'cat > {out}\'"\n')
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("FAKE_JUDGE_MODE", "fail")
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
assert run(env).code == 1
|
||||
assert "FAILED: judge" in out.read_text()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- the permission envelope ---------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_write_guard_refuses_outside_paths(tmp_path):
|
||||
g = WriteGuard(dirs=[str(tmp_path / "ledger")], files=[str(tmp_path / "state.json")])
|
||||
g.write_text(str(tmp_path / "ledger" / "reports" / "x.md"), "ok")
|
||||
g.write_text(str(tmp_path / "state.json"), "{}")
|
||||
for bad in [tmp_path / "elsewhere.md", tmp_path / "ledger" / ".." / "escape.md", tmp_path / "ledger-evil" / "x"]:
|
||||
with pytest.raises(EnvelopeError):
|
||||
g.write_text(str(bad), "no")
|
||||
os.symlink(tmp_path, tmp_path / "ledger" / "link")
|
||||
with pytest.raises(EnvelopeError):
|
||||
g.write_text(str(tmp_path / "ledger" / "link" / "escape.md"), "no")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_a_full_run_changes_nothing_outside_the_envelope(env, tmp_path):
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
clean_session(env.root)
|
||||
db = tmp_path / "oc" / "opencode.db"
|
||||
db.parent.mkdir()
|
||||
con = oc_db(str(db))
|
||||
oc_session(con, "ses_abc", [("user", [{"type": "text", "text": "you deleted my notes"}])])
|
||||
con.close()
|
||||
open(env.cfg_path, "a").write(f'\n[[source]]\ntype = "opencode"\npath = "{db}"\n')
|
||||
open(env.cfg_path, "a").write(f'\n[[source]]\ntype = "claude-code"\nname = "cc"\npath = "{env.root}"\n')
|
||||
before = snapshot(tmp_path)
|
||||
assert run(env).code == 0
|
||||
after = snapshot(tmp_path)
|
||||
changed = {p for p in set(before) | set(after) if before.get(p) != after.get(p)}
|
||||
# SQLite's WAL index (-shm) is reader bookkeeping, created as the database's own user; the
|
||||
# database itself and every transcript are untouched.
|
||||
allowed = (str(env.ledger) + os.sep, str(env.state), str(env.marker), str(db) + "-shm", str(db) + "-wal")
|
||||
assert changed and all(p.startswith(allowed) for p in changed), sorted(changed)
|
||||
assert before[str(db)] == after[str(db)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_someone_elses_opencode_database_gets_no_sidecar_files(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
from ai_incidents import sources
|
||||
db = tmp_path / "opencode.db"
|
||||
con = oc_db(str(db))
|
||||
oc_session(con, "ses_abc", [("user", [{"type": "text", "text": "you deleted my notes"}])])
|
||||
con.close()
|
||||
before = sorted(os.listdir(tmp_path))
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(sources.os, "geteuid", lambda: os.stat(db).st_uid + 1)
|
||||
[ref] = list(sources.iter_opencode("opencode", str(db)))
|
||||
assert ref.load().turns[0].text == "you deleted my notes"
|
||||
assert sorted(os.listdir(tmp_path)) == before
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- git ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def git(repo, *args):
|
||||
return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_git_commits_only_what_it_wrote(env):
|
||||
env.ledger.mkdir()
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "init", "-q", "-b", "main")
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "config", "user.name", "Test")
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
|
||||
(env.ledger / "notes.txt").write_text("my own uncommitted notes")
|
||||
(env.ledger / "staged.txt").write_text("someone else's staged work")
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "add", "staged.txt")
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
o = run(env)
|
||||
assert o.code == 0
|
||||
files = git(env.ledger, "show", "--name-only", "--format=", "HEAD").split()
|
||||
assert sorted(files) == sorted(["incidents.md", "index.json", "latest.md", f"reports/{os.listdir(env.ledger / 'reports')[0]}"])
|
||||
assert git(env.ledger, "log", "-1", "--format=%s").strip() == o.headline
|
||||
status = git(env.ledger, "status", "--porcelain")
|
||||
assert "A staged.txt" in status and "?? notes.txt" in status
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_git_push_goes_to_the_configured_remote_and_verifies_it(env, tmp_path):
|
||||
remote = tmp_path / "remote.git"
|
||||
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "--bare", "-b", "main", str(remote)], check=True)
|
||||
env.ledger.mkdir()
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "init", "-q", "-b", "main")
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "config", "user.name", "Test")
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "commit", "-q", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init")
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "remote", "add", "origin", str(remote))
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "push", "-q", "origin", "main")
|
||||
open(env.cfg_path, "a").write(f'\n[git]\npush = true\nexpected_remote_url = "{remote}"\n')
|
||||
bad_session(env.root)
|
||||
assert run(env).code == 0
|
||||
assert "ai-incidents" in git(remote, "log", "-1", "--format=%s")
|
||||
# A repointed checkout is refused before anything is pushed or written.
|
||||
git(env.ledger, "remote", "set-url", "origin", str(tmp_path / "somewhere-else.git"))
|
||||
bad_session(env.root, sid="another00001", date="2026-07-20")
|
||||
o = run(env)
|
||||
assert o.code == 1 and "refusing" in o.headline
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- CLI ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_cli_init_scan_config_and_exit_codes(tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys):
|
||||
cfgp = str(tmp_path / "cfg" / "config.toml")
|
||||
led = str(tmp_path / "led")
|
||||
assert cli.main(["-c", cfgp, "init", "--ledger", led, "--git"]) == 0
|
||||
assert os.path.isdir(os.path.join(led, ".git"))
|
||||
assert cli.main(["-c", cfgp, "init", "--ledger", led]) == 2 # refuses to overwrite
|
||||
cfg = config.load(cfgp)
|
||||
assert cfg.ledger.dir == led and cfg.judge.backend == "claude" and cfg.judge.model == "sonnet"
|
||||
assert cli.main(["-c", cfgp, "config"]) == 0
|
||||
assert "writes:" in capsys.readouterr().out
|
||||
assert cli.main(["-c", str(tmp_path / "missing.toml"), "run"]) == 2
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_config_rejects_typos_and_bad_values(tmp_path):
|
||||
with pytest.raises(config.ConfigError, match="unknown key"):
|
||||
config.from_dict({"judge": {"modle": "x"}})
|
||||
with pytest.raises(config.ConfigError, match="must be int"):
|
||||
config.from_dict({"scan": {"max_candidates": "50"}})
|
||||
with pytest.raises(config.ConfigError, match="first_run"):
|
||||
config.from_dict({"scan": {"first_run": "sometimes"}})
|
||||
with pytest.raises(config.ConfigError, match="used twice"):
|
||||
config.from_dict({"source": [{"type": "claude-code"}, {"type": "claude-code"}]})
|
||||
with pytest.raises(config.ConfigError, match="needs"):
|
||||
config.from_dict({"judge": {"backend": "command"}})
|
||||
cfg = config.from_dict({})
|
||||
assert [s.type for s in cfg.sources] == ["claude-code", "opencode"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reindex_reranks_hand_edits(env):
|
||||
env.ledger.mkdir()
|
||||
(env.ledger / "incidents.md").write_text(
|
||||
"# L\n\n## Low one · 2026-09-01 · LOW\n- **What:** a\n\n## High one · 2026-07-01 · HIGH\n- **What:** b\n")
|
||||
assert pipeline.reindex(env.cfg(), say=quiet) == 0
|
||||
text = (env.ledger / "incidents.md").read_text()
|
||||
assert text.index("High one") < text.index("Low one")
|
||||
assert json.loads((env.ledger / "index.json").read_text())["counts"]["total"] == 2
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_example_config_is_valid():
|
||||
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "examples", "config.toml")
|
||||
cfg = config.load(path)
|
||||
assert cfg.judge.backend == "claude" and cfg.ledger.order == "severity"
|
||||
assert [s.type for s in cfg.sources] == ["claude-code", "opencode"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
|
||||
"""The deterministic pre-filter: what counts as a candidate, and in which shape.
|
||||
|
||||
Several of these are regressions for misses in the sweep this tool was extracted from: a scanner
|
||||
that only matched confessions scored MISS on three real incidents in one day, and a destructive
|
||||
command that exited 0 was invisible until tool output was read.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from ai_incidents.prefilter import (
|
||||
AI_ADMIT, BLAME, SYNTHETIC, USER_SIG, Patterns, behaviour, danger_rank, extract, is_hit,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from ai_incidents.sources import Session, ToolCall, ToolResult, Turn
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sess(turns=(), calls=(), results=()):
|
||||
return Session([Turn(r, "2026-07-14", t) for r, t in turns],
|
||||
[ToolCall("Bash", c) for c in calls],
|
||||
[ToolResult(e, t) for e, t in results])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- signals --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_agent_admissions_match():
|
||||
for s in ["Sorry, I made a mistake there", "That was my error.", "I accidentally deleted the branch",
|
||||
"the outage was mine", "This leaked the API key", "I had to revert the migration"]:
|
||||
assert AI_ADMIT.search(s), s
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_user_blame_matches():
|
||||
for s in ["you deleted my notes", "why did you push to main?", "that's not what I asked", "put it back"]:
|
||||
assert USER_SIG.search(s), s
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ordinary_text_does_not_match():
|
||||
for s in ["I added the endpoint and the tests pass", "Let's refactor the parser next"]:
|
||||
assert not AI_ADMIT.search(s) and not USER_SIG.search(s) and not BLAME.search(s)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blame_catches_is_as_well_as_contraction():
|
||||
# "this IS a bug in X" is the commoner phrasing and was once missed by a pattern that only
|
||||
# accepted "this's"/"that's".
|
||||
assert BLAME.search("This is a bug in node_exporter's parser")
|
||||
assert BLAME.search("that's a known issue with the upstream library")
|
||||
assert BLAME.search("I'll pin it to an older version as a workaround for the regression")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_harness_injected_user_turns_are_not_blame():
|
||||
for s in ["<system-reminder>why did you ...</system-reminder>",
|
||||
"<local-command-caveat>Caveat: roll back</local-command-caveat>",
|
||||
"This session is being continued from a previous conversation. You broke x."]:
|
||||
assert SYNTHETIC.match(s)
|
||||
assert not is_hit("user", s, Patterns())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_user_blame_only_counts_from_the_user():
|
||||
assert is_hit("user", "you broke the build", Patterns())
|
||||
assert not is_hit("assistant", "you broke the build", Patterns())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- behaviour ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_destructive_commands_are_collected_and_scratch_is_benign():
|
||||
s = sess(calls=["rm -rf /srv/data/uploads", "rm -rf /tmp/build-cache", "rm -rf mut # scratchpad",
|
||||
"git worktree remove ../wt", "ls -la"])
|
||||
danger, _ = behaviour(s, Patterns())
|
||||
assert danger == ["Bash: rm -rf /srv/data/uploads"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_file_paths_are_not_commands():
|
||||
# A Read or Edit of a file called truncate.py is not a truncate.
|
||||
s = Session(calls=[ToolCall("Edit", "")])
|
||||
assert behaviour(s, Patterns()) == ([], [])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_success_output_warnings_are_evidence():
|
||||
out = "\n".join(["warning: adding embedded git repository: rr/a"] * 14)
|
||||
_, failures = behaviour(sess(results=[(False, out)]), Patterns())
|
||||
assert failures == ["warning: adding embedded git repository: rr/a (x14)"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_routine_failures_are_ignored_and_real_ones_kept():
|
||||
s = sess(results=[
|
||||
(True, "grep: foo: No such file or directory"),
|
||||
(True, "fatal: not a git repository"),
|
||||
(True, 'Traceback (most recent call last):\n File "<string>", line 1\nKeyError: x'),
|
||||
(True, 'Traceback (most recent call last):\n File "/srv/app/main.py", line 9\nKeyError: x'),
|
||||
(True, "You've hit your spend limit"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
_, failures = behaviour(s, Patterns())
|
||||
assert len(failures) == 2
|
||||
assert failures[0].startswith("Traceback (most recent call last): File \"/srv/app/main.py\"")
|
||||
assert "spend limit" in failures[1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_danger_rank_puts_history_rewrites_first():
|
||||
cmds = ["pkill -f worker", "systemctl stop web", "rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm -rf ./data",
|
||||
"git rm -r --cached .", "git reset --hard HEAD~3"]
|
||||
ranked = sorted(cmds, key=danger_rank)
|
||||
assert ranked[:2] == ["git rm -r --cached .", "git reset --hard HEAD~3"]
|
||||
assert ranked[2] == "rm -rf ./data"
|
||||
assert ranked[-1] == "rm -rf /tmp/x"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_extra_patterns_from_config():
|
||||
pats = Patterns.with_extras(destructive=[r"\bterraform\s+destroy\b"], alarm=[r"MyJobOverdue"])
|
||||
danger, _ = behaviour(sess(calls=["terraform destroy -auto-approve"]), pats)
|
||||
assert danger
|
||||
assert is_hit("assistant", "MyJobOverdue fired at 03:00", pats)
|
||||
assert not is_hit("assistant", "MyJobOverdue fired at 03:00", Patterns())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- extraction shapes ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_clean_session_has_nothing_to_judge():
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=[("user", "add a test"), ("assistant", "done, tests pass")], calls=["pytest"]),
|
||||
"claude-code", "abcd1234")
|
||||
assert ex.clean and not ex.candidates
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_snippet_carries_surrounding_turns():
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=[("user", "clean up the repo"), ("assistant", "I deleted the wrong directory"),
|
||||
("user", "restore it")]), "claude-code", "abcd1234")
|
||||
assert [c.kind for c in ex.candidates] == ["SNIPPET", "SNIPPET"]
|
||||
body = ex.candidates[0].body
|
||||
assert "[user] clean up the repo" in body and "[assistant] I deleted the wrong directory" in body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_digest_when_nobody_says_anything():
|
||||
# The incidents nobody narrates: no confession, no complaint, only commands.
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=[("user", "tidy the checkout"), ("assistant", "Done.")],
|
||||
calls=["git reset --hard origin/main"]), "claude-code", "abcd1234")
|
||||
[c] = ex.candidates
|
||||
assert c.kind == "DIGEST"
|
||||
assert "[task] tidy the checkout" in c.body
|
||||
assert "! Bash: git reset --hard origin/main" in c.body
|
||||
assert "[ended] Done." in c.body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_a_session_that_talked_is_still_a_session_that_did():
|
||||
# A session with confessions about one thing must still have its commands examined.
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=[("user", "commit it"), ("assistant", "My mistake, wrong branch name")],
|
||||
calls=["git add -A && git commit -m wip"],
|
||||
results=[(False, "warning: adding embedded git repository: a\n" * 3)]),
|
||||
"claude-code", "abcd1234")
|
||||
assert [c.kind for c in ex.candidates] == ["SNIPPET", "EVIDENCE"]
|
||||
assert "embedded git repository" in ex.candidates[1].body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_evidence_keeps_the_worst_commands_when_capped():
|
||||
calls = [f"rm -rf /tmp/scratch-{i} && true" for i in range(10)] + ["git rm -r --cached ."]
|
||||
# the /tmp ones are not BENIGN here (not matched by the scratch patterns) so they compete
|
||||
calls = [c.replace("/tmp/", "./tmp-") for c in calls]
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=[("user", "go")], calls=calls), "claude-code", "abcd1234")
|
||||
assert "git rm -r --cached ." in ex.candidates[0].body.splitlines()[2]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_excerpts_are_one_line_each():
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=[("assistant", "I broke it\n## Fake heading\nmore")]), "claude-code", "abcd1234")
|
||||
lines = ex.candidates[0].body.splitlines()
|
||||
assert len(lines) == 1 and "## Fake heading" in lines[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_talkative_session_is_cut_once_and_keeps_its_evidence():
|
||||
turns = [("assistant", f"I made a mistake #{i}") for i in range(30)]
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=turns, calls=["git push --force origin main"]), "claude-code", "abcd1234",
|
||||
per_session=5)
|
||||
assert len(ex.candidates) == 5
|
||||
assert ex.candidates[-1].kind == "EVIDENCE"
|
||||
assert ex.dropped == 26
|
||||
assert "not shown" in ex.candidates[-1].body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_candidate_render_has_id_and_shape():
|
||||
ex = extract(sess(turns=[("user", "go")], calls=["rm -rf ./build"]), "opencode", "f44d5651")
|
||||
c = ex.candidates[0]
|
||||
c.id = "C07"
|
||||
assert c.render().splitlines()[0] == (
|
||||
"[C07] DIGEST · opencode · f44d5651 · 2026-07-14 -- nobody said anything; the commands did")
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
||||
"""Secret-shaped strings never reach the judge or the ledger. Test tokens are assembled at runtime
|
||||
so this file does not itself look like it contains credentials."""
|
||||
|
||||
from ai_incidents.redact import MASK, Redactor
|
||||
|
||||
r = Redactor()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_token_formats():
|
||||
samples = [
|
||||
"gh" + "p_" + "A" * 36,
|
||||
"github" + "_pat_" + "B" * 30,
|
||||
"s" + "k-ant-" + "c" * 40,
|
||||
"AK" + "IA" + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP",
|
||||
"xo" + "xb-" + "1234567890-abcdef",
|
||||
"ey" + "J" + "a" * 20 + "." + "b" * 20 + "." + "c" * 20,
|
||||
]
|
||||
for s in samples:
|
||||
out = r(f"token is {s} here")
|
||||
assert s not in out and MASK in out, s
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_private_key_block():
|
||||
pem = "-----BEGIN " + "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nabc\ndef\n-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----"
|
||||
assert r("key:\n" + pem + "\ndone") == "key:\n" + MASK + "\ndone"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assignments_keep_the_key_and_drop_the_value():
|
||||
assert r("db_password=s3cr3t-value") == f"db_password={MASK}"
|
||||
assert r('"api_key": "abcdef123456"') == f'"api_key": "{MASK}' + '"'
|
||||
assert r("SMTP_PASS" + "WORD: hunter2hunter2") == f"SMTP_PASSWORD: {MASK}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_placeholders_and_numbers_are_left_alone():
|
||||
for s in ["password=$DB_PASSWORD", "token: ${TOKEN}", "input_tokens: 123456", "password=********",
|
||||
"secret: true"]:
|
||||
assert r(s) == s, s
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_bearer_and_url_credentials():
|
||||
assert r("Authorization: Bearer " + "x" * 30) == f"Authorization: Bearer {MASK}"
|
||||
assert r("postgres://app:" + "pw123456" + "@db.example.com/x") == f"postgres://app:{MASK}@db.example.com/x"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ordinary_prose_untouched():
|
||||
s = "The author reverted the password-reset flow; tokens were fine. See docs at https://example.com/a:b"
|
||||
assert r(s) == s
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_disabled_and_extra_patterns():
|
||||
assert Redactor(enabled=False)("password=abcdefgh") == "password=abcdefgh"
|
||||
assert Redactor([r"INTERNAL-\d{6}"])("id INTERNAL-123456") == f"id {MASK}"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
from ai_incidents.sources import (
|
||||
SourceError, claude_key, iter_claude_code, iter_opencode, open_readonly, parse_claude_jsonl,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from helpers import cc, oc_db, oc_session, write_session
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claude_jsonl_parse(tmp_path):
|
||||
p = write_session(str(tmp_path), "-home-me-proj", "0123456789abcdef", [
|
||||
cc("user", "please clean up"),
|
||||
"not json at all",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
'{"type": "summary"}',
|
||||
cc("assistant", "running it", tool_use="rm -rf ./build"),
|
||||
cc("user", tool_result="removed 3 files"),
|
||||
cc("user", tool_result="boom", is_error=True),
|
||||
])
|
||||
s = parse_claude_jsonl(p)
|
||||
assert [(t.role, t.text) for t in s.turns] == [("user", "please clean up"), ("assistant", "running it")]
|
||||
assert s.turns[0].date == "2026-07-14"
|
||||
assert [(c.name, c.command) for c in s.calls] == [("Bash", "rm -rf ./build")]
|
||||
assert [(r.is_error, r.text) for r in s.results] == [(False, "removed 3 files"), (True, "boom")]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claude_key_shape_and_change_on_growth(tmp_path):
|
||||
p = write_session(str(tmp_path), "proj", "sess", [cc("user", "hi")])
|
||||
k1 = claude_key(p)
|
||||
name, mtime, size = k1.split(":")
|
||||
assert name == "sess.jsonl" and int(size) == os.path.getsize(p) and mtime.isdigit()
|
||||
with open(p, "a") as f:
|
||||
f.write(cc("assistant", "more") + "\n")
|
||||
assert claude_key(p) != k1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claude_iter_includes_subagents_and_missing_root(tmp_path):
|
||||
write_session(str(tmp_path), "proj", "aaaaaaaa1111", [cc("user", "x")])
|
||||
write_session(str(tmp_path), "proj/aaaaaaaa1111/subagents", "agent-1", [cc("user", "y")])
|
||||
refs = list(iter_claude_code("claude-code", str(tmp_path)))
|
||||
assert sorted(r.short_id for r in refs) == ["aaaaaaaa", "agent-1"]
|
||||
assert list(iter_claude_code("claude-code", str(tmp_path / "nope"))) == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_opencode_parse(tmp_path):
|
||||
db = str(tmp_path / "opencode.db")
|
||||
con = oc_db(db)
|
||||
oc_session(con, "ses_f44d56513ffe8czutv5E", [
|
||||
("user", [{"type": "text", "text": "tidy the repo"},
|
||||
{"type": "text", "text": "<file contents>", "synthetic": True}]),
|
||||
("assistant", [
|
||||
{"type": "reasoning", "text": "thinking"},
|
||||
{"type": "text", "text": "I deleted the wrong folder"},
|
||||
{"type": "tool", "tool": "bash", "state": {"status": "completed", "input": {"command": "rm -rf data"},
|
||||
"output": "ok"}},
|
||||
{"type": "tool", "tool": "read", "state": {"status": "error", "input": {"filePath": "/x"},
|
||||
"error": "Traceback (most recent call last)"}},
|
||||
]),
|
||||
])
|
||||
con.close()
|
||||
[ref] = list(iter_opencode("opencode", str(tmp_path / "opencode*.db")))
|
||||
assert ref.short_id == "f44d5651"
|
||||
s = ref.load()
|
||||
assert [(t.role, t.text) for t in s.turns] == [("user", "tidy the repo"), ("assistant", "I deleted the wrong folder")]
|
||||
assert s.turns[0].date == "2026-07-14"
|
||||
assert [(c.name, c.command) for c in s.calls] == [("bash", "rm -rf data"), ("read", "")]
|
||||
assert [(r.is_error, r.text) for r in s.results] == [(False, "ok"), (True, "Traceback (most recent call last)")]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_opencode_key_changes_when_session_updates(tmp_path):
|
||||
db = str(tmp_path / "opencode.db")
|
||||
con = oc_db(db)
|
||||
oc_session(con, "ses_1", [("user", [{"type": "text", "text": "hi"}])])
|
||||
k1 = next(iter_opencode("opencode", db)).key
|
||||
con.execute("UPDATE session SET time_updated = time_updated + 5")
|
||||
con.commit()
|
||||
assert next(iter_opencode("opencode", db)).key != k1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_opencode_is_opened_read_only(tmp_path):
|
||||
db = str(tmp_path / "opencode.db")
|
||||
oc_db(db).close()
|
||||
con = open_readonly(db)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(sqlite3.OperationalError):
|
||||
con.execute("INSERT INTO session VALUES ('x','p',NULL,'s','/','t','v',1,1)")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_opencode_rejects_a_foreign_database(tmp_path):
|
||||
db = str(tmp_path / "opencode.db")
|
||||
sqlite3.connect(db).execute("CREATE TABLE unrelated (x)").connection.close()
|
||||
with pytest.raises(SourceError):
|
||||
list(iter_opencode("opencode", db))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
revision = 3
|
||||
requires-python = ">=3.11"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "ai-incidents"
|
||||
version = "1.0.0"
|
||||
source = { editable = "." }
|
||||
|
||||
[package.optional-dependencies]
|
||||
test = [
|
||||
{ name = "pytest" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[package.metadata]
|
||||
requires-dist = [{ name = "pytest", marker = "extra == 'test'", specifier = ">=7" }]
|
||||
provides-extras = ["test"]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "colorama"
|
||||
version = "0.4.6"
|
||||
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
|
||||
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/d8/53/6f443c9a4a8358a93a6792e2acffb9d9d5cb0a5cfd8802644b7b1c9a02e4/colorama-0.4.6.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:08695f5cb7ed6e0531a20572697297273c47b8cae5a63ffc6d6ed5c201be6e44", size = 27697, upload-time = "2022-10-25T02:36:22.414Z" }
|
||||
wheels = [
|
||||
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/d1/d6/3965ed04c63042e047cb6a3e6ed1a63a35087b6a609aa3a15ed8ac56c221/colorama-0.4.6-py2.py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:4f1d9991f5acc0ca119f9d443620b77f9d6b33703e51011c16baf57afb285fc6", size = 25335, upload-time = "2022-10-25T02:36:20.889Z" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "iniconfig"
|
||||
version = "2.3.0"
|
||||
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
|
||||
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/72/34/14ca021ce8e5dfedc35312d08ba8bf51fdd999c576889fc2c24cb97f4f10/iniconfig-2.3.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:c76315c77db068650d49c5b56314774a7804df16fee4402c1f19d6d15d8c4730", size = 20503, upload-time = "2025-10-18T21:55:43.219Z" }
|
||||
wheels = [
|
||||
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/cb/b1/3846dd7f199d53cb17f49cba7e651e9ce294d8497c8c150530ed11865bb8/iniconfig-2.3.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:f631c04d2c48c52b84d0d0549c99ff3859c98df65b3101406327ecc7d53fbf12", size = 7484, upload-time = "2025-10-18T21:55:41.639Z" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "packaging"
|
||||
version = "26.3"
|
||||
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
|
||||
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/7d/fa/3944b40b07da9ce895c0e6303a5ab7d53da063554f534556b134a54d6093/packaging-26.3.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:94edc256424af38762eb31306eed28beb9f0efc50a8837492c9d6fd6004aed79", size = 313412, upload-time = "2026-08-04T18:15:28.737Z" }
|
||||
wheels = [
|
||||
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/63/34/ba1c580383c9eada3711951fef0795c80b829a078d72188184bcab9dd527/packaging-26.3-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:d7193f7c8e4e93f444fde0262bf90af30e16fa0ad0ad44cb553c87339b23cd1c", size = 129956, upload-time = "2026-08-04T18:15:27.159Z" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "pluggy"
|
||||
version = "1.6.0"
|
||||
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
|
||||
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/f9/e2/3e91f31a7d2b083fe6ef3fa267035b518369d9511ffab804f839851d2779/pluggy-1.6.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:7dcc130b76258d33b90f61b658791dede3486c3e6bfb003ee5c9bfb396dd22f3", size = 69412, upload-time = "2025-05-15T12:30:07.975Z" }
|
||||
wheels = [
|
||||
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/54/20/4d324d65cc6d9205fabedc306948156824eb9f0ee1633355a8f7ec5c66bf/pluggy-1.6.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:e920276dd6813095e9377c0bc5566d94c932c33b27a3e3945d8389c374dd4746", size = 20538, upload-time = "2025-05-15T12:30:06.134Z" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "pygments"
|
||||
version = "2.21.0"
|
||||
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
|
||||
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/49/2e/ced460408999b33da6b31b0021b0f37d329e202d4169aeb164493778f25b/pygments-2.21.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:610ca751c9bc2492b38eb9a38a7fbc93edbbb2d7182edaf34e66ae493dee5c8c", size = 5005329, upload-time = "2026-08-17T08:02:48.824Z" }
|
||||
wheels = [
|
||||
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/71/46/17f022dd3e953bf20a04a028a21ec746d942f8d2af30fa0f124fa0e6a684/pygments-2.21.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:2363c69b61c4a97c838da3b130dcd6468f4848992b21a82f2a63ec34377137d9", size = 1250147, upload-time = "2026-08-17T08:02:44.912Z" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "pytest"
|
||||
version = "9.1.1"
|
||||
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
{ name = "colorama", marker = "sys_platform == 'win32'" },
|
||||
{ name = "iniconfig" },
|
||||
{ name = "packaging" },
|
||||
{ name = "pluggy" },
|
||||
{ name = "pygments" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/e4/47/b9efed96c114afcfa3c9d3fe98a76a1d14c74a9e266d397cf6eb64be5e01/pytest-9.1.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:1088fbde8f2b49d95a549a195707afa7a76a3ce9bcadc26b6d71f0ffda5fe313", size = 1636369, upload-time = "2026-06-19T10:58:32.857Z" }
|
||||
wheels = [
|
||||
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/24/25/1de2678b631f5a49215c6c96fff41ba892b0a34df68d6d80292b1b48aa7f/pytest-9.1.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:37a86b45efb9a47a61a36449063e8e18d0cab3161329fc099eb21783169c4f0c", size = 386536, upload-time = "2026-06-19T10:58:31.347Z" },
|
||||
]
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user